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MILITARY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUNCTION
RULE-MAKING UNDER THE APA
Arthur Earl Bonfield*

I.

INTRODUCTION

is an obvious need to conduct our governmental affairs
effectively. expeditiously. and inexpensively. No administrative
rule-making procedure is acceptable unless it fairly takes account of
this consideration. Consequently, procedural requirements that
unduly fetter agency action. or frustrate its purposes. are obvious!}
unwise. What is needed, therefore. is a system of rule-making that
will strike a sensible balance between the need for adequate public
participation in that process. and the need for efficient government.
In striking that balance. society's interest in involving affected members of the public in administrative rule-making at an early stage is
not so slight that it should be set aside solely on the basis of minor
inconvenience or expense to government.
Schemes meant to assure public participation in administrative
rule-making guarantee interested persons an opportunity to communicate their views and information to the relevant government
officials before the latter take final action on rules.1 This is desirable
for a number of reasons. Such participation helps to elicit from
those who are in the best position to provide it. the information
necessary for intelligent action by the agency making rules. A single
agency's accumulated knowledge and expertise are rarely sufficient
to provide all the data upon which rule-making decisions should
be based. Even if it has the relevant factual information. an agency's
view may be so myopic that outside feed-in is necessary to put the
information properly in perspective and to give it meaning.
Public participation in rule-making is important for another

T

HERE

• John Murray Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A. 1956, Brooklyn College;
J.D. 1960, LL.M. 1961, Yale University.-Ed.
This Article is based upon a report prepared by the author under the auspices
of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). The Conference, however, does not in any way approve it or evaluate its content, which is the sole respon•
sibility of the author. The Administrative Conference has not yet taken action of any
sort on this subject. The Conference was established by Congress in 1964 to study the
efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of federal administrative practices and procedures.
It is empowered to make recommendations for improvements in those procedures by
which the administrative bodies of our national government determine private rights
and obligations. See 5 u.s.c. §§ 571-76 (1970); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1970-71, at 394-95.
I. On the following three paragraphs, see Cramton, The Why, Where and How of
Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 527-30
(1972); Grossbaum, Procedural Fairness in Government Contracts: The Procurement
Regulations, 57 VA. L. REv. 171, 261-62 (1971).
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reason. Because agency staffs must synthesize the varying interests
and competing policies that are related to the scheme they are
charged with implementing, they cannot usually be relied upon to
present forcefully, on their own motion, the views of environmental,
consumer, minority, or other inadequately represented groups. And
some agencies may not be trusted to vindicate the public interest
without outside input because they may have been captured by those
whose interests they regulate or represent. Furthermore, absent an
ability of the concerned public to participate in the rule-making
process and thereby prod the agencies, officials satisfied with the status
quo may neglect to re-examine their positions in light of new views
or information that becomes available.
Through public participation, individuals can attempt to defend
themselves against an exercise of rule-making power that may be
detrimental to their interests and unwarranted or unnecessary. It
also is one of the most effective ways by which such decision-making
may be kept responsive to the wishes of the citizenry. Administrators
will probably be more responsive to commonly felt needs and desires if they must give interested people an opportunity to present
their views before rules are finally promulgated. After all, agencies
have an inducement to respond to the articulated needs of those who
provide input into the process. Response to those needs will earn
agencies the approbation of individuals or groups whose interests
may be advanced or protected by such official action. Moreover, in
some cases people may be less likely to sabotage a rule they dislike
if they have had an adequate opportunity to present their objections
to the relevant officials prior to its promulgation.
According to the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 2
the term "rule-making" means "agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule." 3 Another provision of the APA
provides:
"[R]ule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the
approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or
financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or
accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.4
2. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324-, 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06
(1970).
3. 5 u.s.c. § 551(5) (1970).
4-. 5 u.s.c. § 551(4-) (1970).
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The breadth of this statutory definition means that much may be
swept within the compass of the terms "rule" and "rule-making"
that might not, at first blush, ordinarily be deemed to constitute a
"rule" or "rule-making." That fact should be kept in mind throughout the remainder of this Article.
For example, whether or not they affect the public in any way,
day-to-day internal agency planning, operations, and administration
that culminate in a fixed policy of any sort, contingent or otherwise,
may be deemed "rule-making." The all-encompassing open-ended
language defining a "rule" as "an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization"
suggests the propriety of this conclusion. Nevertheless, much internal
agency planning, administration, or operations of this sort may not,
in the end, be treated as "rules" under the AP A despite this very
broad language, for a large portion of these activities would not traditionally have been considered "rule-making." 5 Indeed, a large part
of the internal activities described above could, instead, constitute a
sui generis species of unlabeled function not defined by the APA and
not meant to be within its ambit. The scope of the term "rule" used
in the APA may, therefore, be somewhat unclear at its fringes.
This Article, however, will proceed on the assumption that all
internal agency planning, administration, and operations culminating
in a fixed policy of any sort, contingent or otherwise, would be
deemed "rule-making" within the Act's literal language whether or
not they substantially affect the public. In subsequent discussion,
then, some things which arguably may not be "rule-making" will be
treated as such because of the open-ended, broad definition of "rule"
in the APA, and the negative implications that can be drawn from
existing exemptions in the rule-making section such as that for "general statements of policy" and that for "rules" relating to "agency
management or personnel."6 By clearly assuming that all such planning, operations, and administration resulting in a fixed policy of
any sort are "rule-making" for purposes of this study, several possible
objections to, and difficulties with, the ultimate point of this entire
exercise may be avoided. As noted, however, this will be done with
5. Despite the breadth of language in section 551(4), that provision was not intended to convert into a rule anything not considered a rule prior to adoption of the
APA. The traditional distinction between rule-making and adjudication is, therefore,
continued under this provision despite the inclusion of the "or particular applicability" phrase or the potentially limitless scope of the definition. See generally 1 K.
DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.02 (1958).
6. 5 U .S.C. §§ 553(a)(2), (b)(A) (1970).
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the full recognition that, despite the broad statutory definition of
"rule," much of this kind of internal agency planning, operations,
and administration may be neither "rule-making" nor "adjudication"
and, therefore, entirely outside the intended scope of the APA.
To assure adequate public participation in rule-making, section
4 of the original Act, now section 553, provides mandatory procedures to be followed in all rule-making to which it applies. However, section 553(a) makes these procedures inapplicable "to the
extent that there is involved-(!) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts." The categorical exclusions from section 553 for rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts," have been investigated and found to be unjustified,7
with the result that the Administrative Conference of the United
States8 and the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar
Association9 have recommended that they be repealed. A bill has
been introduced in Congress to accomplish this result.10 In the
meantime, many federal agencies have voluntarily bound themselves
to ignore the exemptions from usual rule-making procedures for
rules relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. "11 No comprehensive study, however, has yet been undertaken
7. See Bonfield, Report of the Committee on Rulemaking in Support of Recommendation No. 16, in I ACUS, R.EcoMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 306 (1970).
8. Recommendation No. 16, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA
Rulemaking Requirements, in I ACUS, supra note 7, at 29 [hereinafter Recommendation No. 16].
9, Resolution No. 2, in Crowther, et al., Report to Council of Administrative Law
Section of Special Committee on Revision of Administrative Procedure Act S (ABA
1972) [hereinafter Crowther]. See also 95 ABA, REPORTS 548 (1970), in which the House
of Delegates approved the recommendation that
amendments should be enacted to the AJ!A in order to assure: Broadening the
coverage of provisions for notice and opportunity for public participation in
rulemaking where formal procedures are not required by limiting, in appropriate instances, exemptions now included in the Administrative Procedure Act so
far as it may be done without occasioning delay or expense disproportionate to
the public interest.
10. S. 1413, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also 116 CONG, R.Ec. 6478-79 (1970) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
11. See 29 P. &: F. Ad. L. Newsletter, 2d Ser., No. 2, Sept. 21, 1971, at l (Department
of the Treasury, Department of Labor, Federal Home Loan Bank Board); 36 Fed. Reg.
2532 (1971) (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare); id. at 4291-92 (Department of Housing and Urban Development); id. at 8336-37 (Department of the Interior); id. at 1!!804 (Department of Agriculture); id. at 16716 (Small Business
Administration); letter from Donald Johnson to Senator James Eastland, Jan. 24,
1972 (Veterans' Administration). See also 30 P. &: F. Ad. L. Newsletter, 2d Ser., No. 2,
Feb. 22, 1972, at 91 (Veterans' Administration). See generally ACUS, 1971-72 R.EPoRT
(1972): "About 20 departments or agencies have published rules or policy statements
which commit the agency to the use of notice and comment rulemaking procedures
in these areas."
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with respect to the other section 553(a) categorical exemptions from
the rule-making provision of the federal APA-the exemption for
rule-making involving a "military or foreign affairs function," and
the exemption for rule-making "relating to agency management or
personnel." Only the former exemption will be the subject of this
Article.12
The question that will be considered here is whether the particular exemption from section 553 for rule-making involving a "military
or foreign affairs function" is justified and should be continued.
As noted earlier, strong reasons favor public participation in the
administrative rule-making process. This exemption may, therefore,
be justified only insofar as it is narrowly tailored to preserve, in a
degree related to their comparative importance, other important
conflicting public interests. Exemptions from an obligation otherwise imposed on agencies to implement public participation in
rule-making should be countenanced only to the extent to which
they are necessary to preserve other values of equal or greater
significance.
II.

THE EXEMPTION

AND

SECTION 553

Section 553(b)-(d) attempts to assure that the public has an
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rule-making process.
More specifically, section 553(b) requires that an agency contemplating the issuance of a substantive rule13 must publish a notice in the
Federal Register of the proposed rule-making, indicating the time,
place, and nature of the public rule-making proceedings, and a
statement of the specific legal authority under which the rule is
proposed.14 The agency must include either the actual provisions
12. The desirability of the various exclusions of 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970) would
seem most feasibly and wisely ascertained by a separate analysis of each. The exclusions of section 553(a)(l) will, therefore, be examined as isolated, operable entities in
order to determine whether they are independently justified. In doing so, this Article
will proceed as if the "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" exclusion
had been repealed, and as if the elimination of subsection (a)(l) would automatically
subject that rule-making now excluded by it to the strictures of section 553, subject
only to other existing exemptions found in that provision.
13. Section 553(b)(A) expressly exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from the notice requirements. See DEl'T. OF JusnCE, ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE AnMINISTRA•
TIVE PROCEDURE Ac:r 30 (1947) [hereinafter ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL], which states
that this restricts the application of the notice and participation requirements in what
is now 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1970) "to substantive rules issued pursuant to statutory
authority," citing SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AnMINI5rRATIVE PROCEDURE Ac:r:
LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1947) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HisroRY].
14. The House Report on the APA stated: "The required specification of legal
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of the proposed rule, or a summary statement of the subjects or
issues to which they relate. The notice "must be sufficient to fairly
apprise interested parties of the issues involved, so that they may
present responsive data or arguments relating thereto" as they are
entitled to do under section 553(c).15 The agency also has the option
of dispensing with such publication if the notice requirement is
functionally satisfied because all "persons subject thereto are named
and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof
in accordance with Iaw."16
After giving notice, agencies are required by section 553(c) to
accord interested persons a chance to participate in the particular
rule-making "through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." In practice the procedure utilized
may take a variety of forms: informal hearings (with or without a
stenographic transcript), conferences, consultation with industry committees, submission of written views, or any combination of these.
. . . In each case, the selection of the procedure to be followed will
depend largely on the nature of the rules involved. The objective
should be to assure informed administrative action and adequate
protection to private interests.17
It must be reiterated, however, that the statutory opportunity to
submit "written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation" states only "the minimum requirement ..•
of public rule making procedure."18
An agency must review the materials presented to it in the course
of public rule-making proceedings, and include in any rules resulting
from this process a statement of their basis and purpose. "The agency
must analyze and consider all relevant matter presented. The required statement of the basis and purpose of rules issued should not
authority must be done with particularity. Statements of issues in the general statutory
language of legislative delegations of authority to the agency would not be a compliance with the section." LEGISLATIVE HrsroRY, supra note 13, at 258.
15. Id. at 200, 258. See also California Citizens Band Assn. v. United States, 375
F.2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1967) (notice of rule-making is sufficient if it provides a description of subjects and issues involved, and agency is not required to publish every
precise proposal which it may ultimately adopt as a rule).
16. 5 u.s.c. § 553(b) (1970).
17. ArroRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 31. The legislative history indicates that section 553(c) "leaves agencies free to choose from the several common
types of informal public rule making procedures, the simplest of which is to permit
interested persons to submit written views or data ••••" LEGISLATIVE HrsroRY, supra
note 13, at 19.
18. LEGISLATIVE HrsroRY, supra note 13, at 200, 259 (emphasis added).
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only relate to the data so presented but with reasonable fullness
explain the actual basis and objectives of the rule.''19 Nevertheless, it
is clear that the statute "does not require the formulation of rules
upon the exclusive basis of any 'record' made in informal rule-making proceedings.''20 However, where statutes require a particular
kind of rule to "be made on the record after an opportunity for an
agency hearing," 21 other provisions of the AP A outlining more
formal hearing requirements will govern that proceeding instead
of these informal section 553 provisions;22 and in such a case, the
rule must be made on the formal "record" so adduced.
According to section 553(b)(B) neither the advance notice nor
public participation requirements outlined above apply in those
cases where "the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the
finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules
issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." This provision will
be discussed in more detail later in this Article.
In addition to general notice of proposed regulations, and an
opportunity for interested persons to communicate their views
thereon to the relevant government officials, adequate public participation in the rule-making process also requires that the exact terms
of a new rule be published a reasonable time before its effective date.
Otherwise, even if the public has participated in the preliminary
formulation of a rule, the final details of its text may not be known
to interested parties until the date of its promulgation as law. As a
result, a procedure for delayed effectiveness is necessary "to correct
error or oversight in regulations before, rather than after, they
become effective.''23 Such a safeguard will "afford persons affected
a reasonable time to prepare for the effective date of a rule or rules
or to take any other action which the issuance of the rules may
prompt."24
A further requirement may, therefore, be found in section 553(d)
relating to the time period that agencies must allow between the pro19. Id. at 201, 259.
20. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 31, citing Hearings on S. 674,
S. 675 and S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 444 (1941) [hereinafter 1911 Hearings], which is limited authority for
the otherwise sound conclusion of the Manual on this point because the testimony
referred to is that of only a single person, Commissioner Aitcheson of the ICC.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 55!1(c) (1970).
22. 5 u.s.c. §§ 556-57 (1970).

23.

ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMI'ITEE ON .Al>MINISl'RATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT

114 (1941).
24. LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY,

supra note 13, at 201, 259.
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mulgation of a substantive rule and its effective date. It states that
the required publication of a substantive rule under section 552, the
freedom-of-information provision of the Act, must be made at least
thirty days prior to its effective date.25 It is clear that the thirty-day
notice provision is applicable even where the public rule-making
procedures of section 553(b)-(c) are not because they are found to
be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."26
Exceptions are provided to this time requirement, however, for
those situations in which the substantive rule "grants or recognizes
an exemption or relieves a restriction."27 An exemption is also
provided where the agency decides, "for good cause found and published with the rule," 28 that a minimum thirty-day period between
the time of a rule's publication and its taking effect is unnecessary.
This last exemption will also be discussed in more detail later in
this Article.
All of the above requirements-advance public notice of rulemaking, opportunity to submit views, and delayed effectiveness of
rules-are applicable only to substantive rules and not to rules of
agency procedure.29 Nor are any of the above requirements applicable
to "interpretative rules [or] general statements of policy."30 A report
written under the auspices of the Administrative Conference of the
United States examined the justification for the latter two exemptions and found their continuation justified.81 The Conference itself,
however, has taken no official action on the subject of that report.
Meaningful public participation in the rule-making process would
25. See AlTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 36:
The discussion on section [553(d)l in the reports of both the Senate and House
Committees on the Judiciary makes clear the phrase "The required publication
or service of any substantive rule" does not relate back or refer to the publication of "general notice of proposed rule making'' required by section [553(b)]:
rather it is a requirement that substantive rules which must be published in the
Federal Register (see section [552(a)(l)(D)]) shall be so published at least thirty
days prior to their effective date.
The language of section 553(d) does, of course, lend itself readily to the opposite construction, but it seems to have been construed only in the manner suggested by the
Attorney General's Manual. See, e.g., Lansden v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1948).
See also CoMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 160 (1955). The congressional
discussion referred to may be found in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 201, 259.
26. LEGISLATIVE HISToRY, supra note Ill, at 200-01, 259.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(l) (1970).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1970).
29. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A), 553(d) (1970).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1970). See also 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2) (1970).
31. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of
Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L
REv. 101 (1971).
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also seem to demand recognition of another administrative obligation
and private right. Interested parties should be able, on their own
motion, to induce a reasoned consideration of the propriety of the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule by those authorized to make
and modify rules. Otherwise, administrators satisfied with the status
quo might neglect to re-examine their position in light of new views
or information that becomes available. A right to petition is not only
valuable as a protection for private interests, but is also necessary
to assure sound government. It forces agencies to reconsider their
position on existing or proposed rules in light of petitioners' objections, and therefore makes it more likely that wise policies will be
pursued.
Section 553(e) insists, therefore, that even if the notice, public
participation, and delayed effectiveness requirements of section 553
(b)-(d) are not applicable because they come within the "good cause"
exceptions noted earlier, every agency must give interested persons
"the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule"-substantive or otherwise. It seems clear, however, that the
filing of such a petition does not itself require an agency to engage in
a public rule-making proceeding on that subject.82 All the agency
must do is to act on the petition in accordance with the procedures
it has promulgated under other provisions of the APA.88 The agency
may, of course, either grant such a petition, undertake public rulemaking proceedings in relation to it, or deny the petition. The chief
practical significance of this express right-to-petition requirement
seems to be that the denial of a section 553(e) petition calls into play
the provisions of section 555(e),84 which insist that
[p]rompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of
a written application, petition, or other request of an interested
person . . . . Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial
is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial.
No mention has yet been made of the exemptions contained in
section 553(a) for rule-making that involves "a military or foreign
affairs function," a "matter relating to agency management or personnel," or a matter relating to "public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts." The language of section 553(a) operates to
32. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 38; LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra
note 13, at 201, 260.
33. 5 u.s.c. §§ 552(a}(l}(B)-(C) (1970); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 260.
34. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 39, citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 201, 260,
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exclude entirely, and without qualification, all rule-making in the
categories enumerated therein from every provision of section 553
(b)-(e). Consequently, in no case are any of the requirements imposed
on administrative agencies by the provisions previously discussed
applicable to these specifically exempted classes of rule-making. This
means, for example, that unless some other statute specifically directs
the contrary,35 agencies making rules involving a "military or foreign
affairs function" of the United States are never obliged as a matter
of law to (I) publish notice of proposed rule-making in the Federal
Register according to the specifications of section 553(b); (2) give
interested persons a chance to participate in the formulation of
rules through submission of views or data, according to the terms of
section 553(c); (3) publish substantive rules at least thirty days
before their effective date as required by section 553(d); or (4) give
interested persons "the right to petition for issuance, amendment or
repeal of a rule," according to the terms of section 553(e).36
The blanket section 553(a) provisions make no allowance whatsoever for the possibility that rules involving the excluded subjects
may differ in their need to be exempted from one or more of the
requirements of subsections (b)-(e). That is, section 553(a) does not
recognize the possibility that certain rule-making involving a "military or foreign affairs function" may need to be exempted from some
of the subsection (b)-(e) requirements, and not from others. Similarly, this exclusionary provision does not recognize that certain
rule-making within its terms may need exemption from all of those
requirements and other such rule-making from none of them.
The exemptions currently found in section 553(a) obviously proceed upon the assumption that as to the exempt categories of subjects
one can make an across-the-board judgment. The policies favoring
public participation in rule-making are outweighed by the consequences of subjecting these particular categories of rule-making to
the requirements of subsections (b)-(e), or by the consequences of
utilizing a more flexible approach to determine whether in any
given case rule-making in these categories should be subjected to
those requirements. In this Article, the validity of the assumption
35. Another statute will control if it directs that certain kinds of rules relating,
for example, to loans, grants, or benefits be made in accordance with the requirements
of section 553(b)-(e). See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970). This conclusion is supported by a
statement made during the congressional hearings on the APA: "These exceptions
would not, of course, relieve any agency from requirements imposed by other statutes." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 199.
36. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 39; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 199, 257.
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underlying section 553(a) must be carefully examined and tested with
respect to the particular section 553(a)(l) exemption for rule-making
involving a "military or foreign affairs function." As noted earlier,
such an assumption has already been rejected with respect to rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts."
When rule-making is excepted from the requirements of section
553(b)-(e) by section 553(a), agencies may use any rule-making procedure they please unless, of course, another statute specifies otherwise. This means that with respect to rule-making involving a
"military or foreign affairs function," it is completely up to the
agency to decide whether there shall be any public participation in
rule-making at all. And if the agency decides that some such participation is desirable, it may determine the form or extent of that
participation.
The legislative history of the AP A indicates that none of the
blanket introductory exemptions from the section
is to be taken as encouraging agencies not to adopt voluntary public
rulemaking procedures where useful to the agency or beneficial to
the public. The exceptions merely confer a complete discretion upon
agencies to decide what, if any, public rulemaking procedures they
will adopt in a given situation within their terms.8 7

In practice, however, most agencies do not usually exercise their
discretion to follow the requirements of section 553(b)-(e) when
they are not bound to do so because the rule-making involves a
"military or foreign affairs function." A survey distributed under
the auspices of the Rulemaking Committee of the Administrative
Conference of the United States during the summer of 1969 asked
each federal agency:
Does your department or agency follow the procedures specified by
§ 553(b)-(e) for any rulemaking exempted from those provisions by
§ 553(a)(l)-(2)? If it does, list the particular kinds of rulemaking
exempted by § 553(a)(l)-(2). Explain. Also list the frequency with
which it voluntarily follows those requirements for such exempted
rulemaking, and the specific circumstances under which it does so.

Responses to this question by those agencies reporting that they
make rules involving a "military or foreign affairs function" 88 reveal
37. LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 199, 257.
38. Agencies that responded to the 1969 Survey and indicated specifically that they
made rules of the sort covered by the "military or foreign affairs function" exemption
were the Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Federal Power Commission, Post Office Department,
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a pattern with respect to such rule-making. The subsection (a)(l)
exclusion of these specified types of rule-making from the mandatory
procedural terms of section 553(b)-(e) means that most rule-making
of this sort will not be conducted according to these procedures.89
And while a number of agencies indicated that they engaged in a
contrary practice with respect to some rules involving a "military
or foreign affairs function," 40 such rule-making seems to account for
only a small portion of the regulations of this type.
The procedures actually utilized by administrators with respect
to regulations involving a "military or foreign affairs function" are
usually inadequate substitutes for those found in section 553(b)-(e).
The I 969 Survey asked reporting agencies:
What rulemaking procedures does your department or agency use
in those cases where its rulemaking is exempted by § 553(a)(l)-(2)
from the requirements of § 553(b)-(e) and it does not choose, in its
and Treasury Department. The State Department must obviously be added to this
group, but a questionnaire response from that agency has not yet been received.
39. Consider, for example, the following responses: Atomic Energy Com.mission"The AEC does not follow the procedures specified by [section] 553(b)-(e) for the rulemaking described above, which is exempted from such procedures."; Department of
Agriculture (Food for Peace Program)-"[TJhere is no formal published procedure for
such rulemaking."; Department of Commerce (Domestic and International Business
Bureau)-"No."; Department of Defense-"No."; Post Office Department-does not
follow those procedures with respect to rules relating to international mail service
or military mail service; Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control)
-"does not follow the procedures specified by section 553(b)-(e) for any rulemaking
exempted from those provisions by section 553(a).''; Department of the Treasury
(Bureau of Accounts and Treasurer's Office)-"No.''
See also HOUSE COMM. ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., Isr SESS., SURVEY
AND STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRAcrICE IN THE FEDERAL
AGENCIES (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter 1957 HOUSE SURVEY], pt. 3 (Department of
Defense), at 267, 277, 324, 332, 3.47; pt. 9 (Department of State), at 931 ("The Education
Exchange Service does not afford direct public participation when not required by
statute.''), 944 (The Office of Special Consular Service "has not afforded public participation in rulemaking when not required by statute to do so.'), 946 (The Passport
Office "does not use advisory groups or invite public participation in rulemaking.'),
951 ("Inasmuch as the publication of visa regulations is considered to be a foreign
affairs function and, therefore, to be exempt from the requirement of general notice
of proposed rulemaking, this Office has not established any procedure whereby interested parties may formally present their views and briefs.').
40. The following agencies responded with respect to the indicated programs that
they usually did not rely on the section 553(a)(l) exemptions: Department of Agriculture (Regulatory Division)-Regulations under the Defense Production Act of 1950,
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-168 (1970), and Regulations under the plant and auimal
quarantine acts; Department of Commerce (Office of Direct Foreign Investments)Regulations under Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-39 (1970); Federal Power Commission-Regulations relating to export and import of electricity and
natural gas, and construction, operation, or maintenance of certain energy facilities on
the borders of the United States; Department of the Treasury-Regulations under
treaties or the Internal Revenue Code dealing with international tax affairs. See also
1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers), at 286.
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discretion, to follow§ 553(b)-(e)? Be as specific as possible. Include a
concrete example of each of the different kinds of rulemaking procedures utilized by your department or agency when it does not follow § 553(b)-(e) because the rulemaking involved is exempted by
§ 553(a)(l)-(2).

Responses indicate that substitute procedures are not always consistent and frequently do not assure adequate notice to affected parties
and a sufficient opportunity for their participation. In some cases
involving rules of the type under consideration here, the agencies
simply determine the rule they think appropriate and promulgate it,
without first notifying or consulting with anyone outside of government.41 In other such cases agencies give notice to, and engage in
informal consultation with, whomever they deem appropriate under
the circumstances.42
41. E.g., Atomic Energy Commission-"AEC staff recommendations are presented to
the Commissioners. These recommendations are then approved, disapproved, or ap•
proved with modifications. If approved, they are promulgated as rules."; Department
of Commerce (Domestic and International Business Bureau)-The Bureau simply
"[p]repares the rule or regulation in the form prescribed by the Federal Register and
has it published in the register."; Treasury Department (Bureau of Accounts and
Treasurer's Office)When rulemaking involving one of the parts under consideration is exempted
by [section] 553(a)(l)·(2), the Department publishes in the Federal Register the
text of the revision or amendment of the part, prefaced by an introductory state•
ment of the purpose therefor and of the specific exemption under which it has
been determined that notice and public procedure thereon are unnecessary, with
a statement of the immediate or soon impending effective date of the revision or
amendment and the authority therefor. The foregoing procedure is used in all
cases of rulemaking exempted by [section] 553(a)(l)-(2).
See also 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 292
(Administration of the Resettlement Acts: "Public participation in the formulation of
these regulations is not considered necessary or desirable."); pt. 9 (Department of
State), at 946 (The Passport Office "does not use advisory groups or invite public participation in rulemaking.").
42. For example, the Department of Defense responded that "in the writing and
coordination of [exempted] regulations affecting a segment of the public the suggestions
and views of that segment are sometimes sought." Elsewhere it noted with respect
to exempted regulations:
[Such] regulations are promulgated in the Department of Defense in accordance
with a concept of staff responsibility. Therefore, responsibility of initiating, drafting, and issuing regulations lies with the staff agency primarily concerned with the
subject matter of the proposed regulation. Almost all proposed regulations are
staffed internally for comment by any organizational entity within the Department
of Defense that has an official concern with its subject matter. On appropriate
occasion, the views of other Executive Branch departments are also obtained.
Modifications in the proposed "rule" are made to meet objections and suggestions
for improvement. Unresolved disagreements between staff elements on the content
of a regulation are normally forwarded to the approval authority for the regulation, with recommendations for the resolution of the disagreement through a policy
decision on the point or points in issue.
The initiation of a regulation or a regulation change is frequently stimulated
by criticism, objections, or suggestions by members of Congress, the information
media, or the public at large.
Responses from other agencies include: Department of Agriculture (Foreigu Agriculture and Special Programs Divisions)-"The Department, in connection with such
rulemaking, seeks advice from advisory committees composed of representatives of
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Of course, some credit should be given to the appropriate agencies
for those cases in which they do utilize section 553 procedures for
the exempted rule-making, or use substitute procedures that in fact
assure adequate notice to affected parties and a sufficient opportunity
for their participation. However, the procedures actually utilized for
much of the rule-making involving a "military or foreign affairs
function" often result in the following undesirable consequence: persons who should be apprised of such proposed rule-making, and be
given an opportunity to participate therein, are not so apprised, or
afforded an adequate chance to communicate their views. To the
extent that this occurs without a justification sufficient to warrant
that result, it should not be tolerated. As noted previously, the reasons supporting the section 553(b)-(e) requirements for public participation in rule-making are very compelling. The potential damage
to sound government policy formulation and to private rights is great
in any case where such participation is not assured. The scope and
importance of the subsection (a)(l) exemption under examination
here and the specific reasons advanced for its existence must, therefore, be examined with special care.
III.

THE SCOPE AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF
THE SECTION 553(a)(l) EXEMPTION
A.

Generally

A few general comments should be made about the linguistic
form in which subsection (a)(l) is cast. By its terms, section 553(a)(l)
only excludes rule-making from section 553(b)-(e) "to the extent
that there is involved ... a military or foreign affairs function of the
United States." The legislative history emphasizes the "to the extent" language, stating that section 553(a) exemptions "apply only
various segments of the public affected by specific programs and, on occasion, consults
with representatives of affected members of the public."; Post Office Department"Rulemaking by negotiation [with foreign governments] is used most frequently in
international postal matters, [and with the Department of Defense] in developing regulations for postal service to the Armed Forces."; Department of the Treasury"Wherever possible, it is the practice of the Office of Foreign Assets Control to hold
informal consultations with interested groups or persons before the issuance of rules
changing aspects of the Control."
See also 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 951 (In
lieu of adherence to section 553 procedures "it has been the practice of the [visa] office
to confer with representatives of other public agencies as well as private voluntary
agencies, and to solicit their comments on proposed regulations. In addition, representatives of the Visa Office meet periodically with representatives of the private voluntary agencies for the purpose of discussing specific visa problems and procedures."),
931 (In lieu of adherence to section 553 the Education Exchange Service consults with
the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the Advisory Commission.).
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'to the extent' that the excepted subject matter is clearly and directly
involved."43 This suggests that where an agency makes some rules
that come within these introductory exemptions and some rules
that do not, it may ignore the procedures of subsections (b)-(e)
in the former cases but must follow them in the latter. Even a single
scheme of proposed regulations must abide by this principle if it is
practically divisible into particular provisions that involve the excluded functions and ones that do not. The report of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on the bill that was to become the
Administrative Procedure Act stated that the proposed legislation
has avoided the mistake of attempting to over-simplify the measure.
It has therefore not hesitated to state functional classifications and
exceptions where those could be rested upon firm grounds. In so
doing, it has been the undeviating policy to deal with types of functions as such and in no case with administrative agencies by name.
Thus certain war and defense functions are exempted, hut not the
War or Navy Departments in the performance of their functions.44

Every federal agency is, therefore, exempted from the usual
section 553 requirements to the extent that it performs the listed
functions. Drafters of the statute stated that "[w]here one agency has
shmvn that some particular operation should be exempted from any
particular requirement, the same function in all agencies has been
exempted."45 Moreover, the particular purpose or effect of the rules
involving either of the excepted functions under examination is
irrelevant since all such regulation-making is excepted from section
553 by subsection (a)(l).
On the other hand, rule-making is arguably not exempt under
subsection (a)(l) unless it "directly" or "clearly and directly" relates
to the excluded subject matter.46 This language drawn from the
43. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 257. See also id. at 199.
44. Id. at 191. See also id. at 13, reporting a comment made on an earlier draft
of the APA:
It is suggested that all functions of the War and Navy Departments as well as of
the Army and Navy should be exempted. However, since the bill relates to functions rather than agencies, it would seem better to define functions. All departments may, and often do, exercise civil and regulatory powers which should be
subject to an administrative procedure statute.
This seems to be the position adopted by Congress when it finally enacted the APA.
45. Id. at 250.
46. Id. at 199, 257. "Directly" is the language from the Senate Report on the APA,
and "clearly and directly'' from the House Repon. See also AnoRNEY GENERAL'S MAN•
UAL, supra note 13, at 26:
The exemption for military and naval functions is not limited to activities of the
War and Navy Departments but covers all military and naval functions exercised
by any agency. Thus, the exemption applies to the defense functions of the Coast
Guard and to the function of the Federal Power Commission under section 202(c)
of the Federal Power Act [16 U.S.C. § 824a{c) (1970)].
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statute's legislative history suggests that rule-making only indirectly
or tangentially related to the exempted functions is not to be treated
as within the exemptions, and that close cases should be treated as
outside the exemption. There are additional strong reasons to construe the introductory exceptions narrowly, and to resolve close
cases by treating them as outside the intended scope of the "military
and foreign affairs function" exclusion. Most important is the fact
that the subsection (a)(l) exemptions are cast in the form of broad,
unqualified exceptions to provisions implementing an important general governmental policy favoring public participation in rulemaking. Each of these usually operative provisions individually
contain special, detailed exemptions for peculiar cases. In addition, a
principal reason for the enactment of the APA was to secure some
standardization of administrative procedure.47 Exceptions from any
of its provisions should, therefore, usually be construed narrowly to
achieve that result.
Narrow construction of these exemptions is further supported by
the statute's legislative history. The Senate and House Reports on
the APA specifically stated that the "foreign affairs function" exemption, for example, "is not to be loosely interpreted. " 48 This led one
commentator to suggest that "Congress intended general application
of the APA, subject only to individual instances of exemption when
foreign affairs functions become implicated in particular proceedings. "49 Our prior discussion may also suggest that despite the usual
presumption of administrative regularity, 50 the burden of proving
that particular agency rule-making is exempted from section 553
because it involves a "military or foreign affairs function" should be
on the agency. That this is so as a matter of law, however, is less
than clear. We will return to this subject again later.
Significantly, this exemption from usual rule-making requirements only attaches "to the extent there is involved . . . a military
or foreign affairs function." This seems a narrower exemption than
that found in section 553(a)(2) for rule-making wherein "there is involved ... a matter relating to agency management or personnel or
47. McFarland, Analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in THE
Ac:r AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 16, 22 (G.
Warren ed. 1947) [hereinafter G. WARREN]. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 41 (1950). See also LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 187, 249.
48. LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 199, 257.
49. Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the Control of Direct Foreign Investment, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1970).
50. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 5, § 11.06; I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 355,
360 (1965).
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to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." An attempt
to minimize the significance of the additional "relating to" language
in subsection (a)(2) of the statute can be made by arguing that there
is little if any difference between rule-making where there is "involved" a certain stipulated matter and rule-making where there is
"involved ... a matter relating to" that stipulated matter. Since there
is ordinarily a difference in meaning between these phrases, and the
inclusion of the phrase "relating to" in subsection (a)(2) is unnecessary except as a contrast to subsection (a)(l) in which it is omitted, a
conclusion that the usage only constitutes a choice of style and does
not affect content seems difficult to accept. The lesson to be drawn
from this would seem to be in accord with the legislative history
referred to earlier. Only rule-making "directly" and intimately involving a "military or foreign affairs function" is meant to be exempted from usual rule-making procedures.
Nevertheless, the language of the section 553(a)(l) exemption is
very broad. The functions excluded are written in terms easily
susceptible to wide application. The following discussion will, therefore, attempt to state the main thrust of each of the section 553(a)(l)
exclusions and to provide examples of rule-making they may be
deemed to exclude. 51 One last point is relevant, however, to any
effort to define the scope of these exemptions with precision.
Rule-making exempted by the "military and foreign affairs
function" provision of section 553(a)(l) overlaps to a considerable
extent with the rule-making also exempted from section 553 by the
"agency management or personnel, or public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts" provision of section 533(a)(2). Consider, for
example, rule-making with respect to Department of Defense property used in military functions. Rule-making of that sort is exempted
from section 553 by both the "military function" exclusion of section
553(a)(l) and the "public property" exclusion of section 553(a)(2).
An overlap also exists between the "military function" exemption
51. Data with respect to the manner in which administrators actually construe these
exemptions in their everyday affairs have been obtained from the 1969 Survey. One
question asked:
What rulemaking does your department or agency engage in that is exempted
from the requirements of §§ 553(b)-(e) by §§ 553(a)(l)-(2)? Be as specific as possible
by listing the particular programs you administer whose rulemaking is exempt, and
for each such program the particular part or parts of §§ 553(a)(l)-(2) under which it
is exempted. Where some rulemaking for a particular progam is exempt and some
not, indicate which kinds of rulemaking for that program are exempt and which
kinds are not. Very briefly describe the purpose of each such exempted or partially-exempted program and provide citations to the statutes under which it
is administered.
Most of the illustrations of exempted rule-making used in the following section are
drawn from the questionnaire responses.
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and the "foreign affairs function" exemption, since many military
operations of our government are intimately related to, and a part
of, the nation's foreign affairs program. A consequence of this overlap is that there has been little pressure on the agencies concerned
or on the courts to define the precise scope of the "military function"
exemption, for example, as an exclusion with operative effect distinguishable and distinct from the exemptions for "agency management or personnel," "public property," "contracts," or "foreign
affairs."
When the Department of Defense was asked what proportion of
its procurement regulations came under each separable exemptive
portion of section 553(a)(l)-(2), it replied:
It would be very difficult to allocate the proportion of procurement
regulations assignable to each of the categories of this question. In
a fundamental sense [however] all regulations and directives of the
Department are incident to its essentially military function of national defense. 62
The Department answered in this manner despite the fact that such
procurement regulations are also obviously exempt from section 553
as a "matter relating to public ... contracts" under subsection (a)(2).
Similarly, the United States Navy Judge Advocate General has stated
with respect to the Department of the Navy that "matters of agency
management and personnel are, in the case of this Department, 'military functions'" and that "[t]hose regulations specifically commanded
of the Secretary of the Navy by Statute fall easily into either the
exception for military functions or the one for agency management
or personnel ...." 63
Since the overlap between the various section 553(a) exemptions
has resulted in a conspicuous absence of authoritative constructions
of each of them as separate entities, the following effort to state
the main thrust of the "military function" exemption and the
"foreign affairs function" exemption is to some extent speculative.
After an examination of the legislative history and the language of
each exemption, some possible rules of construction will be suggested
by which their individual scope may be defined. Illustrations of rulemaking arguably within the ambit of each exemption will then be
supplemented by an analysis of the exclusion's significance, measured
in terms of its practical exemptive impact. For definitional purposes
the following discussion will assume that the particular exemptions
52. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 278.
53. 1969 Smvey Response (Department of Defense).
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under examination are exclusive; their scope will be examined without regard to the fact that some rule-making within their ambit
may also be exempt under other portions of section 553(a).
B. "Military Function"

Rule-making is exempted by subsection (a)(l) from the requirements of section 553(b)-(e) "[t]o the extent that there is involved ...
a military . . . function of the United States." It should be emphasized that section 553(a)(l) does not exempt all rule-making to
the extent the "military" is involved. What is exempted, rather, is
rule-making that implicates "military functions." Rule-making involving any "function" that is "military" is entirely excluded from
the requirements of the rule-making provision. Whosoever performs
the "function" that is "military" is exempt to the extent of that
performance. Obviously, there is a substantial difference between an
exemption for rule-making "clearly and directly" involving the "military," and an exemption for rule-making "clearly and directly"
involving a "military function." As noted earlier, the legislative
history of the statute demonstrates that this distinction was fully
understood and relied upon in drafting the APA. The drafters intended to deal with "types of functions as such and in no case with
administrative agencies by name. " 54
The term "military" is defined by Websters as "of or relating
to, soldiers, arms, or war ... belonging to, engaged in, or appropriate
to the affairs of war ... performed or made by armed forces." 155
Random House defines military as "of, for, or pertaining to the
army, armed forces, affairs of war, or a state of war" or "of or pertaining to soldiers . . . performed by soldiers . • . befitting, characteristic of, or noting a soldier."56 The term "function" may be
defined as "the action for which a person or thing is specially fitted,
used, or responsible or for which a thing exists: The activity appropriate to the nature or position of a person or thing." "Function"
signifies the "acts, activity, or operations expected of a person or
thing by virtue of his or its nature, structure, status, or position. " 51
The definitional problem comes to this. The term "military
function" might encompass rule-making "clearly and directly" involved in (I) matters specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected
54. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 191. See also id. at 13.
55. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1433 (1966) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S].
56. R.ANnoM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 909 (1966),
57. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 920-21,
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of the armed forces in light of their peculiar nature and qualifications, or (2) matters specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected
of war and preparation for war generally; or it might encompass
both. Some things "clearly" expected of, appropriate to, or specially
fitted for war or preparation for war would not be "clearly" expected
of, appropriate to, or specially fitted for the armed forces as such;
and some things "clearly" expected of, appropriate to, or specially
fitted for the armed forces would not be considered as such for war
or preparation for war. For example, it may be argued that national
rationing is "directly" involved in, specially fitted for, and appropriate to the waging of war. Yet, the armed forces are not specially
suited, by their peculiar nature and qualifications, to create or
administer such a program; nor is it "clearly" an appropriate activity
for the armed forces as such.
There is some reason to argue that the term "military function"
was used exclusively in the first sense noted above. Congress could
have, had it so intended, used the term "war function" or "national
defense function," rather than "military function," if it wished to
indicate unambiguously a broader range of rule-making activity to
be exempted than that usually expected of, or deemed peculiarly
appropriate to the armed forces. Furthermore, the more colloquial use
of the term "military" probably denotes something related to the
armed forces rather than something related to war or preparation for
war generally.
In construing the term "military function," of what relevance, if
any, is the fact that section 551(1) (F)-(H) specifically exempts from
the entire APA "courts martial and military commissions," "military
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory," and functions conferred under a number of enumerated
statutes relating to war and national defense matters?58 Do these express exclusions from the entire Act suggest anything about the precise scope of the exemptions for matters involving a "military function" found in both the rule-making and the adjudication provisions?59 Some clues may be drawn from a more complete excursion
into the legislative history of the APA.
A provision in an earlier draft of the APA would have expressly
excluded from almost the entire Act "war and defense functions"
arising out of the Second World War, and scheduled to terminate
shortly thereafter. The provision (section 13) stated:
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 55l(l)(F)·(H) (1970).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (1970).
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Except as to the requirements of section 3 [the freedom of information section], there shall be excluded from the operation of
this Act war and defense functions which by law expire on the termination of present hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter,
or before July I, 1947, as well as those conferred by the following:
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940; Contract Settlement Act
of 1944; Surplus Property Act of 1944 [and so forth]. 60
This section was to be in addition to the specific "military function"
exemptions from the rule-making and adjudication provisions.61 It
was suggested, however, that section 13 should be deleted. As a
substitute, the definition of "agency" in section 2(a) of the proposed
act should be amended to expressly exclude from the Act's coverage
"war and defense functions which by law expire on the termination
of present hostilities," and "courts martial, military or naval authority exercised in the field in the time of war or in occupied territory,
and the functions conferred by the following statutes." The purpose
of this suggestion was "to remove any question of the application of
the [entire APA] to purely military functions." 62
The result of the above suggestions with respect to an earlier
version of the APA was that proposed section 2(a) was amended so
that, when finally adopted by Congress, it provided:
Except as to the requirements of section 3 [the freedom of information section], there shall be excluded from the operation of this Act
•.. (2) courts martial and military commissions, (3) military or naval
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory,
or (4) functions which by law expire on the termination of present
hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter, or before July 1, 1947,
and the functions conferred by the following statutes: Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940; Contract Settlement Act of 1944;
Surplus Property Act of 1944.63
The addition of section 2(a)(2) relating to courts martial not "exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory" might have
been the result of doubt about whether the term "military function"
used later in the Act would clearly cover such tribunals in those
cases. A suggestion had been made with respect to an earlier draft
of what has now become section 553(a)(I) that "[t]he phrase 'military
60. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 43.
61. See id. at 17, 21.
62. Id. at 43-44.
63. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324,

5

u.s.c.

§ 551(1) (1970)).

§

2(a), 60 Stat. 237 (codified at
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functions' should be clarified, particularly for the purpose of including within it all proceedings relating to court martial." 64
It may be contended that the exclusionary term "military function" that appears in the rule-making and adjudication provisions of
the APA is congruent with the much more specific exemptions that
were finally included in APA section 2(a)(2)-(4) "to remove any
question of the application of the [entire APA] to purely military
functions." There are, however, serious objections to this approach to
construing the term "military function" as it is used in section
553(a)(l). The legislative history relied on is at best muddy in meaning and small in quantity. There is no evidence that the several
specific exclusions from the entire APA found in its section 2(a)(2)-(4)
were intended to constitute an exclusive and exhaustive catalogue of
"military functions." Any effort to confine the meaning of "military
function" to those functions excluded by section 2(a)(2)-(4) is also
at odds with the normal meaning of the former term. Most things excluded from the APA by section 2(a)(2)-(4) are clearly "military
functions"; but it is equally clear that the term "military function"
has a broader connotation than, for example, merely courts martial
and orders of military commanders in the field in time of war.
In addition, if the enumerated section 2(a)(2)-(4) exclusions were
meant to be exhaustive of all "military functions," why include the
more generally phrased, therefore potentially broader scoped, "military function" exemptions in the rule-making and adjudication provisions of the same act? Those latter exclusions would have been
superfluous if section 2(a)(2)-(4) already excluded from virtually the
entire Act, including the rule-making and adjudication provisions, all
that the term "military function" was meant to exclude. The term
"military function" must, therefore, have been intended to encompass more than the specifically enumerated functions listed in APA
section 2(a)(2)-(4), but not necessarily to include all those functions.
The most likely reason for adding the courts martial and military
field authority in time of war exclusions to the definition of "agency"
in section 2(a) was that the drafters deemed it necessary to exclude
those particular "military functions" from all provisions of the APA
except section 3-the freedom-of-information provision. Standing
alone, the "military function" exemptions of APA sections 4 and 5
would have excluded those particular enumerated functions from
64. LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 17. See also id. at 22, to the same effect
with regard to the same exemption in the adjudication section of the APA.
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only the rule-making and adjudication provisions of the Act but not,
for example, from the judicial review provision, section 10.65
A further point should be made with respect to the exclusion of
other war-related functions from virtually the entire Act by APA
section 2(a)(4)-functions that would expire at the termination of the
Second World War, or soon thereafter, and functions conferred by
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Contract Settlement
Act of 1944, and Surplus Property Act of 1944. It is certainly not
apparent that when the exemptions for these enumerated subjects
were added to the proposed APA section 2(a) definition of "agency,"
they were all deemed to be "military functions" as such. Despite the
one shred of evidence to the contrary,66 the legislative history is not
clear that every function that would expire at the termination of the
Second World War or within any fixed period thereafter, or every
function conferred by the specifically enumerated war statutes, was
viewed as a "military function."
Not all "war or defense" 67 functions of the type listed in 2(a)(4)
are necessarily "military functions," since many may be only indirectly or tangentially linked to a mission specifically fitted for,
appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces. Was civilian price
control and rationing administered by the OPA during the Second
World War, and scheduled by law to expire at its termination or at
a specified date thereafter,68 a "military function"? Probably not, if
we resort to the more probable meaning of "military," because it did
not "clearly and directly" involve activities normally deemed within
the special capacity and expertise of the armed forces because of their
peculiar attributes or nature.
The real reason for the exemption of these particular functions
in section 2(a)(4) appears to have been something other than a concern that all "military functions" should be exempted from the Act.
"[I]t would take at least a year for any adequate [Administrative
Procedure Act] proposal to be placed in operation." 69 As a result,
65. Section IO of the original APA did not separately define "agency" as does its
current codification, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). The definition found in section 70I(b)(l)
includes an identical reproduction of that found in section 55l(l)(F)·(H).
66. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
67. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 43. Section 13 of the proposed Act used
the term "war and defense functions" to describe the specific functions later exempted
by APA§ 2(a)(4).
68. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
69. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 43. See also Freedman, supra note 49,
at 6: "Prior to 1966, the APA excluded from its reach 'functions which by law expire
on the termination of present hostilities.' • • • ['T]he revision of the APA in 1966
resulted in the deletion of the phrase 'functions which by law expire on the termina-
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"war agencies" could not comply with the requirements of this 1946
statute, or it was believed that they should not be put to the expense
of complying with it in carrying out these particular enumerated
functions, since these functions would expire shortly. A decision was
made on this basis, therefore, to exempt the specific functions in
question from virtually the entire Act-without any implication that
they were or were not "military functions."
In light of this discussion, it appears that section 2(a) of the APA,
now section 551(1), does not help to define, in any more precise
way, the scope of the term "military function" as it is used in section
553(a)(l). It might also be worth considering, however, whether language used in the 1967 revision of the freedom-of-information provision of the APA,70 section 552, is relevant to the construction of
"military function" in the rule-making provision. The new freedomof-information provision contains an exemption for matters that are
"specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy." 71 This provision
was enacted subsequent to the APA and, therefore, is not of direct
relevance to any original congressional intention with respect to the
scope of the term "military £unction" used in the rule-making and
adjudication provisions. It may, however, indicate Congress' more
recent impression as to the meaning of that term.
Why, for instance, did Congress exempt from section 552 matters
that are "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense"? I£ section 553(a)(l) language were
used, Congress would have exempted from the new freedom-of-information provision matters that are "specifically required to be kept
secret by Executive order in the interest of the proper performance
of military functions." Did Congress consider what, if any, difference
in scope inhered in the term "military function" as compared to the
term "national defense" or "national defense function"? Nothing has
been found in the legislative history to suggest that this particular
question was even considered.72
Indeed, it seems reasonably clear that in choosing language for
the above exemption from the freedom-of-information provision,
Congress was exclusively concerned with assuring some conformity to
tion of present hostilities.' The Reviser's Notes explain that the phrase was omitted
'as executed.'" See 5 U.S.C. § 551, Historical and Revision Notes (1970).
70. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
(1970)).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970) (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).

§

552

246

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:221

a pre-existing Executive Order-more precisely, Executive Order
10501 of November 5, 1953, entitled "Safeguarding Official Information in the Interest of the Defense of the United States." 73 This Order
stated that government information requiring "protection in the
interests of national defense" was to be limited to three classification
categories: top secret, secret, or confidential. It went on to provide:
"No other designation shall be used to classify defense information,
including military information, as requiring protection in the interests of national defense, except as expressly provided by statute." 74
This seems to suggest that "national defense," as used in the Executive Order, was understood to be broader in scope than the term
"military." Further possible corroboration exists in the context of
this Executive Order for the notion that "national defense" connoted a broader range of matters than the term "military." The information described in the Order as requiring protection in the
interests of "national defense" included information the disclosure
of which might lead to "a war, or the compromise of military or
defense plans, or intelligence operations, or scientific or technological
developments vital to national defense." 75
Since the "national defense" exclusion from the freedom-of-information provision was based upon the above Executive Order, there
is reason to assume that when Congress enacted section 552, it used
the term "national defense" in the same way-as a broader notion
than "military," the latter, however, being assumed to be included
within the former. Webster's defines "defense" as "capability of resisting attack ... practice or manner of self protection." 76 The provision of grants to educate college students in fields that are helpful to
the capacity of our country to protect itself and resist attack involves
a "national defense" function; but it is not likely to be considered
as involving a "military function" within the meaning of section
553(a)(I). Similarly, construction of the interstate highway system
or the general stockpiling of strategic raw materials may be viewed
as part of the "national defense" function but should not properly
be deemed to involve a "military function." These examples do not
"clearly" involve an activity expected of, appropriate to, or specially
suited for the armed forces because of their peculiar attributes or
qualifications; they do, however, "clearly" involve our capacity to
resist attack and our manner and practice of self protection.
73. Id. at 9-10.
74. Exec. Order No. 10501, § 1, as amended, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1972) (emphasis added).
75. Exec. Order No. 10501, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 306.
76. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 591.
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This discussion seems to suggest two things. First, as a matter
of common usage and understanding, the term "national defense"
may easily be applied to a broader scope of governmental activity
than the term "military function." Second, Congress probably did
not directly consider the relationship between the term "national defense," which appears in the freedom-of-information provision, and
the term "military function," which is used in the rule-making and
adjudication provisions. Its use of a term in section 552 that is inconsistent with that used to exempt some related matters in the rulemaking and adjudication provisions seems, therefore, to be of little
significance when viewed in isolation. However, in adopting section
552 Congress probably did intend the term "national defense" to be
broader than the term "military function" because it desired to adopt
the principles embodied in an existing executive order which
seemed to have recognized such a distinction. This indicates that in
1967, when Congress amended the already recodified APA, it would
probably have read the section 552 term more expansively than the
section 553(a)(I) term.
This conclusion is, of course, not mandatory. Both at the time
the APA was adopted in 1946 and at the time the new freedom-ofinformation provision was added in 1967, Congress might have believed the terms "national defense" and "military" function to be
fungible. Certainly a number of federal agencies have thought that
these terms are synonymous; 77 and there is no authoritative judicial
construction of the terms to the contrary.
In this connection it should be noted that the precise exemptive
language used in the rule-making provision of the original APA,
section 4,78 and in the adjudication provision, section 5,79 was any
"military, naval or foreign affairs function." The APA was recodified in 1966 without any intention of changing its substance.80 At that
time the word "naval" was omitted in both provisions because it was
considered to be included within the term "military."81 In omitting
the term "naval" on this basis Congress obviously meant to reject any
notion that the word "military" meant "of or related to the armydistinguished from naval."82 Obviously, also, Congress believed
77.
78.
U.S.C.
79.
U.S.C.
80.
81.
82.

See, e.g., text accompanying notes 90-93 &: II0 infra.
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 4, 60 Stat. 238, as amended, 5
§ 553 (1970) (emphasis added).
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 5, 60 Stat. 239, as amended, 5
§ 554 (1970) (emphasis added).
Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553, Historical and Revision Notes (1970).
WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 1433.
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that the term "naval" used in section 4 of the original APA and
deemed by it to be included within the term "military," was intended solely in its military sense-"of, relating or belonging to,
connected with or used in a navy," 83 and not in its general maritime
sense-"of or relating to ships or shipping" generally.84
It has been asserted that since "the statutes governing the Coast
Guard constitute it a military organization ... the authorized rules
for its governance would clearly fall in the first category" of section
553(a)(l)-rules involving a "'military function." 85 Similarly, a:
"special notice" or rule issued by the Coast Guard that restricted
access to a portion of a harbor during the launching of a Polaris
missile firing submarine of the United States Navy was held to be
"within the exception to [section 4 of the APA] for 'any military,
naval, or foreign affairs function of the United States.' " 86 These
examples seem to be consistent with a construction of the term
"military function" that is narrower than the term "national defense" function. However, in a statement regarding a draft of the
proposed APA section 4, the Attorney General of the United States
stated: "The term 'naval' in the first exception clause is intended to
include the defense functions of the Coast Guard and the Bureau of
Marine Inspection and Navigation.''87 This seeming equation of
"defense function" with "military function" may be of no significance, or it may suggest that any attempt to distinguish between
these terms here is improper.
Of interest in this connection is the holding of McBride v. Roland.88 It suggests that a denial by the Coast Guard Commandant
of a special validation endorsement of the plaintiff's merchant
mariner's documents on the grounds that his presence aboard a
civilian ship would be inimical to the national security was not
governed by the APA because this decision came within the exceptions of sections 4 and 5 for "naval or military affairs." 89 The function being performed by the Coast Guard in this circumstance was
a "national defense" function. But did it "clearly and directly" in83. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 1508.
84. Id.
85. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 10 (Department of the Treasury), at 1017.
See also United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1962) (Coast Guard is a
military service).
86. 310 F.2d at 348 n.3.
87. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 225 (emphasis added).
88. 248 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
89. 248 F. Supp. at 465.
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volve an activity specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of
the armed forces as such, because of their peculiar nature, attributes,
or qualifications? Is the exclusion of seamen from civilian ships in
the interest of national security really an activity of this type? Perhaps so, in light of the fact that both the Navy and the Coast Guard
must be considered armed forces. But if this conclusion is wrong,
McBride would suggest that the scope of the term "military function" may be congruent with the potentially broader term "defense
function."
A number of agencies seem to have taken the view that "military
function" is synonymous with "national defense function" or "war
function." Agencies have read the section 553(a)(l) term "military
function" as applying to anything involving, and not necessarily
"clearly and directly," activities expected of, appropriate to, or
specially fitted for war or preparation for war generally, as well
as activities expected of, appropriate to, or specially fitted for the
armed forces as such because of their peculiar nature, structure, or
capacity. In addition, agencies have sometimes construed "military
function" to mean anything involving or affecting the armed forces,
rather than as anything "clearly and directly" involving an armed
forces "function." Consequently, there is no general agreement as to
the precise scope of the "military function" exemption. The following examples demonstrate, however, that in practice section 553(a)(I)
is construed in a number of different ways-and frequently very
broadly.
For instance, the Federal Power Commission reported in 1969:
The Commission's functions which appear to come within the
"military function" exemption of 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(I) include: (I) its
emergency power pursuant to section 202(c) of the Federal Power
Act to order temporary connection of electric facilities and to require generation, delivery, interchange or transmission of electric
energy; (2) those under section 16 of the Federal Power Act which
authorizes the United States to take temporary possession of licensed
hydroelectric projects for the purpose of manufacturing nitrates, explosives or munitions of war; (3) to the extent that a war emergency
is involved, the Commission's authority under section 7(c) of the
Natural Gas Act to issue temporary certificates of public convenience
and necessity to construct and operate facilities of a natural gas
company. With respect to these "military functions", the Commission
would agree that the present policy of the Administrative Procedure
Act exempts it from the rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553
(b)-(e), since in time of war, the public interest may require the use
of certain hydroelectric facilities for military purposes, the alloca-
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tion of electric or natural gas energy to meet emergency demands
and/or the reestablishment of disrupted utility services with the utmost dispatch.90

Similarly, the Department of Agriculture has noted that "the only
rulemaking [in which it engages] that might involve a 'military
function' as mentioned in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(l), would be, possibly,
regulations under the Defense Production Act [of 1950]" dealing
with expansion of civilian productive capacity to provide for "national defense." 91 In 1969 the Post Office Department claimed that
in the "implementation of the statutes relating to postal services for
the Armed Forces," its rule-making was exempt from section 553 by
the subsection (a)(l) "military function" exclusion.92 And the
Atomic Energy Commission stated that its "rulemaking relating to
permits for Access to Restricted Data . . . insofar as Category C-24
'Isotope Separation-Gas Centrifuge Method' is concerned ... [is]
exempt under § 553(a)(l) as involving 'a military ... function.' " 93
Of more importance is the Department of Defense's position as
to the meaning of the term "military function." Obviously that
exemption has its most practical relevance to the activities of this
particular agency. Recall that the legislative history of the APA supports the assumption that some of the functions performed by the
Department of Defense are not "military functions" within the
meaning of section 553(a)(l) and, therefore, are not excluded on
that basis from section 553.94 Such a nonmilitary function performed by this Department might be the domestic flood control and
protection of navigable waters activities conducted by the Army
Corps of Engineers.95 The domestic activities of this sort undertaken by the Corps do not "clearly and directly" involve activities
expected of, appropriate to, or specially fitted for the armed forces
as such96 because of their special nature, qualifications, or attributes. In 1957 the Department of Defense tacitly admitted that not
all activities of the Corps of Engineers were "military functions.'' It
stated:
90. 1969 Survey Response. The statutory authorizations to which the Commission
referred are codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 809, 824a(c), and 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970) respectively. See also 1941 Hearings, supra note 20, pt. 2, at 502-03.
91. 1969 Survey Response. The Defense Production Act of 1950 is codified at 50
U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-168 (1970).
92. 1969 Survey Response.
93. 1969 Survey Response. Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 2.905 (1972).
94. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-09a (1970).
96. Most of the personnel of the Corps are not even members of the armed forces.
The ex.emption, however, is for "military functions" and not "the military."
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Many of the rules considered herein [relating to the Corps of Engineers] are of military or naval significance. Since the procedures
in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act are followed in
all cases, there has been no need to characterize particular rules as
involving or not involving military or naval functions. 97
Of course, there is no doubt that if strategic military planning
constitutes rule-making within the meaning of the APA, it is exempted from section 553 as a "military function" under subsection
(a)(l). Nothing is more plainly adapted to, specially fitted for, or
appropriate to the armed forces because of their peculiar qualifications or attributes than planning "battlefield" strategy in the event
of armed hostilities. So, too, any rules concerning the organization,
deployment, or use of the armed forces as such are plainly "military
functions."
Beyond this, it has been alleged, however, that in light of the
mission of the Department of Defense as a whole, "the rule-making
provisions do not apply to the usual functions of the [Defense] Department"98 or to the "typical" functions of that Department.99 The
Department has also maintained that in "a fundamental sense all
regulations and directives of the Department [of Defense] are incident to the essentially military function of national defense." 100
Therefore, the Department of Defense would probably take the
view that, for example, all of the following regulations involve
"military functions" and are consequently exempt from section 553:
(1) The Armed Services Procurement Regulation; (2) claims and
litigation procedures; (3) distribution of surplus property; (4) the
correction of military records; (5) support of military dependents
and paternity claims; (6) labor surplus area set-asides; (7) indebtedness, financial transactions, and commercial affairs of military personnel; (8) payments under the Missing Persons Act and death benefits; and (9) standards of conduct for civilian employees. 101

While section 553(a)(2) now provides exemptions for most, if not
all, of the above activities, repeal of those exemptions for rules relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts"
would almost surely induce the Department of Defense to rely on
the "military function" exclusion in an effort to reach a result it
97. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 286.
98. Reich, Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act, in G. WARREN,
supra note 47, at 492, 498 (emphasis added).
99. Reich, Administrative Procedure Act: Analysis of its Requirements as to Rulemaking," 33 A.B.A.J. 315, 317 (1947).
100. See text accompanying note 52 supra (emphasis added).
101. 1969 Survey Response.
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desires-the continued exemption of all such rule-making from
section 553.
Indeed, the Department of Defense already appears to have taken
this view. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary recently queried
that Department with respect to its attitude toward a bill-S. 1413102
-that would have repealed the section 553(a)(2) exemptions for
rule-making relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts." The Department's reply indicates a belief that virtually
all of its rule-making is exempted from section 553 by the "military
function" exemption. It commented:
Since S. 1413 would leave intact the current exemption in 5 U.S.C.
553(a)(l) for "a military or foreign affairs function of the United
States," it appears that the Department of Defense would not be
affected by the proposed legislation.... If, however, notwithstanding
5 U.S.C. 553(a)(l), S. 1413 should be so intended and construed as to
apply to rulemaking concerning contracts and the other enumerated
matters of this department, the Department of Defense is strongly
opposed to S. 1413.10s
More specifically, the Department has stated that the subsection
(a)(l) "military function" exemption excludes from usual procedures
the issuance of regulations governing such ·widely diverse military
functions as the operation of the Reserve Officers' Training Program
in civilian education institutions, the determination and designation
of vital industrial facilities in support of military mobilization production programs, the implementation of the defense scientific and
technical information program, ... [and] the choice between commercial or military transportation facilities for military supplies or
personnel.104
It went on to note that "[s]uch regulations govern military functions which do not appear to fall within the exception for 'any
matter relating to internal management or personnel of an
agency.' " 105
The Defense Department has taken the position that rule-making
relating to discharge review boards and boards for the correction of
102. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
103. Letter from Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to
Senator James Eastland, Jan. 18, 1972.
104. Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judidary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (1964) [hereinafter S. 1663 Hearings].
105. Id. at 493-94. The present language of section 553(a)(2) is "agency management
or personnel." The language quoted is from an analogous provision that was to be
included in S. 1663.
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military records involves "military functions." 106 Similarly, the Department has stated that all rules relating to the administrative
settlement of personal injury and property damage claims are exempt because they "involve military functions in the sense that the
claims are generated by personnel of the military departments within
the scope of their employment."107 The Department has also maintained that all rules relating to administration of the Resettlement
Acts governing purchase and acquisition of land for the military, and
resettlement of previous owners, are exempt from usual rule-making
requirements because "[t]hese rules involve military and naval functions in that the rules apply to certain acquisitions of land by the
military departments."1 08
Similarly, it has been suggested that rule-making concerning
property owned by the Department of Defense and used in the
performance of military functions, and rule-making involving "virtually all contracts for military procurement," would be excluded
from section 553 under the "military function" exemption of subsection (a)(l).109 The Department of Defense has specifically stated
that it would be "difficult to allocate the proportion of procurement regulations assignable" to each of the categories specifically exempted by section 553(a)(l)-(2) because all regulations of the Department are "incident to its essentially military function of national
defense." 110 It has also been asserted that rule-making dealing with
"United States military surplus [property] located abroad" is exempt
from section 553 because it involves a "military function" within
the meaning of subsection (a)(l).111 Less debatable, of course, is
the assertion that rules "pertaining to access to a secret missile
base" would be deemed to involve a "military function.'' 112
Some of the previous claims as to the scope of the exemptive
provision in question are at best dubious. As suggested earlier in
this section, the term "military function" should be construed as
encompassing only those activities or operations, by whoever performed, that are specially tailored for, appropriate to, or expected
of the armed forces as such because of their peculiar nature, capacities, or qualifications. Only rule-making "clearly and directly" in106.
107,
108,
109.
110.
111.
112,

1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 332, 346.
Id, at 324,
Id. at 292.
Bonfield, supra note 7, at 312.
1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 278.
Id., pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 128.
S. 166!) Hearings, supra note 104, at 679.
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volving such activities should be deemed excluded by section
553(a)(l) as a "military function." There is, however, as illustrated
by at least some of the examples cited above, disagreement over the
correctness of this construction by those who are charged with applying section 553.
Even if we assume the soundness and acceptability of the construction of "military function" proffered here, promulgation of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), for instance,
may arguably be deemed such a function. However, one commentator has suggested that these regulations are not excludable as section 553(a)(l) "military functions":
The ASPR are not peculiar to military functions. They merely
represent a comprehensive restatement of those policies thought to be
necessary in applying sound business practices to the acquisition of
goods and services by the military departments of the Government;
they are not tailored to the necessities of military operations as such.
The ASPR are no more entitled to exemption as a "military function"
than is the rather skimpy State Department Procurement Regulation
to be excluded from section 4' s requirements as a "foreign affairs
function." 113
This view seems questionable for several reasons. It is true that
rule-making for the acquisition, use, and disposal of government
property generally does not involve an activity specially fitted for,
appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces as such because of
their peculiar nature, capacities, or qualifications. However, that
characterization views rule-making of this type at an unduly high
level of generalization and abstraction. A more realistic formulation of the relevant question might be: Does rule-making for the
acquisition, use, and disposal of property and materiel needed by
the armed forces to perform their admittedly "military functions"
"clearly and directly" involve such a function?
The acquisition, superintendence, and disposal of combat weapons, weapons systems, and other materiel peculiarly designed for use
by combat forces and their support units is unique to the armed forces.
Acquisition of materiel of this type frequently presents special problems and peculiar requirements. In many cases, the same may also be
said about other materiel specifically required by the armed forces
in their performance of "military functions." No doubt, this is one
of the reasons for Armed Services Procurement Regulations, rather
than one single set of General Services Administration regulations
governing all procurement of property and materiel by every agency
113. Grossbaum, supra note 1, at 260.
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of the United States Government-including the armed forces.
Department of Defense rules tailored to provide for the acquisition
of these kinds of things seem, therefore, "clearly" to involve an activity specially appropriate to, expected of, or fitted for the armed
forces by virtue of their peculiar nature, qualifications, or capacities.
The armed forces have special problems in procurement of materiel
for use in admittedly "military functions"; therefore, they have
special competence and are specially suited to deal with that procurement process, which means that ASPR may be "clearly and
directly" involved in a "military function."
To be sure, an argument to the contrary may be made: The
acquisition, as opposed to use, of the property and materiel necessary to create and maintain a governmentally organized armed
fighting force is not specially fitted to, appropriate for, or expected of the armed forces by virtue of their peculiar capabilities.
Procurement as such is not a "military function"; nor is procurement for the armed forces generally, or procurement of specially
designed military hardware specifically, such a function. In fact, the
performance of none of these tasks requires any special attributes or
qualifications peculiar to the armed forces.
This last factual assumption is very dubious, however, especially
in the context of materiel designed specifically for combat use or
for other peculiar requirements of the armed forces. It may also be
dubious, though less so, in the context of procurement for the
armed forces of materiel generally; peculiar problems with which
the armed forces are specially fitted to deal may arise out of the
unusual needs of the armed forces in the acquisition of even common materials and equipment. The need for special speed and
peculiarly large quantities are examples. All of the above, however,
are debatable issues upon which reasonable men may disagree.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that ASPR does not "clearly and
directly" involve a "military function" is also difficult to accept for
other reasons-the general terminology of that particular exemptive term, and the very direct involvement of the procurement
process for materiel in the successful execution of other indisputable "military functions." One may agree with the undesirability of
the "military function" exemption generally, or the exemption of
ASPR particularly, without necessarily concurring in the optimistic
conclusion that the courts or Defense Department would, as a result, construe ASPR as being beyond the scope of subsection (a)(l). 114
114. Grossbaum specifically notes as part of the justification for deeming ASPR to
be beyond the scope of section 553(a)(l):
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Of course, the relevant decision makers might conclude that
ASPR is neither entirely inside nor entirely outside the scope of
section 553(a)(l). Alternative positions are possible. One view might
be that such procurement regulations are exempt only when they
are applied to the acquisition of materiel specially designed for the
peculiar requirements of the armed forces in the performance of
their "military functions." The theory here is that only the acquisition of such materiel "clearly and directly" involves a "military
function" as such, and that section 553(a)(l) operates by its terms
only "to the extent that" a function of this sort is involved. This
approach would suggest that public participation could be avoided
by issuing two sets of Armed Forces Procurement Regulations--one
set, promulgated without public participation, for the acquisition of
materiel specially designed for the peculiar requirements of the armed
forces in their performance of "military functions," and one set,
formulated with public participation, for the acquisition of all
other materiel needed by the armed forces. The difficulty with this
approach is that an ordinary antibiotic pill may be as involved in
and necessary to the performance of "military functions" as a
specially designed item of military hardware.
Another view might be that only those provisions of ASPR-if
there are any-that are specially designed to handle the peculiar
problems that arise in the acquisition of materiel for use in "military functions," as distinct from those provisions designed to handle
problems that arise in the acquisition of materiel for the government in general, would be deemed to involve "clearly and directly"
such a "military function." The theory would be that only the
issuance of those particular sections of ASPR involve an activity
specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces
as such due to their special qualifications, expertise, and nature. The
problem with this view, however, is its underlying assumption that
if a "military function" is performed by means similar to, or indistinguishable from, those used to execute a nonmilitary function,
rules involving that function are not exempt under section 553(a)(l).
Neither the language nor legislative history of the provision exempting rules involving a "military function" from usual rule-making
procedures justifies this conclusion.
Furthermore, to exclude ASPR from the requirements of section 4 would be
tantamount to locking the barn after the horse had been stolen, since the preponderance of government contract rules are first made by the ASPR Committee and
subsequently aped by civilian agencies. Imposing the notice and comment requirements of section 4 only with respect to proposed civil agency contract rules, rules
that have already become faits accomplis by incorporation in ASPR, offers neither
timely nor adequate protection to the public interest.
Id. at 260-61.
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Realistically, of course, most of the previous discussion as to
the scope of the "military function" exemption in general, or its application to ASPR in particular, is highly speculative. Comfortable
or clear solutions with a likelihood of wide acceptance do not
abound. Furthermore, a meaningful test of these arguments about
ASPR, for example, will come only after the "contracts" exemption
of section 553(a)(2) is repealed, since no one questions the exclusion
of ASPR from normal rule-making procedures under that more
specific and clear exemption. The exact scope of the "military function" exemption thus remains unclear. Some things, however, are
worth noting about it by way of summary.
Not all rule-making undertaken by the Department of Defense
involves a "military function." Nor is Defense the only department
that engages in "military function" rule-making. Although it is not
certain, the term "military function" probably means "armed forces
function" rather than "war function" or "defense function." Section 553(a)(l) does not exclude all rules involving the armed forces;
it is only rule-making involving "military functions" that is excluded. Consequently, only rule-making involving an activity that
is specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the armed
forces as such because of their peculiar nature, qualifications, or
attributes is exempted. Furthermore, to be excluded under subsection (a)(l) the rule-making in question must "clearly and directly" involve such an activity. But what is "clear and direct" is not
adequately defined.
It is apparent that the term "military function" is unduly vague,
hard to define, and harder yet to apply-especially in marginal
cases. This alone presents significant problems. It is, for instance,
not clear to what extent, if at all, rule-making involving procurement for the armed forces is exempt from section 553 by the
"military function" exclusion. The term "military function" is viewed
by those who must apply it as being very broad in scope. The
imputed scope is also likely to increase rather than decrease. The
Department of Defense, for example, is likely to rely on the "military
function" exemption as a substitute for the section 553(a)(2) exclusions for rule-making relating to "public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts," if they are repealed. The reason for this is
that it desires to continue the exclusion from section 553 of a whole
range of rule-making now clearly exempt under section 553(a)(2),
and arguably also exempt under section 553(a)(l).
One last point concerning the scope of the "military function"
exemption should be noted. As a matter of predictable predilection
and practical reality, rule-making claimed by the Department of
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Defense to be exempt from section 553 because it involves a "military
function" may more easily be treated as such by various other
governmental authorities-including the courts-than similar claims
by other agencies. After all, the Department of Defense is the specific
agency whose reason for being is "to provide for the future [military]
security of the country."115 Furthermore, the judgment of the Department of Defense on this issue, or for that matter the judgment
of any agency on this issue, may also be presumed correct as a matter
of law. Of course, it was argued earlier that, for a number of reasons,
the burden of proof should probably rest on the agency to prove
that rule-making sought to be exempted under this provision "clearly
and directly" involves a "military function." But the law on this
subject is unsettled, and the presumption of administrative regularity
deeply ingrained. All of this magnifies the practical significance of
the "military function" exemption of section 553(a)(l).

C.

"Foreign Affairs Function"

Rule-making is also exempted by subsection (a)(l) from the
requirements of section 553 "to the extent that there is involved a
... foreign affairs function of the United States." Webster's defines
"foreign affairs" as "matters relating to foreign countries: affairs
other than domestic; esp: matters having to do with international
relations and with the interests of the home country in foreign
countries."116 A "function," it should be recalled, is an activity
"specially fitted for," "appropriate to" or "expected of" something
because of its peculiar nature, attributes, or qualifications. A "foreign
affairs function," then, may be an activity specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of international relations-the interests of this
country in foreign countries-due to the peculiar nature or attributes
of such relations. And all rule-making "clearly and directly" involving such an activity is exempt from section 553_
There is a conflict of evidence as to whether the term "foreign
affairs" was intended to be limited to strictly diplomatic functionsthat is, activities "belonging to or proper to the personnel responsible
for the conduct of international relations."117 On the one hand, a
Congressman stated that the "exempted foreign affairs are those
diplomatic functions of high importance which do not lend themselves to public procedures and with which the general public is
ll5. UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
116. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 889.
117. Id. at 638.

MANUAL

1968-69, at 130-31.
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ordinarily not generally concerned."118 More persuasive, however, is
the argument that "the exemption is not limited to strictly diplomatic functions, because the phrase 'diplomatic function' was employed in [an earlier draft of the AP A] and was discarded in favor
of the broader and more generic phrase 'foreign affairs function.' " 119
Both the Senate and House reports on the AP A may limit the
term somewhat, because they took the position that
[t]he phrase "foreign affairs functions," used here and in some other
provisions of the bill, is not to be loosely interpreted to mean any
function extending beyond the borders of the United States but
only those "affairs" which so affect relations with other governments
that, for example, public rule-making provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international consequences.120

However, in light of the more general and unqualified statutory
language stating the exemption for rule-making involving a "foreign
affairs function," it is unclear whether the legislative history just
referred to constitutes an effective or meaningful restriction of the
term.121 This question will be discussed at greater length later in
the present section.
Another bit of legislative history is worthy of note. In a comment
on an earlier draft of the APA the following appears:
It has been suggested that "foreign-affairs functions" should be
defined and added to section 2 in order to exclude from the operation of [the entire APA] all passport and visa functions as well as all
duties of consular and diplomatic officers abroad. However, so far
as these are not foreign affairs functions "requiring secrecy in the
public interest," there would seem to be no reason why they should
not be subject to the simple public information requirements of
section 3.122

Although not completely clear, this seems to suggest that "foreign
affairs function" was intended to encompass at least "all passport and
visa functions as well as all duties of consular and diplomatic officers
abroad." Rule-making "clearly and directly" involving those subjects
is, therefore, exempt under section 553(a)(I) from usual rule-making
118. LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 358 (remarks of Representative Walter).
119. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27. The earlier bill can be
found in LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 157.
120, LEGISLATIVE HlsrORY, supra note 13, at 199, 257.
121. It is probable, in any event, that it would constitute no greater limitation of
the exemption than the subsequent specific exclusion found in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B)
(1970) for rule-making in which the required notice and opportunity for public participation are found to be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest."
122. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 12.
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procedures. How much further the exemption goes is another issue.
It is not easy to determine what rule-making involves activities
specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of international
relations as such due to their peculiar nature or attributes.
No clearer definition of the exact scope of the section 553 "foreign
affairs function" exemption is supplied by the fact that when Congress amended the freedom-of-information provision of the AP A in
1967, it expressly excluded from that section matters that are "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of ... foreign policy."123 There is no evidence that the term "foreign
policy" in section 552 was in fact considered in juxtaposition to the
term "foreign affairs function" in sections 553 and 554.
However, even if Congress had expressly considered the term
"foreign policy" in comparison to the term "foreign affairs function,"
and purposefully chose the former over the latter for use in the
freedom-of-information section, the message conveyed would be less
than clear. "Foreign policy" has been defined as "the underlying
basic direction of the activity and relationship of a sovereign state
in its interaction with other sovereign states typically manifested in
peace, war, neutrality, and alliances or various combinations or approaches to these."124 It might be argued that an exemption for a
"foreign policy function" would be narrower than an exemption for
a "foreign affairs function" because the former concerns only activities specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the making or
formulation of such policy, while the latter includes that and also all
activities involving the execution of such policy. But it is very unlikely that Congress intended to permit exemptions from the freedom-of-information provision only for matters involving the formulation of foreign policy, as opposed to its execution. In any event,
Congress did intend to exclude from usual rule-making procedures
all rule-making "clearly and directly" involved in "foreign affairs
functions"; and that term certainly includes both the making and
execution of "foreign policy."
The "foreign affairs function" exemption may be coextensive
with our nation's foreign affairs capacity. Since rule-making is exempted from section 553 only "to the extent that" it "clearly and
directly" involves such a function, however, this exemption may
apply only to agency rule-making under authority granted it specially for foreign affairs purposes. If that is the case, an agency would
123. Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970)) (emphasis added).
124. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 889.
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not be entitled to an exemption under subsection (a)(l) for rulemaking undertaken pursuant to some general nonforeign affairs authority, even though it in fact acted with such foreign affairs considerations in mind. This line, however, may be difficult to draw,
and also unjustifiable in light of the purpose and general language
of the particular exemption in question.
In any case, it is clear that the "foreign affairs" exception is applicable to many functions of the State Department.125 In 1957, the
State Department estimated that about forty per cent of its rules involved foreign affairs functions and were, therefore, exempt for that
reason from section 553.126 Certainly, if strategic foreign policy formulation is deemed to constitute rule-making within the meaning
of the APA, it is exempt as a "foreign affairs function." Nothing is
more clearly adapted to, especially fitted for, or appropriate to the
conduct of our international relations by virtue of its peculiar
nature than strategic foreign policy planning. Consequently, formulation of all the specific details of our foreign policy toward France
when she left NATO would be an exempt "foreign affairs function."
So, too, after the coup in Greece, the determination as to whether
we should communicate with the new government, what our attitude toward the seizure should be, and whether any action should
be taken to protect Americans in Greece, would also be exempt as a
"foreign affairs function." 127 Similarly, it has been implied that
"rules pertaining to . . . methods of subsidizing the military operations of friendly powers" are exempt as a "foreign affairs function." 128
Presumably, all rule-making directly involving a foreign aid program
would also be exempt from usual procedures under subsection
(a)(l).120
Many other kinds of rules made by the State Department, however, are allegedly claimed to be exempted by the "foreign affairs
function" provision of section 553(a)(l). For example, the Department considers all rules made by the Educational Exchange Service,
which "is empowered to promote, facilitate, and conduct programs
for the exchange of persons between the United States and foreign
countries," exempt from section 553 by subsection (a)(l) because
125. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27.
126. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 927.
127. Hearings on S. 518 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 321-22 (1967) [hereinafter S. 518 Hearings].
128. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 679.
129. Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreir,n A.flairs Power over Forei[fon Aid1
1970 DUKE LJ. 453, 454-9¾,

262

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:221

they "involve foreign affairs functions of the United States."130 The
same has been said of all rules involving the relief, protection, and
regulation of American seamen and ships abroad.131 The Department of State also claims that "[a]ll rules made by the Passport
Office relate to foreign affairs functions of the United States" and
are, therefore, exempt under section 553(a)(l).132 The reason offered
by the Department for this view is that "a passport is a formal letter
issued by the Secretary of State to officials of foreign governments
attesting to the identity and citizenship of the bearer and requesting
that certain courtesies and privileges be extended to him."133 In addition,
[t]he Visa Office takes the position that all of its regulations involve
a foreign-affairs function of the United States and, hence, their publication is considered to be within the exemption from notice of
proposed rule-making as provided in section 4 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.1a4
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,135 that office makes
rules dealing with all aspects of immigration into this country and
the determination of nationality of a person not in the United
States.136
The Department has even stated that rule-making involving
" [s]tudies contracted for at the request of the Historical Division,"
which "prepares the foreign relations volumes which date from 1861
and constitute the only official record of United States diplomacy,"
is entitled to an exemption under the "foreign affairs function"
provision because those studies "may indirectly affect the formulation of foreign policy on that particular subject."137 And rule-making
by the Authentications Section, which establishes a schedule of fees
based on cost of service, is also claimed to be exempt under section
130. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 928. See also
id. at 931: "There is no statutory provision relating to any rulemaking function of the
Educational Exchange Service requiring notice, hearing, or record of the hearing" because the "Administrative Procedure Act (foreign affairs exemption) does not require
notice or public rulemaking proceedings concerning" such rules.
131. Id. at 924-44.
132. Id. at 946. Consequently, such things as the "determination of geographical
limitations of general applicability on issuance of passports" are excluded under section
553(a)(l). S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387.
133. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 946.
134. Id. at 952. The Department does claim, however, that it follows usual procedures in cases of "routine visa procedures." S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387.
135. 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-503 (1970).
136. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. l) (Departm~nt of State), at 950-52,
137. Id. itt 93J, 933,
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553(a)(l) on the grounds that "[a]ll authenticated documents have
a foreign affairs interest."138 Note also that "[o]f the approximately
14 pages of rules relating to the tariff of fees" which Foreign Service
officers are supposed "to collect for [their] official services," the Department stated that "[a]pproximately 10 per cent relate to foreign
affairs functions." 13o
Of course, the "foreign affairs function" exemption is also applicable to agencies other than the State Department when they
engage in rule-making involving such functions. 140 Many federal
agencies other than the Department of State claim to make rules of
this sort. For example, the Post Office Department asserted that its
regulations involving the international postal service were exempt
"foreign affairs functions." 141 And the Atomic Energy Commission
maintained that its "rulemaking relating to Export of Byproduct
Material . . . insofar as the establishment of export restrictions for
certain countries [is involved], e.g. Southern Rhodesia . . . [is] exempt under § 553(a)(l) as involving a 'foreign affairs function.' " 142
Similarly, the Federal Power Commission has noted that
the Commission's power to authorize the export of electricity ... the
export and import of natural gas ... and to issue Presidential permits authorizing the construction, operation or maintenance of
electric power and natural gas facilities on the borders of the United
States ... would appear to be encompassed within the exemption
of [section] 553(a)(l) relating to foreign affairs.14a
The Department of Agriculture has also suggested that its rulemaking under the Food for Peace Program,144 which is designed to
develop and expand markets for United States agricultural commodities and combat hunger, is exempt from section 553 because it
involves a "foreign affairs function." 145 So, too, that department has
1!18. Id. at 936.
139. Id. at 940-41.
140. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27. See also note 44 supra and
accompanying text.
141. Delaney, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Post Office Department, in G. WARREN, supra note 47, at 196, 202; 1969 Survey Response: "Rule-making
by the Post Office Department in implementation of various international postal conventions as authorized by [39 U.S.C. §§ 505-06 (1970)] ••• [is] exempted ••. by
[section] 553(a)(l)." See also 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 8 (Post Office Department), at 874: "All our regulations concerning our international mail fall within
••. [section 553(a)(l)J."
142. 1969 Survey Response. The regulations may be found at IO C.F.R. §§ 36.1-.50
(1972).
143. 1969 Survey Response.
144. See 7 U.S.C. § 1702 (1970).
J45. 1(169 Survey Respon~~.
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noted that its "regulations relating to exports and imports under the
plant and animal quarantine acts, meat and poultry products inspection acts, and other regulatory laws" may be exempt under section
553(a)(I) because they "affect foreign relations." 146
The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control is responsible for the Foreign Funds Control Regulations,147 the
Foreign Assets Control Regulation,148 the Transaction Control Regulations,149 the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,150 and the Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations.151 It reported:
The kinds of rules [developed in these programs] which are exempt
from the rulemaking procedures under section 553(a)(l) as involving
a "foreign affairs function" are ... [g]eneral blocking rules .... [,]
[g]eneral licenses and authorizations unblocking classes of property
or persons or authorizing classes or transactions ... [,] and [r]ules
related to the blocking orders requiring reports and records of
blocked property and of prohibited transactions.152

The Department of the Treasury explained:
All of the above described kinds of rules issued by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control clearly involve "a foreign affairs function of
the United States." There can be no question that the blocking
actions taken under the authority of Section 5(b) of the Trading
with the Enemy Act and Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act, were taken exclusively because of urgent foreign policy considerations of the United States Government and that they clearly
have a direct bearing on our relations with foreign countries. To an
equal degree, the actions in the form of general licenses taken simultaneously with the blocking orders or subsequent thereto to exempt
from or license out certain classes of transactions or persons from
their prohibitions as well as the related reporting requirements are
actions involving the foreign affairs functions of the United States.
It is equally evident that the actions taken by the Treasury Department to prohibit financial and commercial dealings with Southern Rhodesia, and the corollary rules exempting or licensing classes
of prohibited transactions deemed desirable in order to maintain a
flexible system, involve a foreign affairs function since they form an
146. 1969 Survey Response.
147. 31 C.F.R. §§ 520.01-.809 (1972).
148. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (1972).
149. 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-.60 (1972).
150. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (1972).
151. 31 C.F.R. §§ 530.101-.809 (1972).
152. 1969 Survey Response. See also 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 10 (De•
partment of the Treasury), at 1017,

December 1972]

Rule-Making

265

important part of the United States Government's implementation
of resolutions of the United Nations.1 53

The Department of the Treasury has also claimed exemption under
the "foreign affairs function" provision for all its rules involving
"Delivery of Checks and Warrants to Addresses Outside the United
States, Its Territories and Possessions."154 Similarly, regulations dealing with "International Traffic in Arms" previously issued by the
Secretary of Statem and now issued by the Secretary of the Treasury
in "the administration of the firearms import control program pursuant to ... the Mutual Security Act of 1954," are deemed in "the
exempt category relating to foreign affairs."156
The Department of Commerce has noted that rule-making involving a number of its programs is exempted from the requirements
of section 553 by the "foreign affairs function" language. More specifically, all rule-making involving the following is said to be exempt:1157 "The Textile Quota Program," which limits exports of textiles from foreign countries to the United States;158 the "Implementation of United Nations Resolution Regarding Trade with Southern
Rhodesia"; 159 "Required Reports on Foreign Investments and on
International Receipts and Payments and Fees";160 and "Determination of Bona Fide Motor-Vehicle Manufacturers Under the Automotive Products Trade Act." 161 In response to a 1957 survey the
Department also suggested that its rule-making "in connection with
vessel operations in foreign commerce includ[ing] such matters as
description of foreign-trade routes . . . [and] approval of United
States Vessels to foreign flag" was an exempt "foreign affairs function."162 At the same time, it asserted that rule-making pursuant
153. 1969 Survey Response. On blocking actions, see 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1970); 50
U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1970).
154. 1969 Survey Response. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-.6 (1972).
155. Exec. Order No. 10,973, 3 C.F.R. 493 (Comp. 1965).
156. 1969 Survey Response. See 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970).
157. 1969 Survey Response.
158. See 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,052, 3 C.F.R. 253 (Comp. 1962),
as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,214, 3 C.F.R. 122 (Comp. 1965). A similar claim was
asserted by the Department of Labor, S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 241, when
that program was under its jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 208 infra.
159. See 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,322, 3 C.F.R. 635 (Comp. 1968),
as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,419, 3 C.F.R. 442 (Comp. 1968).
160. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-861 (1970); Exec. Order No. 10,033, 3 C.F.R. 70 (Comp.
1949), 22 U.S.C. following § 286f (1970).
161. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2001-33 (1970); 30 Fed. Reg. 13683 (1965).
162. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 126.
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to the Export Control Act of 1949,163 which empowered the President to prohibit or curtail exportation from this country of any articles, materials, supplies, or technical data "except under such rules
and regulations as he shall prescribe,"164 involved "foreign affairs
functions" exempted by section 553(a)(I) from usual procedures, or
at least, that "[a]pproximately 80 to 90 percent of [those] rules involve[d] either military or foreign affairs functions.'' 165 In addition,
the Department of Commerce has stated:
It could be argued that rule-making by the Office of Foreign Direct
Investments is exempt from the requirements of [section] 553(b)-(e),
since the OFDI program is based on the President's authority under
section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, a "foreign affairs"
function.166
Some agencies take a narrower view of the scope of the "foreign affairs function" exemption. For example, the Legislation and Regulations Divisions of the Department of the Treasury jointly issue "rules
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which affect
international transactions, including the interest equalization tax
provisions, as well as provisions under the Income and Estate Tax
Treaties to which the United States is a party." 167 These divisions
have recently stated with respect to the issuance of such regulations:
We do not believe this exception [section 553(a)(l)] applies to any
regulations issued jointly by our offices because none of these regulations affect "only those 'affairs' which so affect relations with other
governments that, for example, public rulemaking provisions would
clearly provoke definitely undesirable international consequences." 168
A recent analysis of the "foreign affairs function" exemption found
in section 554 of the APA, which governs adjudication, employed a
similar approach to construction of that provision. It concluded that
Congress intended the adjudication provision to apply "except 'to
the extent that' a particular proceeding would interfere with the
conduct of foreign affairs functions and, as two congressional committees said, 'clearly provoke definitely undesirable international
163. Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7.
164. Ch. 11, § 3(a), 63 Stat. 7.
165. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 138,
140.
166. 1969 Survey Response. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1970). In any event, OFDI
follows usual procedures when it makes rules. See note 40 supra.
167. 1969 Survey Response.
168. 1969 Survey Response, quoting ATIORNEY GENERAL'S 'MANUAL, supra note 13,
at 25-26. See text accom_pan}in~ note 120 supra.
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consequences.' " 169 These narrow readings of the "foreign affairs
function" exemptions in the rule-making and adjudication provisions are bolstered by the bit of legislative history quoted to support
them.
When applied to the adjudication provision, however, the narrow
reading of "foreign affairs function" proffered above may also be
justified on a more compelling ground than the legislative history of
the APA. Denial of an adjudicatory hearing, even on the basis of an
asserted governmental interest in the unrestrained conduct of foreign
affairs, may in some instances raise serious constitutional due process
problems. For example, the argument that enforcement hearings of
the Office of Foreign Direct Investment "may not have to comply
with the otherwise applicable constitutional requirement of a trialtype hearing [of the kind imposed by the adjudication provision]
because OFDI exercises the plenary power of the President and Congress over foreign affairs [in such cases] seems doubtful.'' 170 If, however, the "foreign affairs function" exemption in the adjudication
provision is read to exclude only those particular compliance proceedings that would interfere with our nation's conduct of "foreign affairs functions" because they would "clearly provoke definitely
undesirable international consequences," constitutional objections
would probably be satisfied "[b]ecause Congress has supplied a responsible resolution of the competing interests involved." 171 Further
support for this restrictive reading of the adjudication provision's
"foreign affairs function" exemption might be gleaned from the
action of the United States Supreme Court when it subjected deportation proceedings to the AP A's adjudication provision despite its
"foreign affairs function" exemption.172 But the Court did not discuss the scope of this exemptive language and the holding was seemingly dictated by constitutional concerns.173 These concerns would
not be present with regard to any effort to define the scope of this
exemption in the rule-making provision. The Constitution does not
169. Freedman, supra note 49, at 27, quoting LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13,
at 199, 257.
170. Freedman, supra note 49, at 26.
171. Id. at 27.
172, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
173. The Court appeared worried that if such a proceeding were excluded from the
statutory requirements of a trial-type hearing imposed by the adjudication provision,
a serious question of due process would be presented. 339 U.S. at 49-51. This conflict
between the interpretation of the term "foreign affairs function" in the rule-making
provision and the interpretation of the term in the adjudication provision is noted in
Parker, Federal Administrative Regulations: A General Survey, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 324,
347-48 n.172 (1952).
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require any public participation in administrative rule-making of
the sort prescribed by section 553(b)-(e).174 As a consequence, the
most important consideration supporting such a restrictive reading
of the term "foreign affairs function" in the adjudication provision
is absent with respect to a reading of that term in the rule-making
provision.
But there are, after all, other very good reasons for a similar
reading of the term in the two provisions. The language of the two
provisions is the same; the legislative history of both provisions on
this question is also the same and would justify this result; and the
House Report on the AP A specifically noted that "the term 'foreign
affairs' is used in [the adjudication provision, section 5] in the same
sense as section 4 [the rule-making provision]."175 Furthermore, as
noted earlier, the section 553(a)(l) exemptions should be read narrowly anyway. If, therefore, the "foreign affairs function" exemption
must, in order to satisfy possible constitutional objections, be read to
exclude from the adjudication provision only cases in which compliance with its requirements would interfere with the conduct of
foreign affairs by clearly provoking undesirable international consequences, it should be read the same way in the rule-making provision. A number of possible difficulties with this conclusion exist,
however.
As previous discussion has demonstrated, this "undesirable consequences" construction of section 553(a)(l) has certainly not been
accepted by most of the agencies claiming to issue rules in the foreign affairs area. And it is also at odds with the exemptive provision's
much more general language-all rule-making is excluded from section 553 "to the extent that there is involved ... a foreign affairs
function." No qualifying language of any sort appears in the exemption. This construction is also inconsistent with the very slight and
perhaps unreliable judicial authority on the subject. One court
maintained by way of a very general dictum that "immigration, dealing with the admission and expulsion of aliens, is an exercise of a
sovereign power in international relations" and, therefore, all rulemaking on that subject is excluded from section 553 by the "foreign
174. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 5, §§ 6.05, 7.06, 7.08. See also R. LoRCH, DEMOCRAUC
PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 96 (1969): "Common law does not require a lawmaker
(by that is meant a statute maker or an ordinance maker or a rulemaker) to listen. Nor
does the U.S. Constitution. However, the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act does require agencies in most situations" to follow the procedures specified therein requiring
agencies to listen before they make rules.
175. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 261.
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affairs function" exemption. 176 However, the significance of this judicial language may be small in light of the Justice Department's
contrary position on the issue. 177
Exemption from section 553 of only that particular rule-making
which involves "foreign affairs functions," and whose compliance
with usual procedures would harm the conduct of our international
relations by producing undesirable international consequences, may
also be objected to on another basis. Sections 553(b)(B) and (d)(3)
exclude rule-making covered by section 553 from usual procedures
when those procedures would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." There can be no doubt that any rulemaking which involves "foreign affairs functions," and whose compliance with usual requirements would interfere with these functions by producing undesirable international consequences, would
be exempted by these provisions. Consequently, it may be argued
that such a narrow reading of the "foreign affairs function" exemption would make that provision redundant and unnecessary because
it would then be virtually congruent with the more specific exclusions of sections 553(b)(B) and (d)(3). Congress, therefore, must have
intended the section 553(a)(l) exclusions to be broader than
these more narrowly tailored provisions. Certainly this view is supported by the fact that, under the language of section 553(a)(l), rulemaking need only involve a "foreign affairs function" to be exempt.
This argument against the "undesirable consequences" construction of the section 553(a)(l) exemption is not convincing. Even if the
subsection (a)(l) exemption were read as suggested by this construction it would not be redundant because it would be broader than the
more specific "good cause" exemptions of sections 553(b)(B) and
(d)(3). Unlike the latter two, the former exemption would apply to
the right to petition granted by section 553(e) and would not require any statement of reasons in each case to justify its use. Furthermore, the "undesirable consequences" construction of the "foreign
affairs function" exemption of section 553(a)(l) has other virtues:
uniformity with the similar adjudication provision exemption-a result specifically intended by Congress-and also consistency with the
specific legislative history of the APA on this subject. It is worth re176. Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D. Va. 1949). United States

ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), also referred in a general way to
the exclusion of dangerous aliens as a foreign affair.
177. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 6 (Department of Justice), at 650 (Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that none of its rules "involved" "foreign
affairs" within the meaning of section 553(a)(l).).
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iterating that Congress did not intend this phrase "to be loosely interpreted to mean any function extending beyond the borders of the
United States but only those 'affairs' which so affect relations with
other governments that for example, public rule making provisions
would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international consequences."178
Nevertheless, this construction of the exemption has not been accepted in practice or theory by most federal agencies making rules
arguably within its ambit; nor has it been accepted by any court. It
is, in addition, inconsistent with the broad language employed in
section 553(a)(l). To complicate matters further, it should also be
noted that "when the total situations dealt with by the State Department [for example] are analyzed in terms of their constituent facts,
the distinction between 'foreign' and 'domestic' affairs frequently
turns out to be quite illusory." 179 The particular provision in question here is, therefore, vague in application under the "undesirable
consequences" construction or, for that matter, under any broader
construction. When these points are added to the fact that the burden
of proof is likely to be on the person who challenges an agency's
claim to exception under the "foreign affairs function" provision of
section 553(a)(l), the significance of this exclusion may be fully appreciated. And just as the courts may be particularly solicitous of
claims made by the Department of Defense for exemption under the
"military function" language, they may be equally solicitous of
claims made by the State Department for exemption under the
"foreign affairs function" language.
IV.

Is SECTION 553(a)(l) NECESSARY?

Federal agencies that make most of the rules involving "military
or foreign affairs functions" take the position that this exemption
is both justified and desirable. It is their view that repeal of section
553(a)(l) would somehow detrimentally interfere with the performance of their responsibilities in connection with such rule-making.
The specific reasons advanced to justify the exemption of rulemaking involving "military and foreign affairs functions" range in
character from the purely theoretical to the intensely practical. In
the following discussion an attempt will be made to enumerate and
1'78. LEGISLATIVE HisrORY, supra note 13, at 199, 25'7.
1'79. Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the Individual in International Economic Regulation, 1'7 AD. L. REv. 159, 164 (1965), citing
Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 591 (D.C. Cir. 195'7) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), quoting
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OUR FOREIGN POLICY 4 (General Foreign Policy Ser. No. 26, 1950):
"There is no longer any real distinction between 'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs."
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evaluate all of the possible reasons for the incorporation of section
553(a)(l) exclusions in the statute. Only then can it be ascertained
whether this exemption is justified in light of the important competing policies that favor public participation in rule-making.
One practical justification for the subsection (a)(l) exclusions
may be that their elimination would expand agencies' work loads,
increase the costs of carrying on these functions, and delay and
thereby generally interfere with the government's performance of
these particularly vital and sensitive functions. For example, with
respect to one set of rules that may involve a "military function," the
Department of Defense claimed:
The necessity for notice, public hearing, and publication, as well as
the opportunity for any interested person to petition for change or
repeal of a rule, would have the effect of so hindering and delaying
the supplementation and modification of these rules that [they]
would become unresponsive to the changing needs of both the Department of Defense and [those affected by them].1 so

The Department of Defense has also noted that the purpose of some
of the acts entrusting to it "military functions" "can be effectively
implemented by rules promulgated without the expense and administrative effort involved in participation by [the] general public."181 A comment made by the Department of the Treasury also
seemed to suggest that subjecting rules involving the subsection
(a)(l) functions to section 553 "would be unduly burdensome upon
the agencies."182 It has also been stated as a general proposition that
adherence to the requirements of section 553 for some rule-making
involving "military functions" may "interfere unduly with the operation and administration of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the military department" and, therefore, the "military function"
exemption is necessary.183
Elimination of the present subsection (a)(l) exemptions may also
appear undesirable because it would cause adherence to the procedures of section 553(b)-(e) in many cases where the public has little
interest in the rule-making or is unlikely to make a significant conISO. Letter from Neil E. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, to Senator
James Eastland, Feb. 20, 1964, in S. 166J Hearings, supra note 104, at 307.
181. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 292.
182. Letter from Fred B. Smith, Acting General Counsel of the Treasury, to
Senator James Eastland, Feb. II, 1964, in S. 166J Hearings, supra note 104, at 389.
183. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 347 (made
in regard to rules relating to correction of military or naval records). See also id. at
332-33 (in regard to rules involving the Discharge Review Boards); S. 166J Hearings,
supra note 104, at 389 (Department of Treasury).
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tribution to it. So, too, many rules involving one of these functions
may be so limited in their application or, for that matter, have such
a minimal public impact, that any solicitation of comment from the
public would be fruitless. It has, therefore, been argued that the
section 553(a)(l) exemptions are justified because many such rules
are not controversial, or would elicit no response from the public.
The Department of the Treasury has stated, for example, that "many
rules which must, or normally would, be adopted prior to any public
participation are not controversial."184 And the Post Office has
argued that these exemptions are justified with respect to those of
its rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" because
"[e]xperience has shown that the bulk of the Departmental regulations relating to management of the mails are not of sufficient substance or general interest to elicit responses when statutory rulemaking procedures are followed.'' 185
Additionally, it has been suggested that the section 553(a)(l) exclusions are justified because there is often no specially interested
and identifiable public whose views should be solicited with regard
to such rules, or because the affected members of the public have not
yet been identified or are not yet identifiable. As a consequence, adherence to the requirements of section 553 in such cases is a waste.
The Department of State sees this as a justification for the section
533(a)(l) exclusion, noting that many rule-making decisions involving such functions "are a matter of general concern to the American
public, and no one individual has a greater interest than any
other.''186 (The dubious logic here seems to be that since everyone is
interested, no one should have an opportunity to participate and
thereby possibly influence the decision makers!) And the Department of Defense has stated in justification for continuance of the
"military function exemption" that with respect to some rules implementing that function there is "no way of ascertaining, at the time
rules are made, which members of the public will be affected by the
rules" ;187 no one, therefore, is likely in such cases to utilize the opportunity for participation that would be created by agency adherence to section 553 requirements. It has also been more generally
alleged that requiring notice and public participation with respect
184. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 389.
185. 1969 Survey Response.
186. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322,
187. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 292
(justifying the administration of the resettlement program of reimbursement for moving expenses to the owners and tenants of land acquired by the military departments).
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to rules involving a "military or foreign affairs function" would "not
be particularly helpful or desirable.''188 In this connection the Department of Defense has stated:
[B]earing in mind the broad definition in section 2 of "rulemaking,"
would it be wise to subject to the requirements of notice, formal
consultation, and hearing the issuance of regulations governing such
widely diverse military functions as the operation of the Reserve
officers' training program in civilian educational institutions, the
determination and designation of vital industrial facilities in support
of military mobilization production programs, the implementation
of the Defense scientific and technical information program, or the
choice between commercial or military transportation facilities for
military supplies or personnel? Such regulations govern military functions which do not appear to fall within the exception for "any
matter relating to internal management or personnel of an agency."
Yet subjecting the promulgation of such regulations to the formal
requirements of rulemaking is not likely to be of benefit to anyone
either within or outside the Department of Defense.189

Furthermore, if rule-making relating to "military and foreign
affairs functions" is subjected to the requirements of section 553(b)(e), in some cases the agencies involved in such rule-making and
those members of the public most directly affected may be placed in
adversary positions, thereby discouraging mutual cooperation toward finding the best solution to common problems. On that basis,
it may be argued, the present exemption for rule-making involving
these functions should be maintained.
Repeal of subsection (a)(l) may also be objected to on another
general ground. Forcing adherence to the mandates of section 553
for any subsection (a)(l) rule-making would inevitably result in some
loss of flexibility for such rule-making. The Post Office stated, as an
example, that repeal of these exemptions "would be disadvantageous
in that it would require the following of formalized procedures with
attendant delays and loss of flexibility without corresponding benefit."1110 A related argument is that elimination of these exemptions
would discourage agencies from making worthwhile changes in rules
involving these functions because of the more formal and particularized procedures that would be required. The Post Office also suggested that subjugation of these rules to section 553 "would result
188. 1969 Survey Response (Commerce Department, OFDI).
189. Letter from L. Niederlehner, Acting General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, to Senator James Eastland, July 23, 1964, in S. 166:J Hearings, supra note 104,
at 492-94.
190. 1969 Survey Response.

274

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:221

primarily in the ... discouragement of desirable changes and would
result in an overformalization of mail management." 191 Other agencies promulgating such rules might well make a similar point.
Section 553(a)(I) is also said to be justified on the ground that in
its absence, there would be uncertainty in some cases about whether
public rule-making procedures must be followed, and thus litigation
or use of those procedures in inappropriate situations would result.
The Department of Defense reported, for example, that the primary
disadvantage to that agency of eliminating the broad exclusions in
section 553 would be "uncertainty," because the extent to which
its rule-making fits under the more limited exemptions found
within section 553(b)-(e) was unclear. This "leads the Department
of Defense to fear a rash of litigation testing . . . [its] interpretation
of these [other exemptions]." 192
The current exemptions may also be considered necessary for
another reason. In some cases, section 553 procedures may be an insufficient means by which to assure that the relevant people participate adequately in rule-making relating to the exempted subjects.
Requiring adherence to those procedures in the subsection (a)(l)
situations, therefore, might sometimes force an agency to follow two
sets of procedures in order to involve the proper people. In addition,
it may be alleged that "military and foreign affairs function" exemptions are necessary because some rules involving these functions may
require joint action by two authorities. In such cases, one may argue,
the procedures of section 553 may be irrelevant, wasteful, and useless. They would only induce communication by the public to an
agency with respect to proposed rules that the agency does not have
a completely free hand in shaping. (The dubious logic here seems to
be that if two agencies have to agree on the rules the public should
have an opportunity to influence neither!) The Post Office has seemingly accepted this view. It has noted that
[t]his would be particularly true in the international area where
Departmental regulations are developed by negotiation with foreign
postal authorities and are not subject to unilateral variation by the
Department. Similarly in the administration of the mail service for
the Armed Forces regulations are developed by or in conjunction
with the Department of Defense and are not subject to unilateral
modifications.193
191. 1969 Survey Response.
192. 1969 Survey Response. See also S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 307 ("Absent
a decision by a court of competing [sic] jurisdiction in each particular case, the validity
of any rule could be subject to challenge ••••"); Letter from Frederick. G. Dutton,
Assistant Secretary of State, to Senator James Eastland, Dec. 6, 1963, in id. at 385-87.
193. 1969 Survey Response.
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There are significant difficulties with all of these general justifications for the current section 553(a)(l) exclusions. In the first place,
they do not distinguish rule-making relating to these particular exempted categories as a class from rule-making now subjected to the
requirements of section 553(b)-(e). Every one of the arguments outlined as justifications for excluding subsection (a)(l) rule-making
from section 553's procedures could also be made with respect to
those classes of rule-making already subject to the usual rule-making
procedures. If these exclusionary justifications were found wanting
with respect to that rule-making currently within the scope of section
553, should they not be found similarly wanting with respect to the
kinds of rule-making currently exempt from section 553?
For example, the complaint that increased cost and work load,
general delay, duplication, and the like will result if the currently
excepted rule-making must follow the requirements of section
553(b)-(e) could also be made with respect to the run-of-the-mill
rule-making that we have already decided to subject to those provisions.194 The argument that adherence to usual rule-making procedures in these cases will, as a general proposition, reduce needed
flexibility, cause uncertainty and litigation, be a waste in many cases,
and discourage needed changes in rules, could also undoubtedly be
used to support the exemption of all the currently included rulemaking. Similarly, the assertion that subjugation of such rule-making
to section 553 will, in many cases, be unfruitful, or of no real benefit
to the agency or the public, could be made about much rule-making
already included in section 553. If the policy of public participation
is deemed sufficiently important to risk some of these possible consequences for the rule-making already subject to the APA rule-making
provision, it is also worth risking them to bring rule-making involving "military and foreign affairs functions" within those requirements.
A second major defect with many of the arguments discussed
above is that they do not apply to all such rule-making. That is,
arguments seeking to justify an unqualified, across-the-board exemption for all rule-making involving "military and foreign affairs functions" on the ground that it is unreasonable or unwise to require
some or even a large part of such rule-making to be conducted in
accordance with section 553, must necessarily be considered inadequate. If public participation is as important as our society seems to
194. The Administrative Conference has concluded that these burdens are insufficient to exclude all rule-making relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits,
or contracts" from section 553. See Recommendation No. 16, supra note 8.
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think it is, exemption should only be granted for those particular
cases in which the benefit is not worth the burden. Although the
arguments discussed previously may suggest that the benefit is not
worth the burden in some or even many cases of rule-making involving these particular functions, they do not demonstrate that conclusion for all of such rule-making as a class.
It has been claimed, however, that inclusion within the coverage
of section 553 of all rule-making involving "military and foreign
affairs functions" as a class would be more deleterious than the inclusion of other classes of rule-making within that provision. The
Department of State noted specifically that the general "need for
speed and flexibility in making decisions ... [has] necessarily led
to different procedures [for foreign affairs function rule-making]
than would otherwise prevail."195 The Department of Defense would,
no doubt, take a similar position with respect to rule-making involving "military functions." It has also been claimed that the general nature of the subjects involved in this kind of rule-making, or
the general nature of these functions, justifies the unqualified exemptions found in section 553(a)(l), since rule-making involving
"military or foreign affairs functions" touches on matters of a peculiarly sensitive and delicate nature. Thus, the Department of State
has noted that "where foreign policy considerations may be paramount . . . it is readily apparent that the Department requires a
free hand to be able to discharge its missions." 196 Application of
section 553 to rule-making involving "foreign affairs functions" is
consequently said to he inappropriate. Also of significance is the
statement that "freedom of executive action has long been regarded
as necessary and desirable" in any function involving "foreign affairs
of the United States."191 "[S]uch rules, by their very nature, are not
generally adaptable to notice or public rulemaking proceedings."198
More specifically, the Department of Commerce has stated that
the "processes of international negotiation and the administration of
international agreements ... simply do not lend themselves to the
formal rulemaking requirements set out in section 4 . . . ."199 The
Department of the Treasury has made a similar statement with regard to the operations of its Office of Foreign Assets Control. It main195. Letter from William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, to Senator
James Eastland, April 10, 1967, in S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 388.
196. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387.
197. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control).
198. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 927.
199. s. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 373 (Department of Commerce).
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tained that section 553 procedures were inappropriate to the "foreign
affairs functions" of the Office for the following reason, among others:
[W]hen a partial relaxation of an embargo is contemplated in a particular area, the basic policy decision is either a foreign policy decision which it is not practicable to hold hearings on-or it is an
administrative policy decision that the economic warfare objectives
of the Control would not be jeopardized by the contemplated relaxation. In either case, the decision is not one which can usefully be
subjected to public hearings.200
The Department of State has similarly suggested that the actual
formulation of foreign policy as such is a singularly inappropriate
subject, by its nature, for formal rule-making procedures. The
Department noted:
Last year the Government of France made clear that it was no
longer willing to participate in the military activities of the North
Atlantic Alliance. This French decision required the United States to
re-examine its policies toward France and in relation to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. These policy determinations ranged
from the most specific-such as where NATO headquarters should
be relocated and what claims the United States and NATO should
press vis-a-vis France-to the most general-such as how to organize
and operate an effective NATO without France and how to conduct
Western relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Could a formal rule-making proceeding have made a meaningful
contribution to policy determinations such as these? ... [W]e should
note that there are no statutory standards here to be interpreted or
developed through rule-making. The problem of the Executive
Branch in dealing with questions of European security is quite different from that confronting a regulatory agency operating under a
statutory grant of authority.201

As a result, the Department concluded, "The inappropriateness and
impracticability of applying the formal procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act to the functioning of the Department of
State in the field of foreign policy" is clear.202
On a similar basis it may, of course, be argued that "the inappropriateness and impracticability of applying the formal procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act to the functioning of the
Department of" Defense in the performance of its "military functions" is clear. It can be maintained with a vigor equal to that of
the Department of State that formulation of strategic military
200. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control).
201. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 821-22.
202. Id. at 821.
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policy, including the drawing up and adoption of battle plans for
various eventualities, and the organization, deployment, and use of
the armed forces as part of those plans, is also, by its nature, a
singularly inappropriate subject for formal rule-making procedures.
There are typically "no statutory standards here to be interpreted
or developed through rule-making," just as there are said to be
none in the foreign policy example offered by the Department of
State.
There are a number of difficulties inherent in the above arguments. In the first place, is it a foregone conclusion that merely because there are no statutory standards to guide an administrator in
his formulation of policy, public participation is either unsuitable
or undesirable? The answer to this question seems clearly to be "no."
One of the chief benefits of public participation is the education of
the administrator with respect to any and all matters that may be
relevant to his making a wise rule-making decision. The public's
ability to do this is in no way diminished by the lack of statutory
standards ultimately available to guide the decision maker. Indeed, because of this lack, public participation may be even more
desirable in such cases than where more detailed strictures are provided by Congress.
Second, is it also clear, for instance, that the public would have
had nothing of value to contribute to foreign policy formulation,
which the Department of State viewed as singularly unfit for section
553 procedures? If it had been provided an opportunity to do so,
might the public have had something worthwhile to contribute to
the formulation of Viet Nam policy in the early 1960's? Only a firm
belief in official omniscience and public impotency would dictate a
negative answer for all such situations. Such a conclusion would
also be particularly out of place in a country like ours committed to
the democratic process and sovereignty of the people.
Nevertheless, section 553 procedures are undoubtedly inappropriate in the formulation of armed forces strategic war plans, or in
the formulation of foreign policy, such as our posture toward France
when she terminates her association with NATO. But, as will be
noted shortly, there are other reasons than the mere lack of statutory
standards or the particular nature of the policy decision in question
that dictate the unreasonableness of any requirement of public
participation in "military or foreign affairs" decisions of this particular type. The fact that these types of policy formulation or "rulemaking" will be shown to deserve exemption from usual section
553 procedures does not, however, justify the much wider scoped
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and unqualified exemption of subsection (a)(I). These examples
prove only that there are specific types of rule-making or specific
situations-perhaps encountered more frequently in rule-making
involving "military or foreign affairs functions" than with most
other kinds of rule-making-in which usual rule-making procedures
are inappropriate. These examples of situations in which an exemption from usual procedures is warranted do not, however, prove
that all subsection (a)(I) rule-making, or even the overwhelming
bulk of it for that matter, would suffer any more from subjugation
to the terms of section 553 than other rule-making already included
therein. Nor do they prove that section 553 procedures are any more
inappropriate to all such rule-making because of its peculiar nature,
than to other rule-making currently covered by that section.
Was the Department of Defense correct when it offered as an
example of a "horrible" the fact that absent the "military function"
exemption-which it thought necessary and desirable-its rulemaking involving ROTC programs at civilian universities would
become subject to section 553? Is the Department of State correct
when it assumes that all rule-making involving the International
Educational Exchange Service is necessarily inappropriate for the
application of section 553 procedures?203 One is hardly shocked by
the general proposition that rule-making involving these programs
should be subjected to the normal requirements imposed by section
553(b)-(e) including, of course, its narrow exceptions for special
circumstances that will be discussed in more detail later.
There is no doubt, however, that agencies making rules involving "military and foreign affairs functions," as with other functions,
must be able to react quickly in emergency situations, or in any
other circumstance where the proper performance of their functions
requires rapid action. There are many such situations, and they
probably occur with greater frequency in rule-making involving
subsection (a)(l) functions than in rule-making involving other
functions. The Treasury Department has stated, as an example,
that three recent changes in rules involving "foreign affairs func•
tions" could not have followed usual procedure because they "were
prompted by the immediately impending effective date of amend•
ments to social security legislation effecting payments to certain
alien beneficiaries, and implemented assurances, which had to be
acted upon expeditiously."204 The same department has also stated
203. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 931.
204. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Accounts and
Treasurer's Office).
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with regard to the rule-making conducted by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control that "it is often essential in issuing public documents,
that the Control act without delay." 205 Consider also the following
comment by a Department of State official dealing with the need for
an exclusion from usual rule-making procedures for the formulation
of certain foreign policy, based upon the need for speed alone.
Let us take another, very recent example of a problem situation
in foreign policy-one in which the speed of developments would
have made impractical the application of Administrative Procedure
Act procedures to the decision-making process. I invite the Subcommittee to consider last month's military coup in Greece.
Immediately upon the occurrence of that coup and in the days
thereafter the Department of State was confronted with a range of
issues, some of which required immediate decision. There was the
question whether to communicate with those who had seized power
and in what fashion, what attitude to take toward the seizure,
whether action needed to be taken for the safety of Americans, how
we might most effectively promote a return to democracy within
Greece, and a number of other issues. I do not think it can seriously
be argued that there was time for such a proceeding.2oa
In order to discharge their obligations properly, therefore,
agencies making rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" must be able to respond quickly when the need arises. That
is, they must be able to alter their rules at once when immediate
action is necessary to accomplish or preserve the objectives of their
programs. In such a situation there is no time to publish advance
notice of the rules in question, to provide an opportunity for public participation therein, or to delay their effective date. These requirements must be set aside where necessary speedy action would
be impaired. The formulation of foreign policy and strategic military plans will very often fit within this circumstance because speed is
frequently of the essence in those particular sorts of policy-making.
There are also specific occasions involving subsection (a)(l)
rule-making in which advance public procedures of the type listed in
section 553 may either cause the very evil that the proposed rules
are designed to avoid, seriously impair the ability of the agency to
perform its "military or foreign affairs function," or produce other
serious undesirable consequences. In those particular circumstances
an exemption from usual procedures for subsection (a)(l) rule-mak205. 1969 Survey Response.
206. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322 (Mr. Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser,
Department of State).
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ing is obviously necessary. An example is furnished by the Department of the Treasury:
In general, rule-making by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
involves foreign affairs functions of the United States. The chief
rule-making activity of the Office involves the imposition of a trade
and financial embargo on quasi-enemy countries. It would be impossible to have notice and public hearing prior to imposition of
such an embargo. For example, if it were publicly known that the
United States were definitely going to impose a financial embargo on
a particular country at a certain time, there would within a matter
of several hours be a virtually complete transfer of all its public and
private liquid assets to other countries. Obviously, therefore, public
hearings would nullify the proposed embargo entirely.207

A similar point may be made about the Textile Program administered by the Department of Labor. That rule-making is said to be
exempt from section 553 because of the "foreign affairs function"
exclusion:
The program includes negotiation of international bilateral agreements with foreign countries concerning cotton textiles and cotton
textile products; requests by the United States that a country or
countries voluntarily limit their exports to the United States of categories of cotton textiles or products not to exceed a specific level;
and, under certain circumstances, unilateral imposition by the United
States of import controls on such shipments to the United States.
The program also includes administration of the multilateral agreement (the Long Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade
in Cotton Textiles, of February 9, 1962).
Compliance with the notice requirements of section 4 could
stimulate exports from foreign countries and imports into the United
States of great quantities of goods which might later be subject to
ceiling limits. Such action might have an adverse effect on the textile
program.2os

Other statements of a more general nature have suggested different evils that might be caused if some section 553(a)(l) rule-making
were required to follow usual procedures. For example, the Department of Justice noted that a
207. 1969 Survey Response. See also S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 392 (De•
partment of the Treasury):
If, for example, notice of an order (a rule under the definitions in the bill)
to block the assets in the United States of certain foreign nationals were given,
the holders of the assets would have opportunity to withdraw them before the
action could be taken. If notice were given 0£ proposed regulations restricting
the export or import of gold or its use abroad by persons under U.S. jurisdiction,
speculation would be inevitable and the effectiveness of the regulations would
be reduced.
208. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 241.
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requirement of public participation in all proceedings for the promulgation of rules to govern our relationship with other nations ...
inevitably would encourage public demonstrations by extremist
factions which might embarrass foreign officials and seriously prejudice our conduct of foreign affairs.209
This suggestion that the possibility of public protest over proposed
rules involving our foreign affairs should itself be deemed a sufficient ground upon which to dispense with the normal procedures
seems, at best, dubious. One need not, however, agree with that conclusion to agree with another. Federal agencies making rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" must be freed from
the rule-making requirements of advance notice and public participation when adherence to these requirements would induce serious
undesirable consequences that the government has a right to avoid,
such as frustrating the immediate or ultimate purposes for which
the rules are made.
Most strategic military policy formulation and most strategic
foreign policy formulation, if they are "rule-making," will need to
be exempted from usual rule-making procedures on this basis. Adherence to section 553 requirements for these particular kinds of
rule-making will usually either cause the very evil sought to be
avoided, or will frustrate the immediate or ultimate purposes of the
rule-making involved, or will otherwise seriously impair the ability
of the agency to perform its "military or foreign affairs functions"
properly. That is, publication of advance notice prior to the adoption
of strategic military or foreign policy plans will usually seriously
interfere with or destroy their utility; such advance publication may
also cause serious harm to our nation's ability to defend itself
effectively or to protect its interests abroad. Illustrations of this kind
of policy-making for which an exemption from usual procedures is
necessary for the above reasons probably include the State Department's examples with respect to France and Greece, cited earlier in
this section. Other examples are such things as policy formation with
regard to the military steps we will take in any given circumstance
if our country, its possessions, or our armed forces or citizens abroad
are attacked or threatened, and the precise nature of our political
and military response to the capture of an American ship at sea by
a foreign power.
Of course, any rule-making that is exempted from the publica209. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 363. See also id. at 392 (Department of
Treasury).
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tion requirements of the freedom-of-information provision of the

APA because it is "specifically required by Executive order to be

kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy"210
must similarly be excepted from the usual advance notice and public
participation requirements of section 553. After all, if the rules involved "should be kept confidential in the national interest,"211 it is
hardly possible, without violating this confidentiality, to give advance
notice of the type required by section 553 and to accord the public
an opportunity to comment thereon. This, too, would have the effect
of excluding most strategic military planning, most strategic foreign
policy planning, and some other rule-making that involves "military
and foreign affairs functions" generally, from usual rule-making
procedures required by section 553.
Another situation in which some section 553(a)(I) rule-making
should be exempt from the usual requirements of public participation may be posited. In certain instances all of the pertinent or useful information relating to the form and desirability of a given rule
is necessarily within the exclusive possession of the national government because, for example, that information is a military secret
or otherwise privileged from disclosure. Advance notice of the proposed rule and an opportunity to participate therein would be useless and a predictable waste in that situation because the public
could not, by definition, contribute anything of real value to improve
the product of the agency's decision-making process. Requiring adherence to usual procedures in such cases would, therefore, be
unreasonable. Situations of this type undoubtedly occur more frequently in rule-making that involves a "military or foreign affairs
function" than in rule-making that involves other functions.
The Department of Treasury, for example, has justified the
exemption of section 553(a)(I) rules promulgated by its Office of
Foreign Assets Control on the ground that
the matters with which the Control deals are almost invariably
confidential. Frequently, the most important and confidential foreign
or military affairs activities of the United States are involved. From
the private viewpoint substantially all activities of the Control cover
privileged matters.212
A somewhat expanded version of this last view has been expressed
by the Department of State as a basis for excluding rule-making in210. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970).
2II. S. 166J Hearings, supra note 104, at 392 (Department of Treasury).
212. 1969 Survey Response.
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volving "military or foreign affairs functions" from usual procedures.
It first notes that "in the making of foreign policy decisions much
of the information that must be relied upon is not publicly available
and indeed cannot be made public."213 This has "necessarily led to
different procedures than would otherwise prevail."214 The rationale
for the different procedures was more fully explained as follows:
[F]ormal rule-making procedures seem primarily intended for and
work best in situations where the rule-maker can be assisted through
a presentation of the interplay of all interests at stake. In the case
of a rule-making proceeding in the field of foreign policy, however,
it seems clear that in many cases the most important considerations
would fail of representation. Only the Department would be privy to
many such considerations and often it could be awkward and of
possible embarrassment to relations with other countries for the Department to bring these considerations to the fore. The result would
be that the rule-making proceeding, far from affording an elucidation of the reasons behind a policy decision, would provide a distorted picture of the decision-making process.211>
More specifically, the Department of State noted in 1957 that the
Passport Office "does not . . . invite public participation in rulemaking. Many of the changes are quickly made as the result of
confidential information concerning the international situation, the
disclosure of which might affect foreign relations."216
One can hardly quarrel with the assertion that exemption from
usual rule-making procedures should be provided in those particular
cases where all relevant or useful information necessary to the making
of the specific policy decision involved is within the exclusive possession of the government because it is secret "in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy,"217 or because it is otherwise
privileged. However, one may question why normal rule-making
procedures should also be dispensed with when only some of the
information relevant to a fully informed policy choice is in the exclusive possession of the government. To the extent that the public
can, through normal participation procedures, add to the storehouse
of information maintained by the agency on the subject, the ultimate
decision may be improved. That is, the mere fact that some information directly relevant to the rule-making decision in question is
·within the exclusive possession of the government does not vitiate
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322 (Mr. Leonard Meeker).
Id. at 388 (Department of State).
Id.
1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 946.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970).
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the usefulness of a section 553 proceeding since other directly relevant information is available to the public. As a consequence, the
agency still may learn something from the public's participation.
The fact that the agency may finally make its decision in such a case
on the basis of that information justifiably held secret does not
change this conclusion. Public participation procedures were not
intended to inform the public; rather, they were intended to educate
the agency. Indeed, under normal section 553 procedures the public
will not even know the precise content of the materials submitted
in the rule-making process unless those who make such submittals
to the agency publicize their contents, or unless some member of
the public specifically demands to see those materials, as he has a
right to do under the freedom-of-information provision of the Act. 218
On the other hand, this line of reasoning may be vulnerable on
the ground that an exception limited to the situation where all of
the information relevant to the rule-making decision is necessarily
within the exclusive control of the agency is illusory. In every case
where a rule involving a "military or foreign affairs function" is
made, some relevant and important information bearing on that
decision will be available to the public. More importantly, however,
the Department of State has made a good point when it asserts that
public procedures are inappropriate for those cases of rule-making
where the ultimate decision is likely to be made on the basis of
information that is necessarily in the exclusive possession of the government. In such cases, opinions expressed to the agency by members
of the public availing themselves of the opportunity furnished by
section 553 will usually be of little value since they are based on
incomplete information. The agency, therefore, is unlikely to give
them great weight.
Public participation in such cases might, however, still be of
value in assuring that the decision maker is fully informed since it
may induce submission to the agency of some important relevant
information that is in the public sector and not previously known
by the agency; or it may furnish the agency with opinion, based on
information in the public sector, that is of substantial value in making the ultimate decision. In terms of a cost-benefit analysis this may
suggest that public procedures are worth the cost even when some
of the information directly relevant to the decision is not available
to the public because it is privileged. On the other hand, those procedures are not worth the cost when the information that is neces218. 5

u.s.c.

§

552 (1970).
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sarily the most important or relevant factor in making the final
rule-making decision is not available to the public. Consequently, it
may be desirable to exempt rule-making involving a "military or
foreign affairs function" from normal procedural requirements in
the latter case but not in the former.
There is another class of situations involving subsection (a)(I)
rule-making in which adherence to the usual procedures involving
advance notice and an opportunity to participate may be deemed
unreasonable. A situation occasionally arises in which the rule-making in question is so insignificant or minor in nature and impact that
utilization of these procedures may be a complete and predictable
waste. A rule requiring persons receiving passports to sign them in
ink or ball point rather than in pencil or crayon surely does not
require public participation-nor, of course, do technical or other
purely ministerial amendments to an existing rule. Rule-making of
this sort should, therefore, not be subject to usual section 553 procedures.
Previous discussion demonstrated that in certain types of cases
rule-making involving "military or foreign affairs functions" should
not be required to follow the usual procedures mandated by section
553. Specific situations exist in which the policies favoring public
participation in rule-making are outweighed by the conflicting need
to operate our government efficiently, expeditiously, effectively, and
inexpensively. These situations, however, break down into a number
of well-defined classes that can be dealt with individually. They do
not, therefore, constitute an adequate justification for the exemption
of all rule-making activity involving the excepted functions; rather,
they only suggest that suitable, narrowly drawn exceptions be provided for these particular types of cases. As subsequent discussion
will demonstrate, a more narrowly tailored exemption already on
the statute books can deal adequately with those cases of section
553(a)(l) rule-making that need special treatment. Consequently, no
persuasive reason appears to justify continuation of the present unqualified and across-the-board exemption for all rule-making involving "military or foreign affairs functions."
A number of federal agencies making rules of this sort have at
least tacitly recognized that an unqualified exemption for all rulemaking involving these functions is unnecessary. The Department
of State, for example, has noted that section 553 procedures are
appropriate for at least some rule-making involving "foreign affairs
functions." In the course of congressional hearing-s on administra-
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tive-procedure reform, a spokesman for the Department emphasized
that
I want to make perfectly clear that I am not proposing that formal
procedures are inappropriate to the exercise of all foreign affairs
functions. I do believe that the Department is already fulfilling the
underlying purposes of the proposed amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act in those cases where formal procedures are suitable.219
(This last point is, of course, debatable.) Consider also in this connection the following additional statement by the Department of
State.
With respect to its regulatory activities, the Department has in
the past published notice of proposed rulemaking in those areas
not vitally impregnated with foreign policy considerations. Examples
of this are found in various routine visa procedures. There are, however, other areas where foreign policy considerations may be paramount. In such areas, it is readily apparent that the Department
requires a free hand to be able to discharge its mission. Examples of
this are the determination of geographical limitations of general
applicability on the issuance of passports and munitions control area
in toto. 220
Referring to its rules involving "military and foreign affairs
functions," the Department of the Treasury similarly asserted that
"in many instances public participation in rule-making would be
desirable, although not required with respect to the matter specified.
The determination in any specific case, however, would have to be
made with reference to the controlling facts and circumstances."221
The Department of Defense has also tacitly admitted that an unqualified, across-the-board exemption for all rule-making involving
"military functions" is unnecessary by voluntarily following section
553 procedures for at least some rule-making that may involve a
"military function." 222
It may be argued that since usual rule-making procedures are
inappropriate for a substantially larger portion of subsection (a)(l)
rule-making than for most other kinds of rule-making, the whole
219. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322 (Mr. Leonard Meeker).
220. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387.
221. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. IO (Department of the Treasury), at 1017.
222. Id., pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 286: "Many of the rules considered
herein are of military or naval significance. Since the procedures in paragraph 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act are followed in all cases, there has been no need to
characterize particular rules as involving or not involving military or naval functions."
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class-all "military and foreign affairs function" rule-makingshould be exempted from section 553 without qualification. The
argument is that the burden of individually excluding, on a caseby-case basis, each one of those many particular instances of such rulemaking that should be excluded from normal procedures is too great,
when compared to the benefits obtained from those relatively few
cases in which such rule-making should follow usual procedures.
This view ought to be rejected for several reasons.
First, the number of situations in which rule-making involving
"military or foreign affairs functions" should follow usual section
553 procedures is probably much larger than the affected agencies
would admit. Closer examination reveals that in many of the instances of such rule-making for which agencies claim exemption
from section 553, the claims are unjustified in terms of actual need.
What is more, past performance suggests that the overly broad
exclusionary actions of the agencies with respect to public participation in these kinds of rule-making are unlikely to change very much
absent a statutory requirement to the contrary or the credible threat
of such a requirement. Second, the policy in favor of public participation is so weighty that it should be rejected only if the burden of
administering a system of more narrowly tailored exemptions than
those presently found in subsection (a)(l) is unduly large. As will be
demonstrated, this is not a problem here. An existing, narrowly
tailored exemption can exclude appropriate subsection (a)(l) rulemaking from usual procedures without excluding rule-making undeserving of that treatment; and it can do so without imposing an
unduly large administrative burden on those charged with deciding
whether particular rule-making involving these functions must follow
ordinary procedures or is exempt from them for good cause.
One last point should be noted with respect to the undesirability
of the existing subsection (a)(l) exemptions. Discussion in earlier
portions of this Article has demonstrated the vagueness of the terms
"military function" and "foreign affairs function." The unusually
large difficulty encountered in any effort to define satisfactorily their
exact scope has meant, in practice, that they are susceptible to very
wide application by agencies colorably entitled to rely on them. As
a consequence, section 553(a)(l) is also undesirable because its excessive vagueness facilitates more widespread evasion of the congressionally willed policy of public participation in rule-making than
Congress is likely to have intended. At the very least, this suggests
that subsection (a)(l) should be replaced with terms that are less
vague and more easily definable in practice. As noted, however, this
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is only an additional reason why section 553(a)(I) should not be
continued. The chief reason this exemption should be eliminated
is that it is unqualified and overbroad and, therefore, not justifiable
on its merits.

V. ARE

EXISTING EXEMPTIONS ADEQUATE

A FLAT REPEAL OF SECTION

To

SUPPORT

553(a)(l)?

Previous discussion has demonstrated that agencies making rules
involving "military or foreign affairs functions" must have freedom
to ignore usual rule-making procedures in various types of situations.
A flat repeal of section 553(a)(I) without more is, therefore, justified
only if other existing exemptive provisions would satisfactorily accomplish this result. The following discussion will examine legitimate agency needs for avoiding usual procedures in rule-making
involving "military or foreign affairs functions," and determine
whether existing exemptions, other than subsection (a)(l), can adequately meet these needs,
A.

The Secrecy Exemption of Section 552(b )(1)

Agencies must be allowed to ignore section 553 in those cases
where the rule involving a "military or foreign affairs function"
must be kept secret because of the harm to our "national defense or
foreign policy" that would occur if it were made public. It seems
clear, however, that where a rule is required to be kept secret under
section 552(b)(l), the freedom-of-information section's exemptive
provision, agencies may properly ignore usual rule-making requirements entirely without adversely affecting the validity of the rule in
question. Similarly, when an "Executive order" under section 552
(b)(I) mandates that the reasons for a rule, as opposed to the rule
itself, be kept secret in the interest of "national defense or foreign
policy," agencies would be excused from the section 553(c) requirement that the adopted rules incorporate "a concise general statement
of their basis and purpose." The point is that in the formulation and
promulgation of valid rules, agencies may ignore usual rule-making
procedures to the extent that adherence to those procedures would
interfere with a lawful secrecy requirement imposed by an executive
order issued pursuant to section 552(b)(l).
The present exemption from section 553 for rule-making involving a "military or foreign affairs function" is in no way necessary
to accomplish this result. If pursuant to an exemption from the freedom-of-information section an agency must keep certain :rule~ secrett
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or has the discretion to keep certain rules secret, advance notice and
an opportunity for public comment thereon can be dispensed with
despite the requirements of section 553. In such cases the effectiveness
of the rules involved would not be impaired because it seems obvious
that the publicity requirements of section 553 must be inapplicable
to rules that are required to be kept secret or may be kept secret pursuant to a specific exemption from section 552. Section 552(b)(l) itself
would, therefore, seem to dictate that if certain rules or the reasons
therefor are "specifically" required to be kept secret in the interest
of "national defense or foreign policy" by an "Executive order,"
they are necessarily exempted from all inconsistent requirements of
section 553. That is, an agency is not required to violate a proper
section 552(b)(l) executive order to comply with any provision of
section 553. This reading of section 552(b)(l) against section 553 is
the only sensible way to reconcile what otherwise might be conflicting demands imposed by the two sections. Furthermore, the only
situation in which an agency should be able to invoke secrecy as a
ground to justify avoidance of any usual rule-making procedures, is
when it may lawfully keep the rule, or the reasons therefor, secret
under section 552. Otherwise, it would be seeking to use secrecy as
a basis upon which to avoid usual rule-making procedures in a situation where section 552 confers upon the public a right to discover the
contents of the rule or the reasons for it.
It is clear that the term "secret" in this context means only that
the relevant matter needs to be kept confidential in order for the
agency to perform properly the function to which that matter pertains. That is, it
is not intended in the sense of the technical security classification
"secret" as defined in Section l(b) of Executive Order 10501, Safeguarding Official Information, but rather in the broad sense of
matters which in the interest of [national defense or] foreign policy
should not be prematurely disclosed, as for example, while international negotiations are pending or before restraint determinations
have been arrived at.22a

Section 552(b)(l), therefore, insulates from any inconsistent requirement of section 553, all facets of section 553(a)(l) rule-making that
must be kept secret in the broader sense because publicity would
in some way be injurious to the successful conduct of our "national
defense or foreign policy." To read section 552(b)(I) and section 553
223. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 373 (Department of Commerce). See 3 C.F.R.
306, 307 (1972).
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differently would be out-of-step with the purpose behind the recent
addition of the former's language to the APA.
Consequently, even if internal agency planning is regarded as
"rule-making" under the APA, virtually all strategic "military and
foreign affairs function" planning would be exempt from the requirements of section 553 on this basis. Secrecy with respect to strategic
planning will invariably be required by executive order because
revealing such plans will usually interfere with the very purpose
they seek to achieve-an advantage over our adversaries. As will
be seen, this is not the only basis under existing law whereby such
strategic planning, assuming it is deemed rule-making, would be
exempt from usual rule-making procedures in the event section
553(a)(l) is repealed.

B.

The Sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) Exemptions

While section 552(b)(l) may enable agencies to ignore usual
procedural requirements when they make section 553(a)(l) rules
that must be kept secret, what provisions may be used to exempt
the other situations mentioned earlier in this Article? If subsection
(a)(l) were repealed, would other exemptions assure that agencies
making rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" could
ignore usual procedures when they need to react quickly in emergency situations? Would other exemptions assure that agencies making such rules could ignore usual procedures when adherence to them
would cause the very evil that the rule seeks to avoid, defeat the
purpose of the rule, or result in other undesirable consequences?
Are usual procedures for making such rules currently avoidable
under exemptions other than subsection (a)(l) if the most important
information relating to the rules' form or desirability is necessarily
within the exclusive possession of the national government? Are the
usual procedures currently avoidable under other exemptions for
rules that are so insignificant or minor that public procedures are
predictably a complete waste of effort? As subsequent discussion will
demonstrate, the answer to all of the above questions is "yes."
According to section 553(b)(B), the provisions of section 553(b)(c) are inapplicable "when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the
rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." This exemption from two subsections of section 553 deserves careful examination.
It may satisfactorily handle all of the problems that would arise if
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the current exemption for rule-making involving "military or foreign
affairs functions" were repealed. And it may do so in a manner narrowly tailored to fit the specific problem. Section 553(b)(B) is especially narrowly tailored because it is qualified and limited, and
requires an administrative assessment of the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding each case of rule-making to which it is
sought to be applied. The reports of the Senate and House committees responsible for the APA clearly stated:
The exemption of situations of emergency or necessity is not an
"escape clause" in the sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms or the facts. A true and supported or supportable
finding of necessity or emergency must be made and published.22 4

By this, the committees intended to establish a restrictive meaning
for the phrase "when the agency for good cause finds," which precedes
the enumeration of the grounds upon which this particular exemption is available.
Therefore, the agencies are required under this provision to make
specific findings, and thus to meet what has been interpreted to be
a strict standard, before they can avail themselves of the exemption.
Although some commentators have argued that the courts should
not examine the accuracy of the required administrative finding
when the validity of an agency's use of this exemption arises in litigation,225 this finding is clearly judicially reviewable on the same
basis as any other finding committed to an agency's judgment.226
Thus, if the finding is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with law" or is "unsupported by substantial evidence" based on the whole record, it will, in a proper suit,
be set aside and the promulgated rule rendered invalid.227 Of course,
in such cases the presumption of validity will be, as it always is, with
the administrative agency, and the burden of overturning its finding
will rest upon the assailant.
224. LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 200, 258. See also id. at 358 (remarks
of Representative Walter).
225. See R. PARKER, AnMINISl'RATIVE I.Aw 182-83 (1952); Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 Iu.. L. REv. 368, 384-86 (1946).
226. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969); Durkin v. Edward S.
Wagner Co., 115 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), affd. per curiam sub nom. Mitchell v.
Edward S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
See also National Motor Freight Traffic Assn., Inc. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90
(D.D.C. 1967). In this last case, it is not clear whether section 553(b)(B) or section
553(b)(A) was involved.
227. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (2)(E) (1970). See also cases cited in note 226 supra.
But see Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), discussed
in text accompanying note 255 infra.
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There is one interpretation of section 553(b)(B) that should be
rejected at the outset. It can be argued that an agency seeking to
come within the section 553(b)(B) exemption must find that it is
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" for
the agency to follow the procedures of section 553(b) in each separate
rule-making case to which it seeks to apply the exemption, and that
it cannot make that finding wholesale for any narrowly tailored class
or group of rule-making situations. This interpretation relies upon
certain somewhat ambiguous language in the provision, "when the
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)." It also relies
upon the supposed intention of Congress to provide a means by
which individual cases could be separately considered on their own
merits, and an exemption granted only in those specific cases in
which it was justified on one of the grounds stated.
While the above argument has great merit and is a sound general
rule by which to construe section 553(b)(B), it overlooks two points.
First, it may be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest" to follow usual section 553 procedures in every instance of
a specific type of rule-making under a particular statute, when each
such instance is viewed in isolation. In those circumstances it seems
a waste to require repetitive and redundant findings and full publication of those :findings. As will be explained later, strategic military
planning and strategic foreign policy planning are examples of this
kind of situation.
Second, there are also situations where compliance with the procedures of section 553(b)-(c) is not "impracticable" or "contrary to
the public interest" as applied to any single instance of rule-making
on a given subject, but becomes so for a whole class if those requirements must be followed for all such similar instances of rule-making.
For example, so many different rules of a particular type may have
to be issued within a short time period that affording notice and an
opportunity to participate in every case would be practically impossible, and would frustrate the proper performance of the agency's
functions or cause other substantial deleterious consequences. Rules
promulgated for individual military bases by the commander of each
base in light of its peculiar conditions and circumstances may provide an example of this kind of situation. Certainly the day-to-day
orders of military superiors to inferiors, if they are rules, would serve
as an example. Procedures of the type specified in section 553 may
not be "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest" with
respect to any one such determination viewed in isolation; but those
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procedures may become so when they must be applied to all such
determinations.
The exemption contained in section 553(b)(B), therefore, should
be read to allow an agency to make the requisite finding for a whole
class of rule-making. But this should be permitted only if the agency
can make that finding either as to every individual instance of rulemaking within the class considered separately, or as to every individual instance of rule-making within the class because it would be
"impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest" to impose section
553 procedures in all instances. Of course, agencies must be required
to draw classes for this purpose as narrowly as possible so that no
more is excluded under this exception than is absolutely justifiable
in terms of the statutory criteria. Overbreadth of any kind in delineating such a class of rules should not be tolerated. Consideration
might also be given to shifting the burden of proof to the agency
with respect to such group delineations as opposed to individual cas~
delineations, and thus forcing the agency to justify its definition of
the "class" of rule-making it seeks to exclude from usual procedures.
Such a limitation, however, may not be necessary and may have some
undesirable consequences.
The Administrative Conference of the United States commented
on this subject when it proposed the "Elimination of Certain Exemptions [found in section 553(a)(2)] From the APA Rulemaking Requirements." The Conference concluded: A section 553(b)(B) finding
that adherence to usual procedures would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest . . • can be made, and
published in the Federal Register, as to an entire subject matter
concerning which rules may be promulgated. Each finding of this
type should be no broader than essential ...." 228 Similarly, while
in the United States Attorney General's Office, Justice Rehnquist
stated that "where it is evident to an agency that notice and public
procedure will always be inappropriate to a particular class of rulemaking, there is no objection to making this finding and basing
future actions upon it." He suggested, however, that "a boiler plate
recitation or incorporation by reference [of the class finding] must
be published as part of each rulemaking action" because this "is
more consistent with a literal interpretation of section 553(b)(B) and
seems to me to be the better practice." Justice Rehnquist was more
guarded in his response to the question, "whether an agency may
228. Recommendation No. 16, supra note 8, at 29-ll0.

December 1972]

Rule-Making

295

determine that notice and public procedure are 'impracticable' with
respect to a whole class of cases simply because of the unusually large
number of cases involved and despite the fact that as to any one such
case [viewed in isolation] such a procedure might not be impracticable." After suggesting that this question cannot be "answered in
the abstract," and expressing some uncertainty about its merits, he
stated that "the language of section 553(b)(B) is not so clear as to
preclude the interpretation ... [suggested and] it does not appear
that there is any authority which would rule out such an interpretation." Finally, Justice Rehnquist suggested that any doubt on this
issue could be completely eliminated "by legislative history made in
the course of the consideration of [an] amendment" of the type being
considered here. 220
The grounds specified in section 553(b)(B) upon which an agency
may dispense with the usual rule-making procedures are stated in the
alternative, so that any one of the three grounds listed is sufficient to
invoke the exemption.230 The first ground for a qualified exemption
is when the notice and participation requirements of section 553 are
found to be "impracticable." Websters defines this term as meaning, among other things, "infeasible," "impractical, unwise, imprudent."231 Earlier drafts of the APA would have made the exemption
available when the public rule-making procedures were "impracticable because of unavoidable lack of time or other emergency,"232 but
the qualifying language after "impracticable" was subsequently
dropped. The Senate and House reports on the APA stated that "impracticable" refers to a situation "in which the due and required
execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably prevented
by its undertaking public rulemaking proceedings."233
The term "unnecessary," which is the second exemptive ground
specified in section 553(b)(B), connotes something that is "not
necessary: useless, needless." 234 The legislative history indicates that
it must be unnecessary "so far as the public is concerned, as would
229. Undated letter from William Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Jerre Williams, Chairman, Administrative Conference of
the United States.
2!10. A1TORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at !10.
231. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 11!!6.
2!12. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note l!!, at 140, 148, 157. See also id. at 181, a draft
reading "impracticable because of unavoidable lack of time or other emergency affecting
public safety or health."
2!18. Id. at 200,258. Accord, ArroRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at 80.
2!14, WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 2504.
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be the case if a minor or merely technical amendment in which the
public is not particularly interested were involved."235 On this basis,
one court seems to have concluded that "unnecessary" applies to
situations in which an agency rule is "minor or emergency in character,"236 or " 'a routine determination,' 'insignificant in nature and
impact,' and unimportant 'to the industry and to the public.' " 237
Rule-making is also exempted by section 553(b)(B) from advance
notice and public participation when adherence to those procedures
would be "contrary to the public interest." According to the AP A's
legislative history, this phrase "supplements the terms 'impracticable'
or 'unnecessary'; it requires that public rule-making procedures shall
not prevent an agency from operating and that, on the other hand,
lack of public interest in rule-making warrants an agency to dispense
with public procedure."288 The Attorney General's Manual takes the
position that " '[p]ublic interest' connotes a situation in which the
interest of the public would be defeated by any requirement of advance notice.'' 239
At some point during their legislative history. all three terms"impracticable," "unnecessary," and "contrary to the public interest"
-were referred to as operating "only where facts and interests are
such that notice and proceedings are impossible or manifestly unnecessary,''240 and as exempting "situations of emergency or necessity."241 However, the weight of their legislative history. as well as
their language, clearly establishes that these terms were not meant
to be so narrowly limited. At the same time, it must be remembered
that these are qualified grounds for exemption and are not to be
construed more broadly than the demands of sound government administration and wise public policy require. It is worth repeating
that the section 553(b)(B) exemption is "not an 'escape' clause in the
sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms or the
facts.'' 242 An agency can use this exemption only if it has "good
cause" within the meaning of the AP A.
A more detailed description of how the section 553(b)(B) exemp235. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 200, 258. See also ATI'ORNEY GENERAL'S
MANuAL, supra note 13, at 31.
236. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1969).
237. 412 F.2d at 743, citing National Motor Freight Traffic Assn. v. United States,
268 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (D.D.C. 1967).
238. l.EcISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 200, 258.
239. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 31.
240. LEGISLATIVE HISIORY, supra note 13, at 358.
241. Id. at 200, 258.
242. Id. See text accompanying note 224 supra.
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tion might operate in practice demonstrates that it could satisfactorily handle all the problems resulting from a repeal of section
553(a)(l)-and in so doing, rationally accommodate the need for
public participation in rule-making, on the one hand, with the need
for efficient, effective, expeditious, and inexpensive government administration on the other. Although the terms "impracticable," "un•
necessary," and "contrary to the public interest" overlap to some
extent, an effort will be made to examine their applications sepa•
rately. But in light of the very close relationship between these terms,
the following analyses of their applications should also be considered
as partially overlapping.
Consider, first, the exemption for situations where public procedures are found to be "unnecessary." This could undoubtedly
perform the function intended by the exception for "minor revisions
and refinements of rules," which is found in several bills that sought
to rewrite section 553.243 Indeed, the existing language can probably
do so more satisfactorily because it is more narrowly tailored. For
example, the "unnecessary" exemption seems to cover situations
where a rule is in fact so minor, such as the rule requiring passports
to be signed in ink rather than in pencil, that public procedures
would be a predictable waste. Under this exemption public procedures may also be dispensed with for rules announcing exact rates
under statutes making the calculation of those rates purely minis•
terial because, for example, the rate set must be a certain specified
percentage of another known figure. 244 Similarly, usual rule-making
procedures are also "unnecessary" for mere technical changes in
regulations. If, for example, the statutory citations contained in a
regulation must be altered to conform to changes in the numbering
of the United States Code, or regulations are rewritten or reorganized purely to improve their style, and without altering their substance, it is obviously "unnecessary" to resort to public procedures.
Additionally, if all or the most important information relating
to the form or desirability of a rule is necessarily within the exclusive
possession of the national government, a section 553 rule-making
proceeding would seem unwarranted. In this circumstance, the pub243. See, e.g., S. 1663, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(b)(2) (1964).
244. See, e.g., 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 89, pt. 1 (Department of Agriculture),
at 26·27. The Department may dispense with usual procedures, under the "unnecessary"
exemption, for rules announcing the exact penalty rates applicable to marketing of
certain commodities in excess of the farm marketing quota. The Department's action
in those cases only involved a mathematical calculation, for the rates are set by law
as a certain percentage of parity or support price of the commodity as of a particular
date.
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lie could not contribute anything meaningful to improve the product
of the agency's decision-making process. Thus, by definition, adherence to usual procedures in situations of this sort would be
predictably unproductive, and hence "unnecessary." All, or the most
important, information relating to the form or desirability of a rule
may necessarily be in the exclusive possession of the national government because it is properly kept secret under section 552(b)(l). According to the agencies involved, this is particularly true with respect to a substantial amount of the rule-making involving "military
and foreign affairs functions." 245 To the extent they are right, such
rule-making may be exempted from usual procedure requirements
by section 553(b)(B).
Agencies should not be permitted to decide lightly that public
procedures are "unnecessary" within the meaning of this qualified
exemption. In Texaco~ Inc. v. FPC 246 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit considered an FPC regulation promulgated without
resort to the public procedures of section 553(b)-(c). The regulation
required natural gas companies to pay a compound interest rate, for
the first time, on all amounts refunded to their customers because of
overcharges resulting from new rates subsequently found to be unjustified. After considering all of the Commission's arguments, the
court held that the rule was invalid because of the FPC's failure to
follow the procedures of section 553(b)-(c) in its promulgation.
The court in Texaco explained that "[t]he rule does not fall
within the 'unnecessary' exception relied on by the Commission
since it cannot be classified as either minor or emergency in character."247 The judges refused to accept the argument that the section
553 procedures were "unnecessary," since they found that "the compound rate would affect numerous jurisdictional gas companies and
potentially involves large sums of money." 248 The court also expressly rejected the Commission's contention that the procedures
were "unnecessary" because the new rule imposed no obligation on
affected parties that could not have been imposed on them by ad hoc
adjudicatory orders in each case. "The crucial fact is that the Commission elected to proceed in this case by making a general rule and,
when engaged in rule-making, it must comply with the procedural
requirements imposed on rule-making by the Administrative Procedure Act, which it failed to do ...." 249
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See
412
412
412
412

text accompanying notes 212-16 supra.
F.2d 740 (1969).
F.2d at 743.
F.2d at 743.
F.2d at 745.
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By holding as it did, the court in Texaco seems to have taken the
position that the ability of an agency to achieve the same result as
a rule by another means, such as ad hoc adjudication, does not make
the requirements of section 553(b)-(c) "unnecessary" when the
agency in fact elects to achieve that result through rule-making. This
Article is not the place to explore fully the wisdom of that result. 250
However, a number of general points are worth making here. The
result in Texaco can be justified in light of the fact that the APA
favors public participation in rule-making in all cases except those
where very good reasons preclude it; the fact that the rule was not
minor in its effects and had a large financial impact on many companies;251 and the fact that the agency did make a conscious choice
to proceed by rule-making which would result in an order of general
applicability rather than by an ad hoc order in each case.252 On the
other hand, one of the undesirable effects of this decision may be to
discourage the use of general rules in favor of ad hoc adjudication,
a result that is usually contrary to the sound administration of regulatory policies.25s
The "unnecessary" exemption should also not allow agencies to
avoid section 553 procedures on the ground that a rule has only a
small impact on a very limited segment of the public and is therefore "minor" or "unimportant." It is wise to have well-informed
decision-making and citizen participation in rule-making that has a
relatively small impact on limited segments of the public, as well as
in those actions that have a great impact on large portions of the
public. The size of the group harmed is in no way related to the size
or nature of the individual interest that may be worthy of the protection accorded by a right of public participation. And the magnitude of the harm inflicted on a class is, as a general proposition, not
a reliable guarantee of the efficacy or usefulness of public participation in improving the operation of government or in relieving unusual individual pain. A small inconvenience to some may be large
to others whose circumstances are different or peculiar. At any rate,
250. Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (agency order issued to a
party in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding valid and enforceable, even though
the same requirement announced as a prospective rule in the course of an adjudication
would be void because it failed to follow the rule-making requirements of section 553).
See generally Comment, Wyman-Gordon and the Excelsior Rule, 117 U. PA. L. R.Ev.
621 (1969).
251. 412 F.2d at 743 n.7.
252. 412 F.2d at 744 n.9.
253. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956); NLRB
v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Auerbach, Should
Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions?, 1959 WIS. L. R.Ev. 95; Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of J!Jdministrative Policy, 78 HARv. L R.Ev. 921 (1965).
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since several very minor inconveniences or impositions by government can add up to major ones, government should not be allowed
to act insensitively toward the former. The "unnecessary" exemption
should not, therefore, be a vehicle to avoid public participation
merely because, as a general proposition, the injury worked on individuals is estimated to be relatively small, or the number of persons involved is few. 254 Of course, some of the usual procedures can
be avoided on other bases when the number of individuals affected
by a proposed rule is very small. For instance, under section 553(b)
notice of proposed rule-making need not be published if the persons
"subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise
have actual notice thereof!'
As noted, the term "unnecessary" as it now appears in section
553(b)(B) probably means that usual procedures may be ignored
only when they are of no value or help in light of the purposes for
which public participation is desired. But with the aid of some corroborating legislative history, which could be supplied at the time
section 553(a)(l) is altered or repealed, the term "unnecessary" could
also provide an express statutory vehicle by which executive privilege
may be invoked. This term could be deemed to mean that the usual
procedures may be ignored when they are "useless" because they may
not constitutionally be forced on the executive branch. As will be
noted, there are types of "military or foreign affairs function" rulemaking that may be beyond Congress' authority to regulate even
on a purely procedural basis because they involve matters vested
wholly and exclusively in the President by the Constitution. While
the "unnecessary" exemption is not an essential tool for the invoca254. Note the following illustration in this connection:
One congressional office got a host of complaints from people, not only in that
area, but throughout the country, on an unimportant rule which an agency had
made without any public notice or hearing, related to public property. It related
to how many pounds of pertrified wood you could take off the premises of a
national reservation of some type. And this agency had thought-well, it is a
terrible thing to lose all these hunks of stone, so they-within their own internal
organization, they came up with one pound, or something like that.
This provoked all this correspondence to Congress.
So the congressional people involved went down to the agency ••• [which).
said-"Oh, well, we realize we made a mistake, we will raise it to five pounds.•
So the congressmen went back and said we solved the problem. The agency said yes,
very unimportant.
Well, that provoked ten times more mail than came in the first time, because
it turned out that five pounds just didn't qualify under the standards by which
petrified wood is traded in the market of ••• collectors•• , • It has to be a bigger
poundage.
Well, the moral of that particular story was that this supposedly minor rule •••
turned out to be important to a lot of people in this country, and the fact that
the agency did not give public notice, and give the public a chance to express
its opinion, caused a heck of a lot of trouble for an awful lot of people.
Transcript, ABA Symposium on S. 1386, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1966, at 110-11,

December 1972]

Rule-Making

301

tion of executive immunity, it may be desirable to make it a vehicle
for that purpose--even the exclusive vehicle, if that is constitutionally
possible. The section 553(b)(B) procedural requirements of a formal
finding that notice and public participation would be "impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," followed by publication of the finding with the reasons therefor, would ensure careful
consideration of the necessity and lawfulness of any claim of executive
immunity before it is made, and thereby eliminate some legislativeexecutive conflict while increasing public participation in rule-making. It would also avoid misunderstandings because the fact of the
immunity claim and its nature are made completely clear to all.
Of course, an agency's determination on this issue would be
subject to judicial review. There is certainly no nonjusticiable political question involved. The issue is only whether the agency was
justified, as a matter of law, in determining that adherence to usual
procedures was "unnecessary" because the rule-making in question
is a product of exclusive presidential authority. Judicial review of a
section 553(b)(B) "unnecessary" finding based on a claim of executive privilege is different from the situation presented in Chicago &Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.255 There, the
United States Supreme Court held unreviewable the merits of an
administrative determination that certain American air carriers
should be accorded air routes to foreign countries. The Court did
not refuse to define the exclusive competence of the executive
branch. Rather, after defining it, the Court refused only to review
an administrative determination that was inseparably linked to an
exercise of that exclusive competence.
This situation is more like Powell v. McCormack, 256 which determined whether Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority
when it sought to impose certain qualifications, other than those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, on the election of representatives. In reviewing a section 553(b)(B) finding that usual rulemaking procedures are "unnecessary" because the "military or foreign affairs function" policy involved is allegedly a product of exclusive presidential powers, the Court need do no more than it did
in Powell. It need only determine whether or not the particular
rule-making involved is in fact a product of exclusive executive
authority under the Constitution, just as the Court in Powell determined whether the additional qualifications imposed on representa255. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
256. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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tives were in fact a product of exclusive congressional authority.
Only the Court is in a position to resolve successfully a dispute of
that sort between the other two coequal branches.
The "impracticable" exemption could adequately deal with a
number of different situations in which a requirement of advance
notice of rule-making and public participation therein would be
unreasonable. In emergency cases where a rule is needed immediately to avoid injury or frustration of a program's objectives,
the usual procedures of section 553(b)-(c) can be disregarded because
they are "impracticable." According to the Attorney General's
Manual, for example, an agency may learn "that certain rules concerning ... safety should be issued or amended without delay; with
the safety of the ... public at stake, the ... [agency] could find that
notice and public rule-making procedures would be 'impracticable,'
and issue its rules immediately."257
The Department of Agriculture has properly stated that the
same rationale is equally applicable when the Department must
impose or modify animal or plant quarantines promptly to prevent
the spread of diseases or insect pests; or when the Department makes
orders under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 192!258 to continue
temporary rate schedules previously authorized after notice and an
opportunity to be heard, if prompt action is necessary to avoid a
reversion to rates and charges that are unrealistic in light of existing
economic conditions; or when the Department finds under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933259 that last minute changes
in acreage allotments and marketing quota regulations are necessary
because farmers must know of such changes prior to planting.260
To force adherence to the procedures of section 553 in any of these
situations would be "impracticable" because time is of the essence.
Consider also the situation presented in Durkin v. Edward S.
Wagner Co.261 In an earlier decision involving the same parties,
the court had held that particular workers were not covered by
certain regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.262 This
257. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANuAL, supra note 13, at 30-31. See also 195'1 HOUSE
SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. UC (Independent Agencies-Interstate Commerce Commission), at 1760.
258. 7 u.s.c. §§ 181-229 (1970).
259. 7 u.s.c. §§ 601-23 (1970).
260. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 1 (Department of Agriculture), at 26-27.
See also Dighton v. Coffman, 178 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. m. 1959), afjd., 279 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.
1960).
261. 115 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), afjd. per curiam sub nom. Mitchell v. Edward
S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
262. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-19 (1970).
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holding was contrary to the interpretation and practice of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division-an interpretation
known and relied upon by the industry involved. As an immediate
response to this decision, and without resort to usual rule-making
procedures, the Administrator promulgated a rule that included
those workers within the relevant regulations. When the new rule
was issued, the Administrator stated that it would be "impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" to follow usual rulemaking procedures in the making of this "clarifying" regulation:
[I]mmediately effective clarification of the regulations is essential
in order to accomplish the intent of the present regulations to safeguard the wage standards in the industry, to eliminate the unfair
competitive situation, and to provide for adequate enforcement of
the home work restrictions.2as
On the basis of this evidence, and in the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, the court held that the rule was properly treated as
within the section 553(b)(B) exception.264
The court's result seems justifiable because any delay in promulgation of the rule would have encouraged employers to abandon
their previous adherence to the Administrator's interpretation of
the earlier rule until a new rule to the same effect was formally
adopted. This would have hurt countless employees who had come
to rely on the prior interpretation. It also would have injured those
employers who chose, despite their competitors' contrary action, to
keep their wages at the levels demanded by the earlier interpretation
during the period in which the new rule was being adopted with
public procedures.
As noted earlier in this Article, there are many situations where
agencies making rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" must be able to act quickly to fulfill their mission properly.265
In those cases where usual rule-making procedures would unduly
hinder this necessary capacity for speed they are, of course, "im263. II5 F. Supp. at 122.
264. II5 F. Supp. at 122-23. On appeal, the court said:
Judge Galston has found that the defendant's operations fall within the
amended regulations and that the regulations were properly promulgated under
the Administrative Procedure Act •..• "\Ve see no reason to overturn his wellreasoned conclusions. "\Vhile there was no advance notice of the amendment,
yet that was not necessary, both because of its nature as an "interpretive" rule and
because of the Administrator's finding of "good cause" for immediate action, based
upon the fact that other employers in general were complying with this interpretation of the Act and defendant had long known of the view held by the
Administrator.
217 F.2d at 304.
265. See text accompanying notes 204-06 supra.
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practicable" within the meaning of section 553(b)(B). Agencies making subsection (a)(I) rules may, as a result, avoid usual procedures
in such cases by resort to this limited exemption. Proper reliance on
the "impracticable" exemption because of a special need for speedy
agency action is likely to be more frequent in cases involving
"military or foreign affairs functions" rule-making than in cases
involving other types of rule-making. The peculiar nature of
"military and foreign affairs" dictates this conclusion. On the basis
of a need for speed alone, for example, much strategic military and
foreign policy formulation will be exempt from usual procedures
under section 553(b)(B).
Either the "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest"
exemption, or both, must be deemed to exempt rule-making from
usual procedures when adherence to these procedures would cause
the very evil that the rule seeks to avoid or would sabotage the rule's
effectiveness. An agency can ignore usual rule-making procedures
under section 553(b)(B) whenever advance notice would tend to
defeat a rule's purpose, because in such situations those procedures
would certainly be "contrary to the public interest." 266 In practice,
usual rule-making procedures have been deemed "impracticable"
or "contrary to the public interest" when, for instance, there is
"danger that certain companies might take advantage of the interim
period to effect transactions which the rule is designed to prevent
or control and thus escape the intended regulation of conduct
altogether." 261 Normal procedures have also been deemed avoidable
on those bases in cases where they would "permit speculators or
others to reap unfair profits or to interfere with the [agency's]
action taken.'' 268 A proposed revision of section 553 contained a
specific exemption for "matters with respect to which notice of
proposed rulemaking would seriously impair effectiveness of a
rule." 269 There seems little doubt, however, that the function sought
to be performed by that proposed revision is adequately performed
by the existing "contrary to the public interest" terminology.
Other situations that may involve section 553(a)(l) rule-making
illustrate how the "contrary to the public interest" exemption would
266. See 1941 Hearings, supra note 20, at 812, See also AnoRNEY GENERA.L's
supra note 13, at 31.
267. B. SCHWARTZ, AN !NTRODUcrlON TO .AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE L\W 62 (1958)
(Securities and Exchange Commission).
268. 12 C.F.R. § 262.2(e) (1972). See also S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 36'1
(Federal Reserve Board).
269. S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h)(6) (1967),
MANUAL,
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properly release an agency from following usual procedures. The
Department of Commerce has reported, for example:
In the exercise of priority and allocation functions [under the Defense Production Act of 1950] speed in the issuance of orders and
regulations is often essential as prior notice of proposed governmental action would tend to defeat the purpose intended to be accomplished thereby. For example, notice of intention to place
certain materials under production control or to limit acquisition
thereof might create panic buying in an effort to get the jump on
the regulation and on competitors.270

In such cases the Bureau of Defense Services Administration has
concluded that the section 553(b)(B) exemption may properly be
invoked on the grounds that adherence to usual procedures would
be "contrary to the public interest."271 In the same vein, adherence
to usual procedures may be dispensed with as "impracticable" or
"contrary to the public interest" when import controls are imposed
on textiles, or embargoes are imposed by the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. In the first of these cases
arguably involving "foreign affairs function" rule-making-the textile program--compliance with the advance notice requirements
could stimulate exports to the United States of the very goods that
might later be subject to import limitations, thereby causing some
of the evil sought to be prevented. And "if it were publicly known
that the United States was definitely going to impose a financial
embargo on a particular country at a certain time there would,
within a matter of several hours, be a virtually complete transfer
of all its public and private liquid assets to other countries. Obviously,
therefore, public hearings would nullify the proposed embargo entirely."272
On this basis it is also "impracticable" or "contrary to the public
interest" to follow usual rule-making procedure in the making of
most, if not all, strategic military policy and strategic foreign policy.
Even if the strategic policy involved need not be kept secret after it
is implemented, utilization of usual rule-making procedures in its
formulation will usually be disastrous because they will reveal the
intended scope of such policy in advance of its actual implementation. If the "other side" is aware of the contemplated policy of this
270. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 115
(in reference to its functions under the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App.
§§ 2061-168 (1970)).
271. Id.
272. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury), See text accompanying
notes 207-08 supra.
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country before that policy is actually put into effect in concrete
public action, the very purposes sought to be accomplished may be
defeated, the evils sought to be avoided may be caused, or the "other
side" may be enabled to evade the effects of that strategy. Consequently, adherence to normal procedures in these cases is "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest" within the meaning of
section 553 (b)(B).21a
There is also no reason why the "contrary to the public interest"
language of section 553(b)(B) cannot serve as a satisfactory means
for accommodating the need for public rule-making procedures on
the one hand, and the need for inexpensive, expeditious, effective,
and efficient government administration on the other. The function
performed by exemptive language such as "occasion delay or expense
disproportionate to the public interest," which appeared in a bill
introduced several years ago in an effort to revise completely the
rule-making provision,274 can easily be performed under section
553(b)(B) by balancing the relevant considerations under the standard "contrary to the public interest."
It has been suggested that the "contrary to the public interest"
terminology should allow the Department of Labor an exemption
for the wage determinations it makes under the Davis-Bacon275 and
related acts because of the especially large number of such "rules"
that the Department must continually make during a limited
period.276 The factual basis for this conclusion is set forth in the
following passage:
[T]he Davis-Bacon Act and some 45 related acts for Federal and
Federally assisted construction contracts ... provide that the specifications for all such contracts shall require the contractor to pay to
his laborers and mechanics at least the prevailing wage as determined
by the Secretary of Labor. The determinations are made by the
Secretary at the request of the contracting agency before the bids are
let.
Application of the formal rule-making requirements of section
[553] would require some 500 to 600 notices of proposed rulemaking
to be published each week in the Federal Register. Interested per273. Of course, as noted earlier, reliance on an executive order under section
552(b)(l) may satisfy the need for an exemption in this situation as well
274. See S. 2335, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1003(£) (1964). This bill would have completely revised the rule-making section of the APA.
275. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to a-5 (1970). See also, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
276. Participants in the deliberations of the Administrative Conference of the
United States at the time Recommendation No. 16 was being considered expressly
articulated this view on a number of different occasions and relied thereon in adopting
the Recommendation.
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sons would have an opportunity ... [to participate in each case]. The
processing of the submitted data, views, and arguments could result
in obvious delays and additional personnel and other costs.277
In this program, the magnitude of the adverse consequences that
would result from an application of standard rule-making procedures
to the particular determinations involved were deemed to outweigh
any positive good that might result from requiring adherence to
normal procedures. An exemption from usual requirements should,
therefore, be allowed in this situation under the "contrary to the
public interest" language. In many other situations the facts may
dictate the same result with respect to the determination of contract
specifications, if they are "rules."
Similarly, rules affecting the public that are promulgated on a
day-to-day basis for individual military bases by the commander
of each base, may also properly be exempted from usual procedures
because of their sheer volume. There are hundreds of armed forces
bases at home and abroad, and every year the commander of each
of these bases makes scores of rules affecting the public that are
tailored to the peculiar needs and circumstances of his base or the
military property under his control.278 Rules regarding public access
to the base and use of its facilities are examples. Given the huge
number of such rules in aggregate that may be promulgated by all
base commanders every year, a Davis-Bacon Act argument might be
equally applicable: It may be "contrary to the public interest" to
require adherence to normal procedures for rules promulgated by
individual base commanders for their particular bases, as distinguished from rules promulgated by the Department of the Army
for all Army bases generally. Even though it may not be "contrary
to the public interest" to force adherence to normal procedures for
each such base rule considered separately, running the aggregate
of all such rules through that procedure may be so burdensome, timeconsuming, and expensive that it is unjustifiable in light of the
potential benefits. A class .finding with respect to rules of this particular type may, therefore, be made on the basis of their huge and
unmanageable number, just as it may be done in the Davis-Bacon
Act situation. But the class must be narrowly drawn to satisfy section
553(b)(B) and the volume of rules involved must in fact be as large
as here supposed-a point that requires empirical verification.
The same argument can be made with respect to all everyday
277. S. !JIB Hearings, supra note 127, at 239-40.
278. See Department of the Army, Military Reservations, ch. X (Pamphlet 27-164,
Oct. 1965).
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command orders issued by one member of the armed forces to
another, if they are rules within the APA definition.279 Uncounted
millions of such orders are issued every year directing the manner
in which ordinary military duties are to be performed. A narrowly
tailored finding that rule-making in this category should be exempt
under the "contrary to the public interest" language of section
553(b)(B) would, therefore, also be fully justified on a volume basis
alone. In most situations, resort to usual procedures for such rulemaking would also be "impracticable" or "unnecesary" on other
bases. However, as will be seen, most if not all of the orders of this
character are exempt from usual procedures anyway under existing
exemptions other than section 553(b)(B). They may be exempt, for
example, as either "general statements of policy" or as rules relating
to "agency management or personnel."280
Similarly, the "contrary to the public interest" standard found
in section 553(b)(B) should permit exemptions for other extraordinary situations. Those extraordinary situations will usually (but
not always) arise in contexts where the volume of rule-making decisions that must be made is exceptionally large. Where the delay and
costs involved are of such a magnitude, due to special facts of the case,
that they outweigh the strong public interests favoring adherence to
usual rule-making procedures, an exception could be allowed. More
than just "any" increase in cost or delay will be necessary to justify
such an exception under this standard. The facts will have to demonstrate that an atypically large delay or increase in cost will result
from adherence to normal rule-making procedures, and that the
extraordinary delay or cost is not outweighed by the benefits of adherence to those usual procedures. Situations of this sort will be
relatively few. The ordinary costs and delays occasioned by giving
notice and an opportunity for public participation are properly
treated by the Act as an acceptable quid pro quo for the important
benefits achieved.
Section 553(d)(3) should perform the same function for section
553(d) as section 553(b)(B) performs for section 553(b)-(c). According to section 553(d)(3), an agency can dispense with the section
279. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 551(4) (1970). The question is whether all commands
by a military superior to a subordinate are "agency" statements "designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy." An "agency" is defined as "each authority of
the Government of the United States whether or not it is within or subject to review
by another agency." Since each superior may be deemed an "authority of the Govern•
ment of the United States" their orders may constitute "rules." But see text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
280. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(2), 553(b)(A) (1970).
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553(d) requirement of publication or service of a substantive rule
at least thirty days before its effective date whenever the agency
decides to do so "for good cause found and published with the rule."
This "good cause" exemption should give agencies at least as much
discretion to avoid the application of section 553(d) in appropriate
cases as the "impracticable, unnecesary, or contrary to the public
interest" exemption gives them to avoid the application of section
553(b)-(c). Indeed, the former may give agencies even more discretion than the latter because the guiding terms "impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" are conspicuously
absent from section 553(d)(3).
Nevertheless, to make the requirements of section 553(d) meaningful, the exemption from its terms should be construed to be as
broad as, but no broader than, section 553(b)(B). If that is so, the
"good cause" required by section 553(d)(3) must also be predicated
on a finding that adherence to usual procedures is "impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." The legislative
history of the "good cause" exception in section 553(d)(3) supports
the conclusion that the two exemptions should be treated as congruent. The House Report on the APA states:
[This] exception-upon good cause found and published-is not an
"escape clause" which may be exercised at will but requires legitimate grounds supported in law and fact by the required finding.
Many rules ... may be made operative in less than 30 days because
of inescapable or unavoidable limitations of time, because of the
demonstrable urgency of the conditions they are designed to correct, and because the parties subject to them may during the usually
protracted hearing and decision procedures anticipate the regulation.2s1

Previous discussion should demonstrate that if the section
553(a)(l) exemptions were eliminated, the exclusions found in
section 553(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) could adequately handle any
peculiar problems that would arise in rule-making involving military
or foreign affairs functions. Where a rational balancing of the relevant interests would indicate the desirability of an exception from
the requirements imposed by section 553(b)-(d) for particular rulemaking, the above "good cause" exemptions could suffice to achieve
the result.
No special exemption is needed from the right-to-petition provision of section 553(e) if the subsection (a)(l) exclusions are re281. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 260. See id. at 201. See also Buckeye
Cablevision, Inc. v. FTC, 387 F.2d 220, 228 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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pealed. Interested parties should always have the right to petition
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. As noted earlier,
the only obligations that this right imposes on an agency are the
duty to follow its own rules with respect to such petitions, and the
section 555(e) duty to respond by giving "[p]rompt notice ... of the
denial in whole or in part of a •.. petition accompanied by a brief
statement of the grounds for denial." If the need arises, an agency
may treat a group of similar petitions as an entity and issue a single
response. Consequently, except for one situation to be noted later,
there seems to be no case relating to section 553(a)(l) rule-making in
which even a qualified exemption from section 553(e) is required.
Currently no exemption from the right-to-petition requirement is
deemed necessary for any rule-making already subject to the terms
of section 553. In light of the importance of that right, and the
minor burden it imposes on agencies, this position seems fully justifiable.
If the right to petition continues unhampered by any exceptions
even after the subsection (a)(l) exemptions are removed, an important salutary consequence will follow. In every case where usual
public procedures are dispensed with prior to the promulgation of a
rule, because the qualified exemptions of section 553(b)(B) are applicable, interested parties will have an effective opportunity to
express their views on that rule subsequent to its enactment. They
can file a petition for the amendment, repeal, or modification of the
rule in question, including a statement of their reasons therefor.
The agency will then be obliged to respond, as section 555(e) requires, with "[p]rompt notice ... of the denial in whole or in part
of [the] petition ... accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds
for denial." A statement of grounds is not required, of course, if the
agency merely reaffirms a prior denial, or the denial is self-explanatory.
The section 553(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) exemptions impose
a special obligation of disclosure on agencies utilizing those provisions. An agency must incorporate in the rules issued without
following usual procedures the necessary statement of "good cause,"
predicated upon a finding that adherence to section 553(b)-(d) is
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," and
must also include a brief statement of the reasons for that finding.
In cases where the exemption utilized is based on a finding with
respect to a whole class of cases, only one such full publication applicable to the whole class should be required. Rules in that class
subsequently issued without resort to usual procedures would only
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need to refer to the prior full publication of :findings and reasons
and to give its citation. To be of value, the reasons listed in the rules
as justification for the failure to follow usual procedures must, of
course, be fairly specific. Declarations in the language of the Act will
not satisfy this requirement and should be inadequate under the
statute. As noted by the Administrative Conference, "[E]ach :finding
of this type . . . should include a statement of underlying reasons
rather than a mere conclusory recital." 282 At the same time, the
required statement of reasons need not be so detailed that it is
unduly onerous.
This disclosure obligation will have two salutary effects. First,
such a requirement will force the agency to consider carefully its
reasons for each claim to an exemption. Second, by requiring an
official statement of the agency's reasons for using the exemption,
judicial review of that decision will be facilitated. If the decision is
challenged in a judicial proceeding, the court can test its validity
against the reasons provided in the prior publication. The requirement that agencies formally and publicly state the reasons for their
conduct should, therefore, keep them both thoughtful and honest
in their use of the exemption.
In this connection a further point deserves some elaboration and
explanation. Publication of the specific reasons for avoiding usual
procedures is required by sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3). Communication of the denial and the specific reasons for the denial of a
petition is required by sections 553(e) and 555(e). But mere performance of those statutorily imposed obligations may cause serious
evils in some cases involving "military or foreign affairs function"
rule-making. However, this does not demonstrate that sections
553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) cannot adequately handle all of the problems
that would arise if, without more, section 553(a)(l) were simply
eliminated. As noted earlier, an agency need not violate a proper
executive order commanding certain specific matters to be kept
secret in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy" in order
to satisfy any requirements of section 553. Of course, this includes
the requirements of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) and sections
553(e) and 555(e). No other result seems possible when section
552(b)(I) is read in conjunction with section 553. If the President
really believes that the publication of reasons required by section
553(b)(B), for example, would be harmful to our "national defense
or foreign policy" in situations involving certain matters, he can
282. Recommendation No. 16, supra note 8.
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always order that these reasons be kept secret under section 552(b)(I).
In these cases compliance with those provisions requiring publication
or communication of reasons is excused as a matter of law, without
affecting the validity of the rules ultimately issued.
On the other hand, if the President does not issue such an order
applicable to the particular matter in question, and the matter is
not otherwise exempt from the requirements of section 552, the
agency should not be able to invoke the need for secrecy as an excuse
for noncompliance with the statement-of-reasons requirements of
these provisions. After all, to the extent that the reasons for the
agency's failure to follow usual procedures, or its reasons for turning
down a petition, appear anywhere in the government's files, they
may be inspected by members of the public unless they are somehow
exempt from public perusal under section 552. So, if the public has
the right to inspect documents relevant to the rules in question
under section 552, agencies may not properly claim the need for
secrecy as an excuse for not complying with the statement-of-reasons
requirements of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) and sections 553(e)
and 555(e).
The 1969 survey283 asked all federal agencies the following
question:
Why are the several specific exemptions currently contained in
§ 553(b)-(e) insufficient to deal with any disadvantages that might be
encountered by your department or agency if all of § 553(a)(l)-(2)

was repealed? Among these specific exemptions just referred to is
that contained in§ 553(b)(B) providing that public notice of rulemaking is not required "when the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in
the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."
Agencies making rules presently exempted by subsection (a)(l) from
section 553 responded in various ways to this question. These responses, and the following discussion of section 553(b)(B), may also
be considered applicable to the section 553(d)(3) exemption since, as
noted, the requirements of that exemption are probably congruent
with those of section 553(b)(B).
Some respondents insisted that the section 553(b)(B) exemption
was an insufficient substitute for subsection (a)(l) simply because
the latter exemption is necessary as it is, and the former is not as
broad as the latter.284 Responses of this sort are of little help in
283. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
284. 1969 Survey Response (Atomic Energy Commission, Post Office Department,
Department of the Navy). For ex.ample, the Post Office stated:
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evaluating the impact that the proposed statutory change may have,
and they in no way detract from the solution previously suggested.
They amount to no more than unexplained assertions.
Another objection to section 553(b)(B) as a substitute for section
553(a)(I) is that making the findings required by the former would
constitute too great an administrative burden on the agencies.285 The
Department of Defense stated that
[a]dmittedly, the exemption is a broad one in which [the Department] would rely in issuance of any highly significant rule.... But
the scope and volume of substantive rulemaking in the Department
makes impracticable compliance with the unwieldy requirement
for a "finding and brief statement of reasons" for the "good cause."286

By way of summary, the Department of Defense has noted that "the
primary disadvantages" of any reliance on section 553(b)(B) as a
substitute for section 553(a)(l)-which it prefers-"can be described
as costly administrative delay and excessive paperwork without apparent compensatory benefit to the public."287
Since the statement of findings and reasons is required only in
those cases in which the agency opts out of the usual procedures,
and it can be made for a whole class of rule-making in the few
instances where that can be justified on the basis of the special facts
and circumstances discussed previously, this objection seems unsound. The burden involved here is merely that the agency must set
down a finding that public procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," and a brief statement of the
reasons supporting this conclusion.288 To some extent agencies
It is considered that the specific exemptions contained in Sec. 553(b)-(e) are
not well adapted to serve as substitutes for the subject area exemptions. It is
believed that the exemption stated in Sec. 553(a) reflects a proper and generalized
finding that the provisions of Sec. 553(b)-(e) are not appropriate for rulemaking
in these subject matter areas and that the reasons underlying this will continue
despite repeal of Sec. 553(a).
And the Department of the Navy stated:
It is apparent, then, that the coverage of the exemptions in subsection (b) [of
section 553] can be very broad. .Beyond this observation, the Judge Advocate
General is unable to conclude that the Department would not be disadvantaged
by the elimination of the privilege exemptions in subsection (a).

285. 1969 Survey Response (Department of Defense). See also S. 166!] Hearings,
supra note 104, at 307: "[T]he necessity of determining for each such function whether
public participation is unwarranted or contrary to the public interest would itself prove
burdensome."
286. 1969 Survey Response.
287. 1969 Survey Response.
288. Thus, the argument of the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control to the effect that section 553(b)(.B) is an inadequate substitute for
subsection (a)(l} because its rules "are of an urgent nature with a minimum of time
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should be doing that in any case-if they are in fact living up to
their more general responsibilities to accord as much participation
in rule-making as possible, consistent with their other obligations.
The burden, therefore, seems to be both of a kind and quantity that
the agencies should be willing and able to bear in light of the attendant benefits.
Another reason has been suggested as to why the current exemptions contained in section 553(b)(B) are inadequate substitutes
for the subject exemptions of section 553(a)(I). It is said that the
scope of section 553(b)(B) is unclear and uncertain. Reliance upon
that exemption, therefore, would not clearly handle all the problems
created by a repeal of section 553(a)(I); and it would probably
result in much litigation over the scope of the subsection (b)(B)
exemption, causing undue delay in the execution of agency programs
and the like. This "[u]ncertainty about the scope of the exemption"
and the fact that "such a finding [as is required by section 553(b)(B)]
is subject to challenge in the courts making uncertain the validity
of any rule issued under this exemption" were specifically noted by
the Department of Defense.289
It is true that the terms "good cause" and "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" may not be as precise
as those which categorically exempt all rule-making involving
"military or foreign affairs functions." While the scope of the latter
terms may be vague, the former terms may be more difficult to apply
to a given situation, since they demand resort to a balancing process
that requires special assessment of the facts in each case. Consequently, on a comparative basis the application of section 553(b)(B)
may not be as easy or clear as that of section 553(a)(I).
Nevertheless, as previously noted, the language of section
553(b)(B) can adequately deal with all of the problems created by a
repeal of section 553(a)(I). That language also need not be as unclear as the opponents of change in this area suggest. If section
553(a)(I) is repealed, Congress could insert in the legislative record
a statement that would clarify any ambiguities in the scope of section
available for preparation of the necessary documents for publication" is specious. 1969
Survey Response.
289. 1969 Survey Response. See also 1969 Survey Response of the Department of Commerce. The response of the Headquarters, Defense Supply Agency, was that
the indefiniteness of the terms of section 553(b)(A) would make it difficult to
determine whether a particular regulation fell within these exceptions and would
lead to inconsistent application of the act. It is also probable that the courts would
take jurisdiction to review any challenged determination of an exemption made
under section 553(b)(B). This, of course, could have a serious adverse effect on
defense operations.
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553(b)(B) along the lines described earlier. Moreover, litigation
with respect to the scope and proper applicability of "good cause"
and "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest"
is not apt to be any more endless or obstructive here than it is elsewhere. And litigation is not in fact likely, in the overwhelming
number of cases, to have any significant impact on the agencies'
ability to perform their functions properly. Stare decisis should have
a substantial effect within a brief time. Also, although wise and
honest use of the section 553(b)(B) exemption by the relevant
agencies will not forestall all litigation, it will forestall some.
In the end, however, it must be admitted that there remains a
real difference in clarity between section 553(a)(I) and section
553(b)(B), and that some delays may be caused by litigation over
the scope of the latter. But this consequence is a price worth paying
for the largely increased breadth of the guarantee of public participation in the particular rule-making involved. After all, no
showing has been made that such delays will have any serious ill
effects in the few cases where there is some genuine doubt about
whether the section 553(b)(B) exemption does in fact apply. If the
fear really is that agencies will have to be careful in utilizing this
qualified exemption and that their hands will be tied by it to some
extent, this fear is justified. Similarly, if the fear is that in close cases,
the unclear scope of this exemption will cause agencies to utilize
normal rule-making procedures rather than risk possible litigation
resulting in invalidation of the rule, that too is warranted. 290 Both
of these results, however, are acceptable in light of the importance of
the policy favoring public participation in rule-making.
C.

The "General Statements of Policy" and
"Interpretative Rules" Exemptions

Two other exemptions from section 553(b)-(d) deserve brief
examination at this point. They have been recently analyzed and
found to be justifiable.291 Their continued availability may be
coupled with the availability of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) to
illustrate further the point that repeal of the section 553(a)(I)
exemptions would not be unduly disruptive. According to sections
290. Although not included in this study because it does not make rules involving
"military or foreign affairs functions," the Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home
Administration feared that repeal of section 553(a)(l)•(2), with consequent reliance
solely upon the section 553(b)(B) exemption, might discourage issuance of rules and
needed changes in rules. See 1969 Survey Response. This consequence seems highly
improbable.
291. See Bonfield, supra note 31.
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553(b)(A) and 553(d)(2), "general statements of policy" and "interpretative rules" are also exempted as a class from all procedural
requirements of section 553(b)-(d). If the exemption for rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" were repealed, therefore, agencies could also rely on these exemptions for a goodly
portion of their rule-making.202
In addition to being excludable from usual rule-making procedures under the narrowly tailored exemptions of sections 553(b)(B)
and 553(d)(3), therefore, much strategic military and foreign policy
formulation, if they be "rule-making," may be excluded from the
procedures of subsections (b)-(d) as "general statements of policy."
Admittedly, the term "general statements of policy" is hard to define.
It has been suggested, however, that
"general statements of policy" may be rules directed primarily at the
staff of an agency describing how it will conduct agency discretionary
functions, while other rules are directed primarily at the public [or
some segment thereof] in an effort to impose [legally enforceable]
obligations on it. On this basis statements of policy are said not to
have the effect of law; they do not alter [the legal rights of members
of the public] ••. while other regulations do have that effect.293

The determination as to what our nation's diplomatic policy shall
be toward a certain foreign country would seem to be an example of
that sort of "rule-making." So, too, many determinations regarding
the everyday operations and deployment of the armed forces may be
of this type, if they are "rules."
D.

The "Agency Management or Personnel" Exemption

It should be stressed that even after section 553(a)(l) is repealed,
agencies may still resort to the subsection (a)(2) exemption from
every provision of section 553 for rule-making involving "a matter
relating to agency management or personnel." As a consequence,
the latter provision will be an additional means by which to avoid
usual procedures £or some rule-making involving "military or foreign
affairs functions." A brief excursion into the potential scope of this
exemption will demonstrate that the peculiar nature of the functions, operations, and structure of the military establishment results
292. The section 553(b)(A) exemption from section 553(b)•(c) for "rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice" might also be mentioned here to make the same
point. There is, however, great doubt whether this exemption is as worthy of continuance as the other existing exemptions discussed in this Article.
293. Bonfield, supra note 31, at 115. On statements of policy generally, see id. at
113-15.
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in a larger proportion of its rules being exempted under the "agency
management or personnel" provision than are exempted in the case
of most other agencies. Obviously, the reasons for this are the unusually large number of Defense Department personnel, which includes all the personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the
fact that a very high proportion of the military's efforts is directed
at managing, on a day-to-day basis, this unusually large staff.
"Management" means, according to Webster's, "the conducting
or supervising of something (as a business); esp: the executive function of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, controlling,
and supervising any industrial or business project or activity with
responsibility for results." 294 "Personnel" means "a body of employees
that is a factor in business administration esp. with respect to efficiency, selection, training, service, and health: the division of an
organization concerned primarily with the selection, placement, and
training of employees and their representatives."295
Presumably, "matter[s] relating to agency management or personnel" are distinguishable from "rules of agency organization, procedure or practice" since the former are exempted from all the
provisions of section 553 by subsection (a)(2), while the latter are
only exempted from subsections (b)-(c) by subsection (a)(A). "Matter[s] relating to agency management or personnel" are also presumably distinguishable from "matters relating to public property, loans,
grants, benefits or contracts." The latter are specially exempted
from section 553 in a subsequent portion of the same subsection as
that exempting "agency management or personnel."
Obviously, the section 553(a)(2) exemption for "a matter relating
to agency management or personnel" must at least be as broad as the
analogous exemption for "any matter relating solely to the internal
management of an agency" found in section 3 of the original APA,
and the current exemption for matters "related solely to the internal
personnel rules and practices of any agency" found in the newly revised freedom-of-information provision.296 It would be absurd to demand advance notice of, and a right to participate in, any rule-making
expressly exempted from the requirements of public disclosure by a
provision of the freedom-of-information section.297 On the other hand,
294. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 1372.
295. Id. at 1687.
296. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
297. In other words, the Act does not make it clear that all regulations that
are exempted from the requirement of being published in the Federal Register
[by the § 3 exemption for "any matter relating solely to the internal management
of an agency'1 are necessarily also exempted from the quasi-notice and hearing
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some rule-making subject to public disclosure requirements under
section 3 of the original APA, or current section 552, might
have been exempted from the advance notice and public participation requirements of the rule-making provision without causing logical or practical difficulties.
Note that the original APA freedom-of-information provision exempted only matters "relating solely to the internal management of
an agency" while exemptions from the rule-making provision are
granted "to the extent there is involved a matter relating to agency
management or personnel." The language of the rule-making exemption seems to be broader than that employed in the original freedomof-information provision. "[S]olely ... internal management of an
agency" seems to be narrower than simply "agency management or
personnel." Nevertheless, the scope of the rule-making and original
freedom-of-information exemptions have been considered identical,
despite the fact that their disparate wording could make a substantial
difference in particular cases.298 The reason for this is that the
legislative history of the APA rule-making section indicates that the
"exception of matters of management or personnel would operate
only so far as not inconsistent with other provisions of the [APA]
relating to internal management or personnel.''299 On that basis,
Attorney General Tom Clark apparently believed that the exemption
in section 553(a)(2) was congruent with the analogous exemption for
"any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency,"
found in the original public information provision of the AP A.300
Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Gronouski3° 1 is relevant here. The
Post Office had promulgated a rule directed at its employees which
provided that all mail would be "routed abroad by the most expeditious air service, without regard to the type of aircraft used.'' 302
Plaintiff air carrier sought to enjoin the Post Office from operating
requirement of § 4. Yet this is the only possible construction. For if a matter is
either (because of its confidential nature) to be kept secret from or (because of its
purely internal character) not sufficiently important to the general public, so
that not even the regulation itself need be made known, then a fortiori the public
has no right to be notified of a merely proposed regulation. Thus § 4 does not
apply where § 3 does not lie.
PARKER, supra note 225, at 178. This argument is obviously as true under the new
public information act provisions as under those of the original APA.
298. Id. at 179 n.40; A'n'ORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27.
299. LEGISLATIVE H1sroRY, supra note 13, at 199, 257.
300. "The exemption [in section 4] for matters relating to 'agency management
or personnel' is self-explanatory and has been considered in the discussion of internal
management under Section 3." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note l!I, at 27.
301. 230 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1964).
302. 230 F. Supp. at 45.

R.

December 1972]

Rule-Making

319

under the new rule on the grounds that no official notice of the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register, and plaintiff was
not given an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments
prior to the rule's promulgation. The Post Office Department argued
that these procedures were unnecessary in this case because the rulemaking involved was exempted from the requirements of section 553
by the subsection (a)(2) exclusion for "agency management or personnel." In finding that the new policy was a rule, and that its promulgation did not fall within this exception, the court stated:
The Government contends that the second exception is applicable
in the instant case, that this new rule concerns the duties of the
Post Office personnel. It is true that the Administrative Procedure
Act does except any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency. However, the policy involved here, although it
is directed to the Post Office personnel, substantially affects outside
parties and is therefore NOT subject to the exception.30a

This case seems to suggest that a rule specifying the duties of an
agency's staff is not exempted by the exemption for "agency management or personnel" if it "substantially affects outside parties." The
Gronouski result seems entirely appropriate under the language of
section 3 of the original APA to the effect that any matter "relating
solely to the internal management of an agency" was exempted. It
also seems entirely appropriate as a matter of policy. But it is not
necessarily consistent with the actual language used in section 553
(a)(2) which speaks only of "a matter relating to agency management
or personnel." If the two provisions were in fact meant to be congruent, however, the result is perfectly understandable. Some agencies, at least, seem to agree with that notion. One stated that "agency
management and personnel are matters solely the concern of an
agency itself, and do not affect members of the public to any appreciable extent."304
Thus, "military and foreign affairs function" rules that are "solely
the concern of the agency proper and, therefore, . . . do not affect
the members of the public to any extent'' will continue to be excludable under section 553(a)(2), even after section 553(a)(l) is repealed. 305
So, for example, "rules as to leaves of absence, vacation, travel, etc."
of the armed forces are exempted by the "agency management or
303. 230 F. Supp. at 46 (emphasis original).
804. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. UC (Independent Agencies-Housing
and Home Finance Agency), at 1629.
305. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 18. They would undoubtedly
also be exempt under the more limited "unnecessary" exclusion of section 553(b)(B).
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personnel" portion of section 553(a)(2).3011 So, too, virtually all armed
forces rules dealing with such things as record-keeping, financial
management and accounting procedures, working hours and working conditions of personnel, safety programs for personnel, the care,
maintenance, and inventory of armed forces property, and the like,
would also be exempted under this provision.307 Virtually all commands by superiors to subordinates in the armed forces, directing
individuals as to the manner in which they are to carry on their usual
day-to-day activities, and prescribing the nature of those activities,
probably would also be exempt on this basis, if they are "rules." This
section 553(a)(2) exemption would, therefore, exclude an unusually
high proportion of the rules of the military establishment from usual
procedures because of the peculiar nature of its day-to-day functions,
operations, and organization.
But the "agency management or personnel" exemption should
not permit agencies to avoid usual procedures by merely phrasing
regulations in terms of directives to its employees:
[A]Imost any rule may be put in the form of an instruction directed to
subordinates even though its effect and purpose is to regulate private
activities; e.g., how customs authorities are to proceed in valuing
importations of merchandise •.•. In other words, a regulation may
seem to be for mere housekeeping or procedural purposes and yet,
in effect, govern the substantive rights of parties.sos

The key, then, as Seaboard World Airlines notes, is whether the rule
in question "substantially affects outside parties." If it does, then it
should not be excludable under this section 553(a)(2) exemption.
Rules determining the policies of the armed forces with respect
to the acquisition and disposal of property, or rules governing the
terms and conditions of public access to and use of armed forces
property should not, therefore, be excludable from section 553 on
the basis of this exemption.309 A closer case is presented with respect
306. Id.
307. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 374 (Department of Commerce).
308. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 685 (Professor Carl McFarland, University
of Virginia Law School).
309. But see S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 374 (Department of Commerce),
objecting to S. 518, based on the assumption that the "agency management" exemption
excludes from section 553 "procurement policies" and "utilization and disposition of
excess and surplus property." As already noted, rules on these subjects made by the
commander of each base in light of the peculiar local conditions applicable to his
situation may be exempt under section 553(b)(B) on the ground that the sheer number
of such diverse rules involved may make it "contrary to the public interest" to follow
usual procedures for all of them. This logic would not, however, apply to rules on this
subject that are service- or Department-wide.
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to the rules prescribing the terms and qualifications for initial enlistment into the armed forces. Those rules certainly relate to agency
"personnel"; but they are primarily directed at the public and its
rights rather than at the rights of existing agency staff. The above
rules may not, then, relate "solely to the internal management of an
agency" to use the language of section 3 of the APA, which is supposedly congruent in scope with the section 553(a)(2) exemption.
After all, rules of this sort may be deemed to "substantially affect
outside parties" within the meaning of the Seaboard case.
It is recognized, however, that there may be substantial disagreement over the precise scope of the "agency management and personnel" exception in section 553(a)(2), and that agencies may not
readily accept the delineation of that provision's ambit offered above.
It should also be reiterated that the definition of the term "agency
management or personnel" offered here may not be supportable because the language of that provision is in fact broader than the APA
section 3 terminology sought to be superimposed upon it. Repeal of
section 553(a)(l) may also increase the possibility of over-reliance
upon this portion of section 553(a)(2), or increase agency efforts to
expand its scope beyond that described above. If that happens, and
the scope of this exemption in fact proves to be broader than this
brief and superficial examination suggests, there will be time enough
to consider narrowing it.

E. Conclusion Concerning Existing Alternatives to
Section 553(a)(l)
A number of agencies utilizing the section 553(a)(l) exclusions
have admitted, in varying degrees, that potentially undesirable consequences that may result from a repeal of that exemption could be
handled by the remaining exemptions contained in section 553.
While all of the previously discussed provisions were alluded to, the
most prominently mentioned and most significant were the "good
cause" exemptions of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3). Even the
Department of the Navy has concluded that "the coverage of the
exemptions in subsection (b) [(A) and (B) of section 553] can be very
broad," and, therefore, much of its rule-making may be excluded
from usual procedures under those exemptions.310
The Atomic Energy Commission noted that "[i]n our view the
'good cause' exemption set forth in [section] 553(b) could be con!110. 1969 Survey Response. The Headquarters, Defense Supply Agency, Department
of Defense, concluded that if "section 553(a)(l)·(2) of the act were repealed, most of
these agencys' regulations could probably be exempt under section 553(b)(A)-(B)." Id.
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strued to embrace a number of situations now exempted under [section] 553(a)(l)-(2)." But it questioned whether that provision would
be construed to cover all situations in need of such exemption. However, the Commission seemed most concerned in its reservation with
subsection (a)(2) situations rather than with subsection (a)(l) situations.811 On the other hand, the Federal Power Commission's statement was unequivocal:
In those instances in which the Commission departed from the
notice, hearing and effective date requirements of [section] 553(b)-(e),
it relied specifically on the exceptions set out in 553(b)(A and B) and
in [section] 553(d). Insofar as the foreign affairs functions of the
Commission are concerned, we believe that these specific exemptions
would be entirely sufficient for this aspect of the Commission's regulatory work.812

Similarly, the Department of Agriculture noted with respect to its
Defense Production Act313 responsibilities:
No disadvantages are foreseen [from repeal of section 553(a)(l)] provided authority would be continued to omit notice and opportunity
for public comment in any case of rule-making where this procedure
is deemed for good cause to be impracticable, unnecessary or contrary
to the public interest and other exemptions now in [section] 553
(b)-(d) are retained.s14

The Office of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI) in the Commerce Department also stated that in light of other exemptions contained in sections 553(b)-(d) "there would be no disadvantage to
OFDI if [section] 553(a)(l) ... [were] eliminated."815 Similarly, the
Domestic and International Business Bureau (DIB) of the same Department commented:
We believe that the several specific exemptions contained in [section]
553(b)-(e) would be sufficient to deal with situations in the DIB area
involving rulemaking, provided the interpretation given the exemptions is broad enough to exempt agencies from following public rulemaking procedures in situations where this could be internationally
detrimental to the U.S. (e.g., Implementation of an unpublished
international agreement).s10

In the same spirit, the Department of Treasury admitted that
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

1969 Survey Response.
Id.
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-168 (1970).
1969 Survey Response (Regulatory Division, General Counsel).
Id.
Id.
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if all of Section (a)(l)-(2) was repealed, in the preparation of regulations which could not be published until announced by the Secretary,
and in which speed and its requisite corollary, secrecy, are necessities,
and advanced publicity and public participation opportunities, impossibilities, we recognize that we could resort to publication in our
rule of a finding that notice and public procedures are contrary to
the public interest.s17

But its Office of Foreign Assets Control noted that while "a liberal
recourse to the exception [section 553(b)(B)] would permit the Control to continue to operate, virtually every public document of the
Control would have to contain a finding that notice and public procedure is contrary to the public interest."318 As noted earlier, the
availability of class exemptions, where justified, eliminates this argument for retaining 553(a)(I).
Previous discussion seems to demonstrate that a repeal of section
553(a)(I) accompanied by a construction of sections 553(b)(B) and
553(d)(3) along the lines suggested would be an excellent means by
which to reconcile the conflicting societal interests involved in rulemaking. The exemptive language of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3)
should not and need not be so broadly construed that it becomes a
meaningless limitation on agency discretion, forestalling adequate
public participation in rule-making; nor should it be so narrowly
construed that it becomes ineffective to deal with the real problems
which admittedly might be faced by certain agencies, if section 553
(a)(I) were repealed.
As noted earlier, this kind of qualified exemption will remove
from the requirements of the rule-making section virtually all of
those situations now cited to justify the across-the-board, unqualified
exceptions presently contained in section 553(a)(I). Unlike the latter
provision, however, the former has the advantage of excluding from
the strictures of section 553(b)-(d) only those specific rule-making
situations in which competing interests of a high order clearly outweigh the interests in public participation.
Furthermore, repeal of the section 553(a)(l) exemptions will also
be advantageous because the competing values involved will be more
adequately accommodated in another fashion. Unlike the current
unqualified exemption of subsection (a)(l) rule-making from every
provision of section 553, the sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) solution
would exempt only particular instances of such rule-making from
the specific subsections whose application in those instances would
!117. Id.
!118. Id.
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be unreasonable. So, even if prior public participation under section
553(b)-(c) should be eliminated in a particular case of rule-making,
the agency will still be required in most circumstances, as section
553(e) unqualifiedly demands, to give persons a right to petition for
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. As noted previously,
special exemption from that requirement seems to be justified only
in the situation where the required statement of reasons under sections 553(e) and 555(e) must itself be kept confidential. That contingency is already taken care of by section 552(b)(l).
One final point with respect to the scope of the statutory reform
proposed here deserves note. Rule-making is defined by the AP A as
the process for formulating "agency statements of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy ...."819 The procedures of section
553 are better adapted to dealing with rule-making of general applicability than to dealing with rule-making of particular applicability. Therefore, requiring adherence to the procedures of section
553 in the case of the latter class of subsection (a)(I) rule-making
may create larger burdens and smaller benefits than requiring adherence to those procedures for similar rule-making of general applicability.
An argument can be made, however, that there is no problem in
this connection because the rule-making provisions of section 553 do
not apply to rules of particular applicability. This conclusion as to
the applicability of section 553 might be justified on the following
basis. Subsection (a)(l)(D) of section 552, the freedom-of-information
provision of the APA, only requires publication of "substantive rules
of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements
of general policy or interpretations of general applicability ...." Rules
of particular applicability need not be published. According to section 552(a)(2)(B), agencies need only make them available for public
inspection and copying. Requiring publication under section 553(b)
of the terms of a proposed rule of particular applicability or a description of its intended scope, followed by an opportunity for public
participation therein, when section 552 specifically provides that an
agency need not even publish such a rule when it is finally adopted,
would be foolish and inconsistent. Section 553, therefore, must not
apply to rules of particular applicability. If so, even after the repeal
of subsection (a)(l) much "military and foreign affairs function"
rule-making may still be excluded from section 553 on this basis.
319. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970) (emphasis added).
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After all, a substantial portion of the rule-making involving these
subjects is of particular applicability. For example, much of this
nation's foreign policy and many of the orders issued by military
authorities, if they be rule-making, are rule-making of particular
applicability because they are specifically addressed to named countries or persons.
Despite the above argument, the provisions of section 553 probably do apply to rule-making of particular applicability, except as it
is specifically excluded from section 553 by some express provision
thereof. The distinction drawn in section 552 between rules of
general applicability that must be published in the Federal Register,
and rules of particular applicability that need only be made available
for inspection and copying, does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the latter class of rules is outside the requirements of section
553. The situation here is different from that where an agency must
keep certain rules secret under section 552, or has the discretion to do
so under that provision. It is not possible to argue sensibly that the
advance public notice requirements of section 553 apply to any rules
of that sort. But it is possible that advance published notice of proposed rules of particular applicability, with an opportunity for public
comment thereon, might be a requirement for those rules even
though when they are adopted, they need not be published but only
be made available for public inspection and copying. It should be
recalled that the primary purpose of the section 553 rule-making
procedures is to assure wiser rules by educating the decision makers
so that they will be fully informed before any new rules are finally
promulgated.
Furthermore, neither the express language of section 552 or section 553, nor their legislative history, indicates that the rule-making
provisions were meant to be inapplicable to rules of particular applicability. Indeed, the language of section 553 suggests that the rulemaking provisions do apply to such rules. Section 553(b) states
that "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in
the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and
either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in
accordance with law." So, if persons to whom rule-making of particular applicability is addressed are not "personally served" or do not
"have actual notice thereof," usual publication requirements apply.
Similarly, the deferred effectiveness provision of section 553(d) expressly applies to rules that are required to be published under section 552(a)(l)(D) and also to rules as to which "service" is required.
The only rules as to which "service" is ever required are rules of
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particular applicability. The term "service" in section 553(d) is an
obvious reference back to "rules addressed to and served upon named
persons," which section 3 of the original APA exempted from publication requirements. Despite the previous argument, therefore,
section 553 must be deemed applicable to rules of particular applicability as well as to rules of general applicability. Consequently, if
the "military or foreign affairs function" exemption were repealed
the effect on such rule-making of particular applicability should be
considered. Such a consideration would reveal, however, that no
serious or insurmountable difficulties would be encountered with
respect to this sort of rule-making after the repeal of section 553(a)(l).
By using one of two exemptions, an agency can avoid the trouble
associated with opening too wide the role of public participation in
rule-making of particular applicability. As noted, section 553(b) permits agencies to avoid prior publication of notice in the Federal
Register if "persons subject thereto are named and either personally
served or othenvise have actual notice thereof in accordance with
law." This means that after the repeal of section 553(a)(l), agencies
will still not be required to publish advance notice of such rulemaking of particular applicability if they give the persons "subject
thereto" personal notice and "an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments." This seems to be the result of a reconciliation of the language "persons subject thereto" in section 553(b) and "interested
persons" in section 553(c).
Furthermore, to the extent that it is more "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" to follow normal procedures for subsection (a)(l) rule-making of particular applicability
than for such rule-making of general applicability, the section 553
(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) exemptions can adequately handle the
problem. As a result, one may expect greater resort to these exemptions for subsection (a)(l) rule-making of particular applicability
than for such rule-making of general applicability. The various other
exemptions now contained in the rule-making provision will also
adequately deal with any special problems that arise from the application of section 553 to subsection (a)(l) rule-making of particular
applicability, as well as to such rule-making of general applicability.
VI.

OTHER

PROPOSALS To

MoDIFY

SECTION 553(a)(l)

During the past decade, a number of bills have been introduced
to reform federal administrative procedure. The most important of
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these were S. 2335 and S. 1663 of the Eighty-eighth Congress, and
S. 518, S. 2770, and S. 2771 of the Ninetieth Congress. "\\Tith the exception of S. 2771 320 all of these proposals to revise the APA eliminated the unqualified exclusion from section 553 for rule-making
involving "military or foreign affairs functions." In its place, they
substituted varying kinds of narrower qualified exemptions for such
rule-making. So did a more recent ABA proposal.
Of all the proposed substitute exemptions for section 553(a)(l),
only one would have granted a special exemption for this sort of rulemaking on a basis other than a need for secrecy. S. 2770 would have
entirely excluded from section 553 "rulemaking required by an Executive order to be exempt from this section in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy."321 This provision obviously would have
vested authority in the President to exclude any rule-making affecting
"national defense or foreign policy" from the provisions of the rulemaking section if he thought that would be desirable. Rule-making
would have been exempt even if it did not "involve" the "national
defense or foreign policy" as such, provided the President found that
an exemption was "in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy."
The possibility of any effective check on the President in his use
of such a broad provision is probably remote. Of course, one may
assume that unless the rule-making excluded from section 553 by
an executive order was the product of authority vested wholly
and exclusively in the President, a court might review the determination that the exclusion was "in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy."322 A court would set aside that determination, however, only if a clear abuse of discretion appeared. Given the vagueness
of the standard, almost any determination by the President would be
upheld. After all, might it not be "in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy" to avoid usual procedures for subsection (a)(l)
rules on the ground that such action would make it less likely that
the rule-making would encounter political opposition or public
320. S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h) (1967).
321. S. 2770, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h)(l) (1967).
322. But see EPA v. Mink, 41 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4205 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973), decided just
as this Article went to press, holding that in all cases the legislative history of 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(I) (1970) "makes wholly untenable any claim that the Act intended to
subject the soundness of executive security classifications to judicial review • • • • It
also negates the proposition that [section 552(b)(I)] authorizes or permits in camera
inspection of a contested document ••. so that the court may separate the secret from
the supposedly nonsecret and order disclosure of the latter." A contrary legislative
history should, however, induce the opposite conclusion.
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outcry, or that such action would make this rule-making less expensive and time consuming?
Thus, the substitute exemption for section 553(a)(l) found in
S. 2770 is undesirable for the same reasons that elimination of the
current exemption is sought. Practically, the S. 2770 provision vests
in the President too much discretion to avoid usual rule-making procedures when they are not, in fact, "impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest." Yet, the approach of S. 2770 is certainly superior to current section 553(a)(l) because under this proposal the President must act affirmatively to exempt any such
rule-making before usual procedures may be ignored. This obviously
is an advantage over the present situation because the burden is at
least put on the agencies desiring an exemption for such rule-making
to convince the President that they should have it.
The difficulty is, however, that the President is likely to honor
almost any request by trusted subordinates for an exemption from
section 553 in these particular areas.323 Past history clearly indicates
excessive concern by our presidents with safeguarding the supposed
interests of national defense and foreign policy, even at the expense
of other important competing societal values, which may, on occasion, properly be considered more important. Executive orders excusing rule-making from section 553 "in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy" are, therefore, not likely to be difficult
for agencies to obtain. What is more, under S. 2770 the exempting
executive order need not even be specific. Agencies may infer that
they are entitled to such an exemption on the basis of an existing,
general "Executive order." Even if this were not so, however, the
ultimate conclusion would remain unaltered. For all of the reasons
noted above, the solution proposed by S. 2770, while an improvement over current section 553(a)(l), is unacceptable. Outright repeal
of the exemption for rule-making involving "military or foreign
affairs functions," without more, seems best.
Nevertheless, a number of other substitutes for section 553(a)(l)
have been proposed and deserve careful examination. All of these
proposed substitutes were qualified exclusions relating in one way
or another to the need for secrecy of some such matters. More specifically, S. 2335 provided that the rule-making section "shall not
require notice of or public participation in rulemaking ... required
to be kept secret in the protection of the national security."324 S. 1663
323. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 334 (Mr. Frank Wozencraft, Assistant
Attorney General, Department of Justice).
324. S. 2335, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1003(£) (1964).
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provided that rule-making involving "any military, naval, or foreign
affairs function of the United States requiring secrecy for the protection of the national defense" was exempted from every requirement of the rule-making provision.325 Neither of these provisions
expressly demanded that an executive order impose the requirement of secrecy. Moreover, neither recognized the need for secrecy
for "foreign policy" purposes as opposed to "national defense" purposes. And neither expressly demanded any narrow tailoring of
secrecy needs as would have been the case if the exemption only
applied to rule-making "specifically" required to be kept secret.
The Senate subcommittee revision of S. 1663 differed from the
above exclusions somewhat. It provided that all rule-making involving "any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the United
States required by Executive order to be kept secret for the protection of the national defense or foreign policy" was to be exempted
entirely from the requirements of the rule-making provision.326 The
addition of the specific requirement of an "Executive order" and the
use of secrecy for the purpose of protecting "foreign policy" as well
as "national defense" are notable.
S. 518 was almost identical to the latter provision, for it would
have exempted from the rule-making provision all "rulemaking required by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy."327 The recent American Bar
Association proposal differs only by its addition of the word "specifically," so that only rule-making "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense
or foreign policy" is exempted from the rule-making provision.328
This language is precisely the same as that now appearing in the
freedom-of-information provision of the APA, section 552(b)(l). As
the ABA Committee noted, in making its proposal:
Obviously, sensitive matters of national defense and international
relations are by their nature· not appropriate subjects for public
participation. Not all the functions of the Departments of Defense
and State are of this character, however, and to the extent that [s]ection 553(a)(l) may be so construed, it is desirable that the provision
be narrowed to the same ambit circumscribed by the Freedom of
Information Act. ... The proposed amendment to [section] 553(a)(l)
would make explicit that it is not enough to exempt a matter from
rulemaking that it is related to a military or foreign affairs function,
325.
326.
327.
328.

S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(1) (1963).
Revised S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1963).
S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(h)(l) (1967).
See Crowther, supra note 9, at 8.
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in absence of a specific declaration by Executive order that the interest of national defense or foreign policy require that they be kept
secret. Public participation in rulemaking would then generally be
the rule rather than an exception in such activities as the formulation
of Armed Services Procurement Regulations. 329
It has previously been argued in this Article that section 552(b)(l)
already exempts rule-making from section 553 to the extent an "executive order" "specifically" requires that the rules or the reasons
therefor must be kept secret in the "interest of national defense or
foreign policy." That is, in the formulation and promulgation of
valid rules agencies may ignore usual rule-making procedures to the
extent that adherence to those procedures would interfere with a
valid secrecy requirement imposed under section 552(b)(I). No objection, therefore, can be urged against adding a provision to the
rule-making section expressly recognizing this fact. But if such a provision is added, its language certainly should be congruent with the
language of section 552(b)(I). This is, of course, the position of the
American Bar Association. There are a number of very good reasons
to support that view.
If special exemptive language to deal with problems of secrecy
were added to section 553 at the time of subsection (a)(l)'s repeal,
an anomaly would be created if the wording chosen were substantively broader than that found in section 552(b)(l). Agencies would
then be authorized to avoid usual rule-making procedures on the
grounds of secrecy in some situations in which the public would be
entitled to obtain documents relating to that subject matter under
section 552. As noted earlier, there is no reason to permit any greater
resort to secrecy as a basis for avoiding usual rule-making requirements under section 553 than there is for avoiding usual freedomof-information requirements under section 552. A similar difficulty
would be encountered if the language of a substitute for section
553(a)(l) were substantively narrower in scope than that of section
552(b)(l) because in that case an agency might be forced to reveal
matters under the requirements of section 553 that it had a right to
suppress under section 552.
In addition, it is desirable to have determinations of the necessity
for exemption from usual rule-making requirements made by an
"Executive order.''330 The policy of openness of government pro329. Id. at 18-20.
330. "The Department of Justice and the Department of State insisted that the
requirement of an Executive Order was 'unnecessary,' would add a 'layer' and could
be better handled by legislative oversight." Carrow, Revision of the Administr11tive
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ceedings is so important that a final determination to depart from
it on a purely discretionary basis because of an alleged need for
secrecy should be made only at the highest level. An excuse based
on the need for secrecy is, after all, so subject to abuse, and such a
tempting vehicle by which government officials may seek to hide
improprieties, that it should be available only after a determination
of its necessity has been made by the most politically responsible
official, the President. Of course, it is understood that such an "Executive order" requirement cannot and will not ensure personal consideration of the merits of each such order by the President if he is
prepared to rely completely on the advice of his advisors by automatically signing any order on this subject that they put before him.
In support of this requirement of an "Executive order" it should
also be noted that courts reviewing the propriety of the use of an
exemption predicated on a need for secrecy are not likely to probe
very deeply, if at all. 331 That lack of close judicial scrutiny is less
likely to be disastrous if the decision to avoid usual rule-making
procedures based on a need for secrecy is made at the highest level,
because at that level the agency's decision is most likely to be
responsible and justifiable.
An executive order that exempts certain rule-making from the
procedures of section 553 should be reasonably specific as to the
precise kinds of rule-making covered in the order. Specificity would
avoid some unjustified reliance on executive orders by subordinate
officials who wish to dispense with normal rule-making procedures.
The term "specifically" in section 552(b)(l) is, therefore, very desirable and should be imported into any analogous exemption added to
the rule-making provision. Section 552(b)(l) is also worthy of emulation in section 553 because it recognizes the legitimate use of secrecy
not only for "national defense" purposes but also for "foreign policy"
purposes. Secrecy exemptions for either purpose should be available
because they are, in practice, necessary.832 All of these points militate
in favor of the ABA proposal-using language identical to section
552(b)(l) in a special exemption from section 553 for rule-making
Procedure Act: A Comparative Analysis of Current Bills and a New Proposal, 21 Ao.
L. R.Ev. 227, 230 (1969), citing S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 332, 318.
331. They may not probe at all if the Act's legislative history precludes review.
See EPA v. Mink, discussed in note 322 supra, decided just as this Article went to press.
But see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); K. DAVIS, supra note 5, §§ 3A.16,
3A.33 (Supp. 1970).
332. See S. 166:J Hearings, supra note 104, at 354 (Department of Justice); id. at 392
(Department of the Treasury): id. at 387 (Department of State).
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which must be kept secret in the interest of "national defense or
foreign policy."
However, the ABA proposal is arguably undesirable because it
may authorize the President to treat the need for secrecy of a subject
under the rule-making provision in a manner that is inconsistent
with his treatment of the same subject under the freedom-of-information provision. This could not happen if the President were reduced to relying solely on section 552(b)(l) for secrecy exemptions
from both the freedom-of-information section and the rule-making
section. In that case, rule-making could be exempt from section 553
on the basis of a need for secrecy in the interest of "national defense
or foreign policy" only if an executive order also makes the matter
to which those rules pertain exempt under section 552(b)(l). The
argument is that if the President does not think that the matter
involved needs to be kept secret, and, therefore, refuses to issue an
executive order to that effect under section 552(b)(l), he should not
be permitted to exempt the matter from section 553 on the basis of
a special need for secrecy.
But this objection to the ABA proposal may not be realistic or
sound. Even under section 552(b)(l), the "Executive order" need
not be of the all-or-nothing variety, nor should it be. The term
"matter" as used in section 552(b)(l) admits of executive authority
to define in any number of different ways exactly what must be kept
secret. So, the "matter" may include the texts of certain rules themselves, but no other documents relating to the subject to which the
rules pertain, if in fact the President ascertains that secrecy is required in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy" for the
rules but not for the other documents. Or, the President may order
that the reasons for the rules be kept secret but not the rules themselves. This is as it should be, since utmost flexibility in this matter
should properly reside in the President, and is available under the
ABA proposal and section 552(b)(l).
For the same reason the following objection to the ABA proposal is spurious:
If an Executive order makes a finding that the national interest requires secrecy in the case of a particular type of foreign policy decision-making, there will be an inevitable inhibition on employing
other, less formal [and hence more secrecy-maintaining] procedures
of consultation with interested parties, than have been employed in
the past.838
333. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 388 (Department of State).
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Not sol The executive order requiring rule-making to be exempt
from section 553 because of a need for secrecy need not interfere
with those other procedures, if the President so chooses. Neither the
ABA proposal nor section 552(b)(l) is an all-or-nothing provision;
they vest discretion in the President to adopt intermediate, qualified,
or part-way stances in the interest of maintaining the requisite secrecy.
Another more serious objection to the ABA proposal is that it
would "thrust too many duties on an already overburdened President,"334 since it would permit exemption of rule-making from section 553 on the ground of secrecy only if that secrecy is "specifically"
required by an "Executive order." According to the Atomic Energy
Commission, the "course of submitting each proposed exemption to
the President for ad hoc determination would impose on the President an unreasonable continuing burden."385
But is this burden any different or greater than that already imposed on the President by section 552(b)(l)? Congress made the decision at the time that provision was enacted that in light of the
important values involved, imposition of this obligation on the President was justifiable. As pointed out earlier, enactment of the ABA
proposal is unnecessary because the President is already charged
with making determinations under section 552(b)(l) that would in
effect exempt certain rule-making from section 553 because of the
need for secrecy in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy."
No further burden would, therefore, in fact be imposed on him by
the ABA proposal because it would only be declaratory of his present
obligations. Consequently, this objection to the ABA proposal does
not deserve serious consideration since Congress resolved the basic
policy question when it enacted section 552(b)(l).
The Atomic Energy Commission has, however, sought to distinguish section 552(b)(l) from the ABA proposal for section 553deeming the latter unsuitable for the rule-making provision even
though the former may be suitable for the freedom-of-information
provision. It said:
While we recognize that the modified exception [for the rulem.aking
provision] is the same as that in [section 552(b)(I)] the considerations
relating to public information and rulemaking are sufficiently di£334. S. 166] Hearings, supra note 104, at 679 (Professors Marvin Frankel &: Walter
Gellhom, Columbia University Law School). See also id. at 480 (Department of Commerce).
335. 1969 Survey Response.
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ferent as to warrant different treatment with respect to exemptions
from their requirements.886
However, the AEC does not explain why the considerations should
be different with respect to exemptions from these two provisions to
deal with a unitary problem, the need for secrecy in the interest of
"national defense or foreign policy."
Another objection to an ABA type proposal is that "the Executive order that would be needed if section [553] procedures were
to be omitted might in itself destroy the very secrecy it was intended
to enhance." The following illustration is provided:
Consider, for example, the making of rules pertaining to access to a
secret missile base or pertaining to methods of subsidizing the
military operations of friendly powers. Unless the President were to
issue an Executive order, which, of course, would be immediately
available for publication, section [553] procedures would have to be
followed; publication of the absolving Executive order would, how•
ever, perforce disclose some of the very information sought to be
withheld "for the protection of the national defense or foreign
policy."887
Two points should be made with respect to this argument. First, if
it is a valid objection with respect to an "Executive order" requirement for the rule-making provision, it is equally valid with respect
to the "Executive order" requirement for the freedom-of-information
provision. Second, it is based on a misconception concerning the
precise nature of the executive order required under the ABA proposal for section 553, and under section 552(b)(l). Obviously, the
required executive order need not be of a nature or specificity that
would divulge in any way the very matters sought to be concealed
in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy." With respect
to the above illustration, for example, all that would be necessary is
an executive order requiring secrecy for rule-making and documents
(I) pertaining to access to secret missile bases, or (2) pertaining to the
methods of subsidizing the military operations of friendly powers.
The usual requirements of sections 553 and 552 would thereby be
swept aside for such matters. No more specificity is required to be consistent with the purpose of the ABA proposal and section 552(b)(l).838
One last objection to the ABA proposal-and more generally to
the proposal to delete section 553(a)(l)-is that the ABA proposal
and other similar substitutes would merely interject "new definitions
336. Id.
337. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 679 (Professors Frankel &: Gellhorn).
338. See K. DAVIS, supra note 5, §§ 3A.16, 3A.33 (Supp. 1970).
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which make everybody wonder-what is the difference between national defense and military affairs, what is the difference between
foreign policy and foreign affairs, what does the executive order
really cover?"339
The difficulty with this line of argument is apparent. At present
both sets of terms are already in the APA-"military and foreign
affairs function" in section 553(a)(l) and "national defense and foreign policy" in section 552(b)(I). Neither set of terms is intrinsically
clearer or more developed by history and practice than the other.
The differing language of these two sets of terms in the same Act
also raises unhappy and unnecessary problems of comparative construction. Adding an ABA-type provision to section 553 in lieu ol
section 553(a)(I) would, however, improve the situation, not worsen
it. Then, at least, there would only be one set of terms to deal with
in applying the Act-"national defense and foreign policy." Indeed,
mere repeal of section 553(a)(l) would be beneficial for the same
reason. As to the objection that under the ABA proposal construction of executive orders would be unduly burdensome, it need only
be noted that this burden already rests on the agencies under section
552(b)(I).
It should be reiterated that enactment of an express provision
permitting exemptions from section 553 for rule-making "specifically"
required by an "Executive order" to be kept "secret in the interest
of national defense or foreign policy" is probably unnecessary as a
matter of law. Enactment of such a provision is, however, desirable
because it will make agencies feel more secure to have the present
inferential relationship between sections 552(b)(l) and 553 expressly
spelled out. But the result will be the same if the only action taken
is that which is clearly justified and most pressing-simple repeal of
section 553(a)(I). Agencies are not now required by section 553 to
violate a proper executive order under section 552(b)(l). To read the
current provisions any other way would be absurd.
VII.

MAY CONGRESS EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT THE
REFORM PROPOSED?

Is there any constitutional impediment to the procedural reform
proposed here? To what extent, if at all, is section 553(a)(l) a recognition of an independent and exclusive executive authority in the
military and foreign affairs area which may not be regulated by Con339. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 334 (Mr. Wozencraft. Department of
Justice).
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gress?340 The ultimate inquiry, of course, is the extent to which
Congress may regulate the precise procedure by which the executive
branch makes rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions."
To ascertain the answer to these questions, depiction of comparative
congressional and presidential authority in these fields seems necessary. Happily, the theoretical analyses contained in several recent
studies are particularly useful here because of the light they shed
on this question.841
A.

Scope of Congressional Power To Dictate
Procedure for These Functions

In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer3 42 Justice Jackson
suggested that there are three zones of constitutional power with respect to legislative and executive authority in the military and foreign affairs area. The first is a zone of constitutional power that is
exclusively presidential. In that zone the Executive may act lawfully
even against the clearly expressed command of Congress. The second
is a zone of exclusive congressional authority in which the legislature
340. Some comments with regard to foreign affairs functions suggest a con•
gressional incapacity based on the Constitution's distribution of such powers among
the several governmental branches:
The Department of State in its daily functions is, in most cases, carrying out
on behalf of the President the exercise of his constitutional power to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States. The Constitution gives the President an
unusually large degree of authority in conducting foreign affairs ••••
The Department of State thus functions primarily in a different capacity from
that of other departments and agencies. Most executive business entails the execution by the departments and agencies concerned of the laws Congress has passed.
Rules are made and individual cases considered with a view to applying the
mandates of Congress with respect to regnlation of various fields of activity and
expenditure of appropriated funds.
The conduct of foreign policy, by contrast, is generally not dictated by statutory standards.
S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 387-88 (William Macomber, Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations, Department of State).
Generally speaking, the conduct of foreign affairs is not a part of the administrative process.
In most cases foreign affairs are conducted by agents of the President carrying
out his responsibilities in this field under the Constitution.
Id. at 318 (Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State).
Thus, there are good reasons why the foreign affairs exemption should have
been placed in the Administrative Procedure Act at its original enactment 21 years
ago. Those reasons remain valid today.
Id. at 321.
341. Pollack, Black &: Bickel, The Congressional and Executive Roles in JVarMaking: An Analytical Framework, 116 CONG. R.Ec. 16478 (1970) [_hereinafter The Yale
Paper]; Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over Foreign Aid
(pts. 1-2), 1970 DUKE L.J. 293, 453 [_hereinafter Wallace, Foreign Aid]; C. ZINN, EXTENT
OF THE CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1962). The
following brief theoretical discussion in the text relies mainly, though not exclusively,
on these secondary studies.
342. 348 U.S. 579, 635-88 (1952) (concurring opinion).

December 1972]

Rule-Making

337

may act lawfully even against the clearly expressed command of the
President. In between these poles of exclusive executive and exclusive legislative power is a third "zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain." 343 Either of these branches of the national
government can act without the other in this twilight area. But
Justice Jackson did not clearly indicate what would happen if congressional action in the twilight zone conflicted with the presidential
will.
There is no doubt that under the Constitution Congress and the
President each have their own exclusive powers involving "military
and foreign affairs functions." Similarly, there should be no doubt
that there is a large twilight zone involving "military and foreign
affairs functions" in which the Constitution grants authority concurrently to both the President and the Congress. If nothing else,
an enumeration of the various broadly worded constitutional provisions conferring powers on Congress and the President in these
areas illustrates this point.
Congress has the express constitutional authority to levy taxes,
including import duties, and to spend "for the common defense";
"define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
seas, and offences against the law of Nations"; "declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and Make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water"; "raise and support Armies"; "provide
and maintain a Navy"; "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"; "provide for calling forth the
militia" and "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the Service of the United States."344 The Constitution also states
that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States."3411 In addition to vesting in Congress the above powers, and all authority "necessary and proper for
carrying [them] into Execution,"346 the Constitution provides that
two thirds of the Senate must concur in any treaty between the
United States and another nation. The Senate must also concur in
ambassadorial and major military appointments.3 47
On the other hand, article II specifies that "[t]he executive Power
343. 343 U.S. at 637.
l!44. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
l!45. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § l!.
l!46. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
l!47. U.S. CoNsr, art. II, § 2,
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shall be vested in [the] President of the United States." Additionally,
the President is designated as the "Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States." He also is
expressly given the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make treaties . . . [and to] appoint Ambassadors"; to
"receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers"; and to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."348
The fact that there may be a residuum of power in the military
and foreign affairs areas that is vested in the national government
"as a necessary concomitant of nationality," rather than by the express language of the Constitution, also supports the view that there
is a twilight zone involving "military and foreign affairs functions"
in which authority rests concurrently in both the President and
Congress. By definition, the Constitution does not expressly allocate
that power between Congress and the President. But such residual
"powers must vest somewhere, and there is nothing-nothing in the
Constitution, nothing in history, nothing in the case law, and nothing
in common sense-to suggest that the entire residuum vests exclu•
sively in one or the other branch."349
A logical scheme has been posited with respect to clashes of authority in the twilight zone, as well as with respect to clashes of
authority in the zones of exclusive power:
I) In the zone of exclusive executive power, any legislation attempting to restrict presidential action is void and can be ignored by the
President, even if it is "passed" over his veto. 2) In the zone of exclusive congressional power, any presidential action is illegal and can
be prevented or ended by action of Congress. 3) In the twilight zone
of concurrent power, either the President or Congress can act in the
absence of initiative by the other. If both attempt to act in ways
that bring their wills into conflict, the deadlock. must be resolved
in favor of congressional action through valid legislation, which includes legislation passed over a presidential veto.8 ~0

That is, either branch of government is entitled to block efforts by
348. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, §§ 2-3.
349. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16480 (emphasis original), citing the fact
that article I, section 8, of the Constitution makes it clear that some residual power
vests in Congress rather than the President. See id. at 16480 n.11. By that provision,
Congress is given power "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof" (emphasis added). The Yale Paper also states that "the lesson of history is
that the President and Congress haYe shared the residual power." Id. at 16480 n.12,
citing Bickel, et al., Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis, ll6 CONG. REC. 15409 (1970).
350. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479.
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the other to interfere with its exercise of military or foreign affairs
powers vested exclusively therein. However, Congress may properly
seek to regulate exercises of presidential authority in the twilight
zone. When it does so, Congress' will should prevail over that of the
President. The reasons for this are as follows.
Under our Constitution there is a distinct bias toward vesting
national power in Congress, since "Congress is closer to the electorate
and represents a greater diversity of views than the President."351
Its power, therefore, is more "basic" than that of the Chief Executive
in the sense that it is a more democratic institution. Another reason
why congressional will should prevail over that of the President in
the twilight zone may be found in the text of the Constitution. The
Constitution nowhere expressly provides a means by which the President can impose his will over Congress' objection. It does, however,
specifically provide a way for Congress to impose its will over the
President's objection: It makes a bill that is passed over the veto of
the President as much law as one that he has signed.352 The President is, therefore, obligated to enforce the enactment unless, of
course, Congress did not have the power to enact it in the first place.
"But, in the twilight zone, Congress has power by definition." 353
It should also be noted that Youngstown directly supports the
proposition that in the twilight zone any conflict between Congress
and the President must be resolved in favor of the former. Youngstown seems to suggest that the power of the President to order seizure
of the steel mills under the specific circumstances of that case was
in the twilight zone. The reason the President could not lawfully
do so there was that Congress had specifically rejected presidential
seizure as a means for maintaining operation of vital industries during labor disputes. 354 A clear intimation may be gleaned from a
majority of the Justices in Youngstown that absent this congressional
rejection of the seizure device, the President might properly have
acted under his own independent authority to engage in such a
seizure.81111
One may briefly speculate about the nature of those "foreign
affairs functions" delegated exclusively to the President. Certainly,
"[a]mong the principal exclusive powers of the President is the power
351. Id.
352. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7.
353. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479.
354. 343 U.S. at 586. See also The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479, 16480 n.8.
355. 343 U.S. at 588-89 (Black, J.), 602 (Frankfurter, J.), 631 (Douglas, J.), 637-39
CTackson, J.), 656-59 (Burton, J.), 662 (Clark, J.).
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to recognize foreign governments and states ... [which] 'includes the
power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of
recognition.' " 356 Similarly, the power to "commence, maintain and
sever diplomatic relations ... is exclusively the President's.''357 The
precise "content and mode" of this nation's diplomatic relations
with foreign countries may also be considered exclusive.358 "[H]e
alone negotiates. . .. 'The President is the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.' " 859 The President, then, is vested with the whole authority
to make strategic foreign policy in our diplomatic relations with
other nations, and the whole authority to conduct that policy. It has
been suggested that
the traditional core would seem to embrace all diplomatic and Commander-in-Chief foreign affairs decisions, except for the following
particular classes:
1) Certain matters affecting foreign commerce, including such
derived matters as immigration and passports;
2) Certain matters of administrative detail;
3) The withholding of appropriations altogether;
4) Declarations of war;
5) Senate advice and consent to treaties and appointments.
Thus, the Constitution, as it has developed, has struck a balance. On
one side is exclusive executive power with respect to foreign affairs;
on the other, congressional participation.3 60
Under this balance, however, Congress cannot, for example, properly
use its power not to appropriate funds "to prevent the President from
recognizing a state or government, dispatching an emissary to it, or
specifying the rank of such emissary.''861
356. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 315, quoting United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
357. Id. at 316.
358. Id. at 317 (emphasis original).
359. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936),
quoting John Marshall in 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). See also Wallace, The WarMaking Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 719, 734 (1972) [hereinafter
Wallace, War-Making].
360. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 321 (emphasis original).
361. Id. at 326. But see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957,
at 432 n.57 (4th ed. 1957), quoting an 1864 report from the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs that concluded with the following resolution:
"Resolved, That Congress has a constitutional right to an authoritative voice in
declaring and prescribing the foreign policy of the United States, as well in the
recognition of new powers as in other matters; and it is the constitutional duty
of the President to respect that policy, not less in diplomatic negotiations than
in the use of the national forces when authorized by law; and the propriety of
any declaration of foreign policy by Congress is sufficiently proved by the vote
which pronounces it; and such proposition while pending and undetermmed is not
a fit topic of diplomatic explanation with any foreign power." •••
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One may also speculate briefly with respect to some of the exclusive "military functions" conferred on the President by his Commander-in-Chief authority. It has been suggested that while "Congress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether .•. as long as we have a military force Congress cannot take
away from the President the supreme command."362 This proposition
has been elaborated more fully by the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Milligan, 363 where the Court stated:
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern
armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by
law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except
such as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct
of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as
Commander-in-Chief. Both these powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent
must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our
institutions.864
On this basis, it has been concluded that as Commander-in-Chief,
the President "has sole charge of the day-to-day conduct of military
affairs in theatres of battle, and Congress cannot control it."865 Presumably, on the same basis, the President has exclusive control over
strategic military planning or preparation for hostilities. It has also
been suggested that the President may have exclusive power with
respect to the selection of weapons systems. 366 Of course, Congress
can refuse to appropriate funds. As Senator Borah once noted:
Undoubtedly the Congress may refuse to appropriate and undoubtedly the Congress may say that an appropriation is for a specific
purpose. In that respect the President would undoubtedly be bound
by it. But the Congress could not, through the powers of appropriation, in my judgment, infringe upon the right of the President to
command whatever army he might find.367

Any effort to define precisely or to catalogue all of those "military and foreign affairs functions" that are beyond congressional
control because they are vested exclusively in the President, and those
The resolution passed the House in a somewhat diluted form, but failed to
come to a vote in the Senate.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Swain v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), affd., 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139.
Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 320.
Wallace, War-Making, supra note 359, at 735 & n.85.
69 CoNG, R.Ec, 6760 (1928),
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that are within congressional control because they are vested concurrently in both Congress and the President, or exclusively in Congress,
is not required by this Article. For present purposes it is enough to
demonstrate that Congress may properly narrow or eliminate section 553(a)(l), or, stated differently, that Congress may, if it wishes,
subject a significant portion of rule-making involving "military or
foreign affairs functions" to reasonable procedures of its own choosing
-even if the President objects. If there be doubt concerning the
authority of Congress to impose mandatory procedures in particular
instances of such rule-making, that may be worked out on a case-bycase basis under a statutory provision that is valid on its face.
Any effort to define precisely or to catalogue all of those "military and foreign affairs functions" vested wholly or exclusively in the
executive branch also seems futile. 868 The language of the Constitution delegating power in these areas to the Congress and to the
President is of little help because it is opaque and overly general at
best. So, too, no help is furnished by the sparse litigation on this subject. For example, while United States v. Curtiss-Wright states that
the President is "the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations,"869 it does not deal with the questions as
to which branch or branches of the national government have the
authority to make that policy, and under what circumstances; and
which branch or branches have the authority to define how such
policy is made, and under what circumstances. One study does suggest, however, a working principle by which those exercises of presidential power in the military and foreign affairs fields that are beyond
congressional reach can be differentiated from those exercises of such
power that are within Congress' capacity to regulate. "[T]he power
appropriate to each branch" should be analyzed in light of "(l) the
special competences of each, and (2) the probable internal consequences of external actions."370
The presidency's special competence "is its capacity for fast,
efficient, and decisive action." "Power in the executive branch is
hierarchical; in Congress it is diffuse. The essence of the legislative
process is deliberation and compromise; in the executive process, at
least in theory, it is command."871 Another special competence of the
368. See Wallace, War-Making, supra note 359, at 731-33.
369. 299 U.S. at 320.
370. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479. On the comparative competence of
the executive and the legislature, see id. at 16479; Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note
341, at 455-64.
371. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479.
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Presidency is the ability to act secretly and to keep matters confidential. 372 This, too, is a product of the hierarchical and unitary nature
of executive power, since only one person need be privy to any decision on the executive level while on the legislative level 535 people
must necessarily be privy to any decision. The consequences of this
have been a congenital inability on the part of Congress to keep
controversial matters confidential.373 On the other hand, Congress
is "closer to the People and reflects the diversity of their views.''874
Because of its size and the fact that it "acts through deliberation,
compromise, and consensus" it is also likely to be a more prudent
body than the President. Congress' special capacity is, therefore, "a
unique legitimacy to commit the resources and will of the nation." 375
In light of these special competences of the President and Congress:
(1) When a decision in foreign or military affairs demands speed and
decisiveness, [or, it may be added, secrecy,] there is a presumption
that it is within the exclusive power of the President. (2) All other
decisions are within the power of Congress. Some of that congressional power is in the twilight zone and held concurrently with the
President. [The remainder is within the exclusive powers of Congress.]376

The presidential veto of the Military Authorization Act of 1965377
is consistent with this view of congressional authority, and relevant
372. See Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 458 (emphasis added):
In recognizing the superior knowledge and information of the executive, the
Supreme Court has said, "[the Presidentl, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries • . • •
He has his confidential sources of information • • • Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary •••• "
The speed, secrecy, and flexibility of the executive-qualities often cited as
necessary for the effective conduct of certain aspects of foreign affairs-frequently
have been noted.
Quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
373. Consider, for example, Senator Gravel's public issuance of the "Pentagon
Papers," which the Defense Department attempted to keep confidential. Gravel, Introduction to THE PENTAGON PAl'ERS at ix (Gravel ed. 1971).
374. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479.
375. Id. See also id. at 16480 n.14:
The competence of Congress to commit the resources and will of the nation
is reflected in the allocation of enumerated Constitutional powers. It can commit
the human and material resources of the nation by laying taxes, borrowing money,
and raising an army. It can commit the will of the nation by declaring war. And,
perhaps most significantly, it can change the VC!'f character of the nation by establishing standards for naturalization. All these thmgs, furthermore, Congress can do
over the President's veto.
376. Id. at 16479 (emphasis original). The Yale Paper omits mention of a special
need for secrecy as a basis for exclusive executive authority under the Constitution,
and also fails to mention the special capacity of the Executive to act in secret and to
keep matters confidential.
377. H.R. 8439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See 111 CONG. R.Ec. 21244-45 (1965);
H.R. Doc. No. 272, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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to the ultimate inquiry being pursued in this section of the present
Article. That Act provided that no military installation or facility
of any kind "shall be closed, abandoned or substantially reduced in
mission until 120 days after reports of the proposed action are made
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives."878 Reports of this type could only be filed with the
appropriate committees between January I and April 30 of each
year. "If Congress adjourns sine die before 120 days pass, the report
must be resubmitted to the next regular session of the Congress."879
President Johnson vetoed the bill on the ground that it was unconstitutional.
According to the President, this Act was an improper effort by
Congress to regulate the procedure by which he could exercise military and foreign affairs powers conferred exclusively upon his office
by the Constitution. In his veto message, the President relied on the
need for speedy action in determining matters within the Act's purview as the basis for his exclusive authority over that subject. Congress could not impose this procedure on the President in the performance of those particular military and foreign affairs functions
because:
We cannot commit ourselves, for the prolonged period required
by this bill, to delay action necessary to meet the realities of the
troubled world in which we live.
By the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
The President cannot sign into law a bill which substantially inhibits him from performing his duty. He cannot sign into law a measure which deprives him of power for 8 months of the year even to
propose a reduction of mission or the closing of any military installation, and which prohibits him from closing, abandoning, or substantially reducing in mission any military facility in the country for
what could be a year or more and must be 120 days. The times do
not permit it. The Constitution prohibits it.
. . . The President must be free, if the need arises, to reduce the
mission at any military installation in the country if and when such
becomes necessary.sso

The President indicated that his veto did "not mean to imply
that a reasonable reporting provision, consistent with the legislative
powers of the Congress, would warrant a veto."881 It is unclear, how378. H.R. 8439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6ll(a) (1965),
379. Id.
380. 111 CONG. REc. 21244 (1965).
381. Id. at 21245.
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ever, whether the President meant that congressional imposition of
such a reporting requirement with respect to the particular type of
rule-making involved there would be valid and, therefore, binding
on him even if he opposed it. The President probably intended to
suggest only that he would approve a bill containing such a simple
reporting requirement because it would not unduly interfere with
the proper performance of his duties. There is, of course, a very large
difference between these two possible constructions of the veto
message.
According to one view, Congress may lawfully obligate the President to follow a particular rule-making procedure in the performance
of those "military or foreign affairs functions" vested exclusively in
the executive branch so long as the procedure prescribed in no way
interferes with the merits of the President's substantive decision or
his ability to perform that function as expeditiously or confidentially
as necessary. If Congress has such authority, it may impose rulemaking procedures of its own design on the performance of all "military and foreign affairs functions," and the Executive would be
bound to follow these procedures in all cases, subject only to the
qualifications noted above. According to the contrary view, however, the very need for reflexive or secret executive action in certain
military and foreign affairs situations demonstrates that the particular rule-making involved is being executed pursuant to an exclusive
presidential power. Congress may not, as a consequence, interfere
with the Chief Executive's exercise of that authority in any way.
It may not, therefore, prescribe the procedures by which that function is performed, even if those procedures do not interfere with
his substantive decision or with his capacity to act as swiftly or confidentially as is necessary.
As a matter of policy, both views described above may be able to
gamer some support because functionally they end in the same place.
Under either theory the President is assured freedom to act as
quickly and confidentially as necessary to perform those "military
and foreign affairs functions" whose peculiar nature demands such
a special capacity. The only difference is that under one of the
theories Congress may impose some procedural requirements of its
choosing on the President in the performance of these duties-requirements that would not interfere with the executive's substantive
decision on its merits or ·with his capacity for speedy or confidential
action. Under the other theory Congress could impose no procedural
requirements when the President makes rules involving a "military
or foreign affairs function" whose peculiar nature requires an ability
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to act reflexively or secretly. The President would obviously contend
for the latter theory and Congress for the former.
In support of the former view it has been suggested:
Related to the congressional power to create programs is the power
to specify many matters of administrative detail. These run the
gamut from the establishment of agencies, offices, and positions,
through the control of many personnel matters, to the disposition
of property and the specification of operating procedures. Thus, it
would appear that Congress' discretion is virtually unlimited in
"prescribing the organization, procedure and business practices of
an administrative agency ...."as2
The assumption is that "[t]his kind of administrative detail which
may be common to both domestic and foreign programs, is to be
distinguished from the 'detail' of conduct and policy which forms
part of the core area of foreign affairs [or military functions] that is
immune from congressional control."388 So, for example, it is suggested that even with respect to those "military and foreign affairs
functions" vested wholly and exclusively in the Executive, Congress
can check and balance the President by "reports which the executive
can be required to make."384
This conclusion is qualified, however, by the observation that
the extensiveness of these powers over "administrative detail" and
administrative procedure "is not well defined."3811 Consequently, it
is admitted that this power of Congress to force the President to
make reports is limited by the doctrine of executive privilege, which
originates in the residuum of independent and exclusive presidential
powers.386 So, too, note the response to the following question:
While Congress can normally prescribe operating procedures, should
it be completely free to do so if the same have a considerable impact
on the effect of United States ... programs abroad [or on the exercise
of military functions]? The burden which this might place on the
conduct of foreign affairs [or military functions] suggests that Congress should not possess such freedom. 3s7
Nevertheless, on occasion Congress has attempted to impose require382. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 307, quoting L. l\lERIA."d: & L. ScHMECKE•
BRIER, REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: 'WHAT DOES !T INVOLVE? 125

(1939).
383.
384.
at 19.
385.
386.
387.

L. MERIAM & SCHMECKEBRIER, supra note 382, at 125.
Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 492 citing C.
Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 307-08.
Id. at 475-76, 492 n.425.
Id. at 481.

ZINN,

supra note 341,
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ments of administrative detail or procedure on the Chief Executive
even where the particular "military or foreign affairs function"
being executed is arguably vested wholly in the President.388 In doing
so, it claimed to be acting under one of the powers expressly delegated
to the legislature in this area.
A logical objection may be raised to the broader view of congressional power. To the extent that the Constitution vests authority
over certain "military or foreign affairs functions" wholly or exclusively in the Executive, Congress may in no way interfere with or
regulate their exercise-substantively or procedurally. Even a procedural regulation that does not hinder the Executive's capacity to
make any decision on the merits he sees fit, or to react as swiftly or
confidentially as he deems necessary in such cases, should be invalid.
By enacting such a procedural regulation Congress is, after all, attempting to impose its will on the performance of a particular
function delegated by the Constitution wholly to the President.
Why should Congress have more authority over the procedure than
the substance with respect to matters whose substance admittedly
lies within the zone of exclusive executive power? Certainly, no
such distinction is drawn in the language of the Constitution or in
any known judicial opinion.
Furthermore, it can always be argued that any procedural limitation that is imposed by Congress on rule-making in an area of exclusive executive authority will, by definition, hinder at least to some
extent the Executive's ability to act as speedily or secretly as he may
deem necessary in such cases. On the other hand, a suitable response
may be that the precise nature of the particular procedure Congress
seeks to impose will in fact determine whether or not the Executive's
ability to act as speedily or secretly as necessary is impaired. An
analysis of the actual procedure involved is, therefore, a prerequisite
to any conclusion on this subject.

B. Section 552(b)(l)) the ABA Proposal) and Section 553(b)(B)
It may be argued that Congress has already acted upon the
belief that it has some authority to prescribe the procedures employed in the exercise of all "military and foreign affairs functions,"
including those demanding a special capacity for speedy or confidential executive action. When the new freedom-of-information provision was added to the APA, Congress did not follow the model of
section 553 and unqualifiedly exempt all records involving a "mili388. Id. at 480-82,
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tary or foreign affairs function." Instead, in section 552(b)(l), Congress stated that the freedom-of-information section "does not apply
to matters that are ... specifically required by Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."
This statutory provision may not, however, be used to demonstrate the existence of any assumed congressional authority to
impose on the executive branch rule-making procedures for the
performance of those "military and foreign affairs functions" exclusively delegated to the President. In the first place, the President
concurred in the freedom-of-information provision. This generally
applicable provision does not, therefore, demonstrate a congressional
belief that it may force section 552(b)(l) on the President's exercise
of any exclusive executive authority over a veto based on constitutional grounds. Furthermore, it is doubtful that presidential concurrence in such a general statute at the time of its enactment would
later disable the Chief Executive from disavowing it in those particular instances where it is seen to trench upon the Executive's
exclusive power. In such a case the President and Congress only
agreed to a law that was valid on its face. And the President and
Congress cannot, either singly or in concert, agree to bind the President to follow a certain procedure in those particular cases where
the Constitution delegates to him sole and exclusive authority to
make a decision and to act upon it as the occasion demands.889
Secondly, it may be argued that section 552(b)(l) does not, in
£act, impose any procedure on the Executive in cases of exclusive
presidential power because the particular procedure imposed is so
devoid of substance that it is no limitation at all. It is a totally
empty command to order the Executive to follow certain open
records requirements for all public documents except those "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy," since the only procedure
required by that provision is that the President must indicate that
he does not want to follow the usual requirements when he does
not want to do so-a limitation of doubtful significance or substance.
389. "The President has on occasions vetoed legislation with such [unconstitutional]
provisions [in congressional acts infringing on his exclusive powers]; in more recent
years he has at times approved the legislation but indicated he will treat the provision in question as unconstitutional. Attorneys General have supported this approach." Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 321-22 n.191. "[T]he President has
increasingly indicated in signing messages that he will ignore certain provisions in
legislation or treat them in such a way as to avoid constitutional problems." Id. at 493.
See also Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions
and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REv. 569 (1953); Newman and Keaton, Congress and the
Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 CALIF.
L. REv. 565 (1953).
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However, this view of the effect of section 552(b)(l) may be
unduly narrow. If usual public record requirements are to be
dispensed with, an "Executive order" must be issued, and the matters exempted must be done so "specifically." No precise definition
of "Executive order" is provided in the AP A. Common language
usage and historical practice would suggest, however, that the term
"Executive order" means that the President must personally issue
or sign the command for exemption.390 This constitutes a procedural
limitation of some substance because it suggests that the final decision on this subject cannot be delegated by the President to any
other official.391
The term "specifically" may also constitute a procedural limitation of some substance because it suggests that the President must
indicate with a fair degree of particularity the precise records affecting "national defense or foreign policy" that are to be exempted
from usual public records requirements. He cannot vest unduly broad
discretion in subordinate officials by issuing an exemptive command
phrased in vague or overly general terms-leaving it to his subordinates to determine in their completely unfettered discretion what
should and what should not be exempted.892
There is yet a third reason why section 552(b)(l) does not demonstrate any congressional belief that it may impose rule-making
procedures on the executive branch in the performance of those
"military and foreign affairs functions" exclusively vested therein.
The freedom-of-information provision, and in particular section
552(b)(l) thereof, is generally worded and open ended. It may,
therefore, be applied to all sorts of "national defense and foreign
policy" matters. The provision is undoubtedly constitutional on its
face because Congress has the authority to impose procedural requirements on the Executive in his performance of many "national
390. The Federal Register, for example, clearly draws this distinction between executive orders and other regulations.
391. Of course, as noted earlier, it is understood that such an "Executive order"
requirement cannot and will not ensure personal consideration of the merits of each
order by the President if he is prepared to rely completely on the advice of his
advisers by automatically signing any order on this subject that they put before him.
392. But see EPA v. Mink, 41 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4204 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973); Epstein v.
Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affd., 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 965 (1970) (Army order, specifying certain files as "Top Secret" under general
guidelines designated by President, sufficient to exempt those files from freedom-of.
information provision pursuant to "Executive order" excluding all "Top Secret"
information from the Act's requirements). They only prove that the "specifically" requirement will be read in light of the practicalities of any situation to ensure that on
the one hand, the President is not forced to make an impossible number of individualized judgments, and, on the other hand, that he does not subvert the purpose
of the requirement of an "Executive order" "specifically" exempting certain documents
by delegating to subordinates more authority than is reasonably necessary.
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defense and foreign policy" matters. But Congress is presumably
aware that such a general statute may still be unconstitutional as
applied to any particular situation in which the Constitution vests
exclusive authority in the President.393 The theory would be that
Congress may in no way control executive conduct, substantively or
procedurally, when the Executive is exercising a power vested wholly
or exclusively in his office. A consequence of this argument would
be that when the President exercises such authority he need not
adhere to the requirements of section 552(b)(l). He need not exempt
records from the freedom-of-information provision by "Executive
order"; nor need he do so "specifically." Indeed, the President or
his designate may do so very generally, leaving it to subordinates to
decide in any particular case, without guidelines, whether an exemption is necessary or desirable.
On the other hand, even if the requirement that any exemption
from the freedom-of-information section for matters involving "national defense or foreign policy" be accomplished "specifically" and
by "Executive order" does constitute a "meaningful" procedural
limitation on the President, and even if the Congress may not generally impose procedural limitations on the Chief Executive when
he executes powers vested wholly in his office, these particular pro393. It seems clear that under his exclusive constitutional powers, the President
may assert executive privilege even as against a congressional demand for information.
"The executive has long asserted the power to withhold documents from Congress in
the name of executive secrecy, and the Congress has to some extent acknowledged this
power." Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 321-22 n.191, citing Bishop, The Exec•
utive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477
(1957); Kramer 8c Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960 (pts.
1-2), 29 GEO. WASH. L. RJ:.v. 623, 827 (1961); Younger, Congressional Investigations and
Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. PrIT. L. RJ:.v. 755, 771
(1959). See also E. CORWIN, supra note 361, at 110-16. Consider, too, the following
statement by Wallace:
As already noted, executive secrecy may be equally applicable to domestic and
foreign affairs, but it has been especially asserted with respect to the latter. Section
624(d)(7) of the Foreign Assistance Act [22 U.S.C. § 2384(i:l)(7) (1970)] requires the
delivery of certain documents and information to certain committees of Congress
or the General Accounting Office. Upon failure to do so, disbursements to the
Inspector General for Foreign Assistance-an official in the State Department-are
to cease, although the President may "personally" waive this. For fiscal year 1960,
section 533A(d) of the Mutual Security Act [of 1954, added by the Mutual Security
Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-108, § 40l(h), 73 Stat. 253], a predecessor, did not contain
this waiver authority •••• [The Attorney General said that] the section in question
was "plainly invalid" and "unconstitutional" [because it did not contain the waiver
provision]. The Attorney General implied that the involvement of foreign affairs reinforced the President's right [to withhold information]. Senator Robertson, in explaining a proposed but unsuccessful amendment to the above statutory provision
which would have permitted the President to withhold information in certain circumstances, stated: "If the President, in keeping with the well-established principle
under the Constitution of the right of the President to handle foreign policy,
decides that the disclosure of some phase of foreign policy would be against the
public interest, he can so certify, and the Congress will not be able to get the
information."
Wallace, supra, at 475-76, quoting H.R. REP. No. 818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1961).
See 41 OP. ATTY. GEN. 507 (1960).
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cedural requirements of the freedom-of-information provision are
almost certainly constitutional as applied to such exclusive presidential powers. The only requirements imposed on the Chief Executive by section 552(b)(l) are that when he seeks to resist the
imposition by Congress of any open records requirements on his
exclusive powers, the President must do so personally and with
some specificity. Since those exclusive powers are vested only in the
office of the President, it seems reasonable to require that he personally invoke their immunity from any alleged congressional interference. This is especially so since the confrontation is between
two coequal branches of the national government; a presumption
of validity attaches to this congressional action as with any other;
Congress is closer to the people in a democratic sense than is the
President; and the line delineating the zone of exclusive presidential
powers is uncertain and highly debatable at best.
On the same basis, when the President claims freedom from congressional interference on the ground that he is exercising power
vested exclusively in his office, he may reasonably be required to
indicate "specifically" that for which he claims such freedom. This
requirement would assure careful consideration by the Chief Executive as to the precise scope of the exclusive powers claimed in a
particular situation and, thereby, minimize the confrontation between the two branches. Indeed, given the serious nature of the direct
confrontation between two coequal branches, one may argue that
personal action by the President "specifically" indicating the matters
for which executive privilege is claimed is the only appropriate constitutional means for invoking the exclusivity of presidential powers
against the legislature. Of course, the particular requirements of an
"Executive order" and fair specificity are minimal procedural impositions and will in no way interfere with the President's ability to
exercise his exclusive powers expeditiously and confidentially. As a
consequence, the particular procedural requirements embodied in
section 552(b)(l) may be imposed on the President in the execution
of his exclusive powers even if such exclusive powers are otherwise
wholly free from congressional interference substantively or procedurally.
As noted, the American Bar Association proposal is to substitute
for section 553(a)(l) an exemption from the rule-making provision
couched in the same language as that found in section 552(b)(l).
Rule-making involving "military or foreign affairs functions" would
be entirely exempt from section 553 only when it is "specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy." This proposal is obviously con-
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stitutional on its face. It would certainly be constitutional as applied
to all "military and foreign affairs function" rule-making that is a
product of authority vested jointly in the President and Congress,
or solely in Congress. On the basis of previous discussion regarding
the constitutionality of section 552(b)(l) as applied to powers vested
wholly in the President, the ABA proposal would probably also be
constitutional as applied to rule-making derived from such powers.
As a result, the provision proposed by the ABA probably may
be made the exclusive means by which executive immunity based
on a need for secrecy can be properly asserted against normal rulemaking requirements. What of rule-making involving "military or
foreign affairs functions" that is a product of authority vested wholly
in the President for reasons other than a need for secrecy? May
Congress similarly designate section 553(b)(B) (and section 553(d)
(3)) as the sole and exclusive means by which executive privilege is
to be asserted for all other rule-making constitutionally exempt from
section 553 because it is a product of authority vested wholly in the
Executive? Or may the Chief Executive completely ignore section
553(b)(B) when he chooses to avoid usual rule-making procedures
based on an assertion of such constitutional immunity that is
grounded on a need, as an example, for speed alone? As noted earlier,
through a reconstitution of the term "unnecessary," section 553(b)
(B) could become an effective and desirable formally structured
means by which executive immunity from usual rule-making procedures can be asserted in cases where it is not assertable under the
proposed ABA provision.
The findings requirements and publication requirements of
section 553(b)(B) (and again, section 553(d)(3)) could be constitutional as applied to "military and foreign affairs function" rulemaking involving exclusive presidential powers, even though the
same may not be said of the usual procedures mandated by section
553(b)-(e). If this is so, it is on the same basis that the requirements
of section 552(b)(l) were deemed constitutional even as applied to
matters delegated wholly to the executive branch. Within limits,
Congress may define the means by which the President must assert
the exclusiveness of his power against a contrary claim of congressional authority under a general statute. So long as that definition
does not impair the President's ability to act as speedily and secretly
as necessary, or interfere on the merits with the invocation of his
constitutional immunity, the Executive must employ the congressionally defined means to assert effectively constitutional privilege
against a generalized legislative policy.
In support of this view it should be reiterated that Congress is
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"closer to the people than the President," and its action must be
presumed constitutional. Furthermore, the requirement of a formal
finding of executive immunity followed by publication of that conclusion and its justification along with the rules involved is a
minimal imposition on what otherwise may admittedly be the
exercise of an exclusive executive power. This minimal imposition
is also very helpful: the requirement of such a formal and public
invocation of executive privilege against an imposition by a coequal
branch of the national government may minimize legislative-executive conflicts and increase public participation in rule-making by
inducing careful consideration of the desirability and lawfulness of
a claim prior to its assertion. It also may minimize or avoid misunderstandings because the fact of the claim and its specific nature
are made clear to all.
Of course, there may be some disagreement with the above conclusion as to the constitutionality of the ABA proposal and section
553(b)(B) when applied to those cases involving exclusive executive
authority. Should the above view be in error, every provision of
section 553, including the requirements of the proposed ABA provision and section 553(b)(B), would be invalid as applied to "military
and foreign affairs function" rule-making that derives from powers
vested entirely in the President. The theory would be that all "military and foreign affairs function" rule-making vested wholly in the
President, for whatever reason, is likely to be immune from every
sort of congressional regulation, substantive or procedural, including
efforts by Congress to define the exclusive means by which executive
immunity may be asserted in such cases.
C.

Conclusion as to Congress' Power

Previous discussion demonstrates that Congress may impose the
procedures contained in section 553(b)-(e) on most rule-making involving "military or foreign affairs functions." Every requirement of
section 553(b)-(e) would certainly be valid as applied to any "military or foreign affairs function" vested exclusively in Congress, or
vested concurrently in both Congress and the President. And, of
course, the President can agree to abide by the procedures desired
by Congress when he exercises particular "military and foreign
affairs functions" delegated exclusively to him. The mere existence
of a general congressional act of this type, meant to apply to all rulemaking, including that involving these particular functions, may be
persuasive to the President in this connection.
Congress has not previously hesitated to enact general, open-
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ended statutes regulating administrative procedure that are valid on
their face merely because they might be invalid as applied in some
cases. For example, the freedom-of-information provision of the
original AP A contained no special exemption of any kind for records
involving "military or foreign affairs functions" as such, even
though that provision was probably invalid as applied to the exercise
of those functions delegated wholly to the President. No constitutional impediment seems, therefore, to stand in the way of a simple
congressional repeal of section 553(a)(l), which would result in section 553(b)-(e) becoming applicable to all "military and foreign
affairs function" rule-making. Of course, as noted, the usual rulemaking procedures contained in section 553(b)-(e) are likely to be
invalid as applied to those "military or foreign affairs functions"
vested wholly in the President; but the ABA proposed provision
and section 553(b)(B) are likely to be found valid as definitions of
the exclusive means by which the President must assert his constitutional immunity from usual rule-making procedures when exercising
powers vested wholly in his office.
Which of these functions are delegated exclusively to the President and are therefore otherwise beyond congressional control, and
which are not, may be resolved on a case-by-case basis. As noted, however, those particular "military and foreign affairs functions" whose
successful performance normally requires a special ability for speedy
or secret action are more likely than others to be deemed vested
exclusively in the Executive and beyond congressional authoritysubstantively or procedurally. Most "military or foreign affairs functions" are, however, not likely to be of this genre. Most authority in
this area is vested concurrently in both the executive and legislative
branches, or exclusively in Congress.
A large part of the rule-making undertaken by the executive
branch that clearly or colorably may involve "military or foreign
affairs functions" should be and may be subjected by Congress to
usual rule-making procedures. Presidential authority over passports,
for example, is certainly concurrent with that of Congress. Zemel
v. Rusk894 held that the Passport Act of 1926395 embodied a grant of
authority to the Executive to impose area restrictions on the right to
travel. Implicit in the case is the notion that Congress could, if it
desired, prohibit the imposition of any such area restrictions on the
issuance of passports. By analogy, is there any doubt that Congress
could require most or all rule-making involving passports to adhere
394. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
395. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1970).
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to the section 553 procedures? At present, relying on the unqualified
exemptions of section 553(a)(l), the State Department totally ignores
usual rule-making procedures when it makes policy relating to passports. Similarly, Congress and the President have, in most cases,
concurrent authority over the acquisition, use, and disposal of military property.396 The times, circumstances, and conditions under
which the public may use such military property, acquire such military property, or sell property to the armed forces, may, therefore,
be subjected by Congress to usual rule-making procedures. Yet, the
Department of Defense almost always ignores section 553 when it
makes such rules on the basis of the unqualified exemption found in
section 553(a)(l). The Constitution certainly does not compel these
results save in a small number of narrowly circumscribed situations.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

In 1970 the American Bar Association adopted a resolution to
the effect that the APA should be improved by
[bJroadening the coverage of provisions for notice and opportunity
for public participation in rule-making where formal procedures
are not required by limiting, in appropriate instances, exemptions
now included in the Administrative Procedure Act so far as it may
be done without occasioning delay or expense disproportionate to
the public interest.307

The resolution was not utopian; it realistically called for the limitation or suspension of current exemptions from section 553 only
where "it may be done without occasioning delay or expense disproportionate to the public interest."
Another critic of section 553(a)(l) has recently noted that
[i]n this era when the biggest undertaking of the federal government
is military, and when the biggest department of government is Defense, there is reason to believe that democratic procedures (of the
kind provided for in section 553] should more than ever be insisted
upon in all rulemaking or policy making [involving military functions] that does not have to be kept secret-namely, most of it.3 98
The same is true of rule-making involving "foreign affairs functions."
The need for democratic procedures of the kind found in section
553 is also especially great with regard to that sort of rule-making
because the effects of this nation's foreign affairs so dominate our
396. In regard to Congress' authority, see U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 3.
397. Comment, Current ABA Proposals for Amendment of the Administrative Pro•
cedure Act, 23 Ao. L. R.Ev. 67, 72-73 (1970).
398. R, LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND A.Il!IUNISIRATIVE LAW 104 (1969).
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whole society today, including the direction in which it moves internally, that we all have a very large stake in rule-making involving
that subject. The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
has thus concluded that
the Military Establishment is so large and its reach so universal, and
the rights of private citizens that its actions affect so numerous, that
a general exception of its rulemak.ing from any procedure requirements can no longer be justified. The same observation can be made
to a large degree with respect to the exercise of what the present act
described as foreign affairs functions-by the Department of State,
by the Treasury and by other agencies of the Federal Government
having such functions. 3 99

The Senate Committee is undoubtedly correct.
The reasons advanced to justify the current exemption from
section 553 for all rule-making involving a "military or foreign
affairs function" are insufficient. At most, those justifications dictate
the need for a more narrowly tailored exemption from usual rulemaking proceedings than is currently found in section 553(a)(l). The
existing "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" provision found in section 553(b)(B) and the "good cause"
exemption found in section 553(d)(3) provide such an exclusion
from the requirements of section 553(b)-(d). They would work an
adequate accommodation of the competing interests involved, carefully balancing the need for public participation against the need for
effective, efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive government administration. And an exemption from the right to petition conferred by
section 553(e) seems no more necessary or justifiable for subsection
(a)(l) rule-making than for rule-making already covered by section
553. When a special need for secrecy appears in cases of rule-making
involving a "military or foreign affairs function," it can adequately
be handled by section 552(b)(l). If this is not sufficient, the language
of section 552(b)(l) can be expressly carried over and incorporated
into section 553. That is the ABA proposal. It seems wise because
it will reassure the agencies involved that their legitimate needs for
secrecy will in no way be interfered with by the repeal of section
553(a)(l).
The solution proposed here to the difficulties arising from the
repeal of section 553(a)(l) is bound to put some additional burden
on the agencies that will have to implement it. But the burden involved is not likely to be very large-especially in light of the availability of narrowly tailored class exemptions-and that burden would
399. S. REP. No. 1234, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966) (a report on S. 1336 amending
the Administrative Procedure Act).
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seem clearly outweighed by the benefits obtained from the repeal
of section 553(a)(l) because it will guarantee increased public participation in rule-making of the kinds currently excluded from usual
procedures by that provision.
The proposal made in this study would only affect the section
553(a)(l) exemptions for rule-making involving "military or foreign
affairs functions.,, It would not affect, in any way, the existing section
553(a)(2) exemption for rule-making relating to "agency management or personnel." Similarly undisturbed would be the exemption
from section 553(b)-(d) of all "interpretative rules" and "general
statements of policy" found in section 553(b)(A) and section 553
(d)(2). When combined with section 553(b)(B) and the "good cause"
exemption found in section 553(d)(3), the above exemptions should
provide adequate leeway for agencies to meet their responsibilities
properly.
Several desirable consequences would flow from repeal of section
553(a)(l). It would eliminate an unqualified exemption that is
susceptible to wide application and misapplication, which may defeat
the policy of public participation in rule-making. Repeal would also
make more effective the previously proposed elimination of the
section 553(a)(2) exemption for rules relating to "public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." Even after the elimination of
these exclusions, rules relating to those subjects that also involve
"military or foreign affairs functions" will be free from usual rulemaking requirements under section 553(a)(l). Repeal of the former
exemption accompanied by repeal of subsection (a)(l) would close
this gap. It would assure that all rules relating to "public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" will clearly, and without question, be subject to the requirements of section 553, and that they will
be excused from those requirements only where particular justifications under more narrowly tailored exemptions dictate that result.
On a practical level, elimination of section 553(a)(l) would mean
that most substantive400 rules involving the acquisition and disposal
of all sorts of military property would clearly be subject to usual
advance notice and public participation requirements. This includes
substantive rules describing the terms and conditions of such acquisition or disposal and the particular circumstances under which it shall
take place. Most rules determining whether, and under what conditions, the public may utilize the property, facilities, and services of
400. The exemption for "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice"
found in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1970) should not be forgotten, It is dubious, however,
whether that exemption deserves to be continued.
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the armed forces would also be clearly subject to usual advance notice
and public participation requirements. The same may be said of
most substantive rules involving the terms and conditions upon
which persons may join the armed forces or receive loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts from the armed forces. Repeal of this exemption would also mean that usual procedures will have to be followed
in the making of substantive regulations governing such things as the
conduct of ROTC programs, the issuance of passports and visas,
and the administration of the immigration laws and foreign exchange
programs. Rules issued to control imports or exports or otherwise
involving foreign trade would also clearly be subjected to usual
procedural requirements in most cases. The same may be said for
most rules implementing the regulation of American seamen and
ships abroad and the regulation of American business abroad. Rulemaking implementing foreign aid programs would also be clearly
subjected to advance notice and public participation requirements
in most cases. The above examples are only illustrative.
A discouraging discovery made in the course of preparing this
Article is that a number of agencies opposing modification of section
553(a)(I) have apparently not re-examined their position seriously
during the past few years. Statements opposing repeal of these exemptions that were prepared as long as five or ten years ago are still used
by some agencies as the principal basis for articulating their position.
The language of a few such statements has sometimes not even been
modified to reflect subsequent changes in the law, or obvious changes
in circumstances, when they were issued in light of a new inquiry
on this subject. It is hoped that this re-examination of the exemption
can at least provoke these agencies into conducting a careful reconsideration of their position on this question. That reconsideration
should result in a realization that repeal of the exemption for rulemaking involving "military or foreign affairs functions" need not
seriously disadvantage them, in light of existing exemptions contained in other portions of section 553. The national interest must
not be compromised. Repeal of section 553(a)(l) will not do so. The
danger is that the mere involvement of "military and foreign affairs
functions" will make the matter so politically sensitive that it will
not be able to receive a fair hearing on the merits by the Congress
or the agencies that make such rules. It is to be hoped that this will
not occur.

